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The problems associated with refugees through-out the
the world are basically similar in general as they relate to
social welfare. There is a particular need for research to
be done with attention paid to the Southern African Refugees
from the Republic of South Africa i.e. Namibia and Zimbabwe.
Fortunately Zimbabwe, Formerly "Rhodesia" has expe
rienced a war of liberation. Since that momentous and his
toric event, the United Nations and interested countries,
have given assistance to former Zimbabweans are being encourged
to be self-sufficient as possible.
The only two countries in Africa who have not been
liberated, and who are still fighting their wars of liberation
are the oppressed majority-all non-white of the Republic of
South Africa and Namibia - which was formerly called by the
colonizers, South West Africa.
Refugees normally evolve as a result of political con
flict and or military onslaught and oppressive governmental
actions against a large number of the indigenous population.
This oppressed segmend, which finds the existing situations
to be unbearable usually seeks an alternative way of living.
Often times an alternative way of life cannot be achieved in
their natural homeland forcing them to adopt and adapt to a
new way of life outside their natural homeland.
Previous attempts to improve the quality of life inside
one's own country have resulted in the termination of life
itself, imprisonment or forced exile.
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This has been the case of the Southern African refugees
who since as far back as 1960 were forced to flee their coun
tries of origin and seek asylum in neigbouring countries.
This refugee population consisted of all ages, all races -
white and non-whites included, and people of diverse educa
tional and political backgrounds. The reasons for forced
emigration were multi-fold either to seek further education
abroad-free of racist ruling, either to improve the quality
of their life, and last but not least to rejoin their prefer
red political party to gain military skills which would /will
enable them to free that part of the country.
But what happened? And why the call for a call for a
social welfare system to assist the needs of Southern African
in these various host countries.
Whatever social welfare problems the refugees expe
rienced in the Southern secter of Africa, and their countries
of origin have been further complicated by the newness of the
distinct cultural differences between the country of origin
and the country of asylum. This has often resulted into a
cultural shock for the refugee. Therefore, as a result ac-
climication in the country of asylum has been delay.
Acclimization has been delayed for are or more of the
following reasons combined;
a. lack of communicative skills in the vernacular of
the present society impedes social interaction,
b. cultural and linguistic differences have hindered
the assimilation process,
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c. government clauses promoting employment of nationals
over refugees-retard refugees from seeking employ
ment and education. This has been a very major
problem for refugee self-efficiency.
Also the refugees have had some severe psychological
stress in this diasporic situation. Quoting the Information
Secretary of the Botswana Embassy in Washington, Mr. Sipho
Mpofu, some refugees found and still find the existing situation
intolerable and unbearable as quoted previously they expe
rienced in some cases language and culture differences. Their
view of life was different, the food was different, even the
way the people lived in their host countries was different.
On a more deeper level they wanted and needed accep
tance - they were frustrated trying to fit in the new society.
The host country could despise them because they are refugees.
Thus then one bears the stigma of being a refugee.
Another factor was and is that the host countries are
politically independent, and Southern Africa was not. But
during February 1980, Zimbabwe obtained its freedom and inde
pendence. The Republic of South Africa and Namibia are still
under a settler regime. These above factors have contributed
largely towards an arrogant attitude of the host countries
citizens towards the refugees.
Also because of refugee status the international com
munity was and is giving aid to the refugee population-this
is in the form of food, money and shelter to the extent
that to the indigenous population. The refugees were living
better than they did.
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Quoting from an Atlanta Constitution article of
Tuesday, April 24th,, 1978, it is stated that the refugees
in Botswana for example "are generally insulted by the local
tribesmen." They are greeted by a cold shoulder if not open
hostility,. It rankles the "natives" of Botswana that the strangers
live in comparatively comfortable camps eating meat and vege
tables and ground corn provided by the United Nations land';'warming
themselves under United Nations blankets at night.
While the United Nations spent a million dollars last year
(1978) to feed and clothe the refugees in the three camps
near the northern city of Francistown, only about 80,000 of
Botswana's 600,000 inhabitants are employed. Hunger is ram
pant in a country rich in diamonds and beef.
"In this part of the country the Botswana people are
the refugees, said J.H. Munaimati a Botswana official who helps
administer the camps near the borders of Zambia and Rhodesia.
"When they see the assistance flowing into the camps they want
it also. They became beggars."
Thus when the Soweto students of the black township in
Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa rebelled in 1976, they
escaped to bordering countries who hosted them. There students
created social upheavals which culminated into hostility be
tween the host community and the local people. Thus little
2
social interaction between refugees and host communities.
Atlanta Constitution, Tuesday, April 24th, 1979.
pp. 1-14-A.
2Quote From the Botswana Information Officer, Mr. Sipho
Mpofu - July 1980, Washinton, D.C.
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Purpose
The purpose of this study is to explore the practica
lity of developing and implementing a social welfare model
for reducing the grave problems of the necessary refugee
population in Southern Africa.
Review of Literature
There have also been the physical and psychological
sufferings of Southern Africa Refugees in the Diaspora-that
is in Africa and abroad. For example in February 6th, 1979
a former black student leader was killed by a parcel bomb in
Botswana - although the South African government denied any
involvement in the incident. In the same year, and same month
February 12, 1979, an official of the African National Congress
of South Africa was killed and two others injured by an explo
sion in -a Zambian building housing various Southern African
opposition groups.
From the mid-sixties until today, Namibians (South West
Africans) are forced to flee their countries to neighbouring
countries such as Angola, even Mozambique and Botswana. But
because of the escalating war against Angola, Botswana again
is facing another influx of refugees from Angola and
Mozambique. Even some host countries empathetic towards the
Southern African refugee situation are forced to arrest re
fugees under the cloak of "protective custody". A case in
point was May 6th, 1976, when Zambia had to arrest forty (40)
members of a dissident political party, and it was also quoted
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that more than 1,000 Namibians were imprisoned because of
3
dissident inter—party political views.
Another issue compounding the problem of acclimization
and adaption to the host country is that refugee status has
also placed the individuals in a unique social, and economic
and political situation. To be a refugee means that one is:
a. prevented and forbidden to participate in national,
economic and social programs provided by the host
country for their own citizans. Thus why the stress
in my paper is for an evolvement of a Social Wel
fare program to service the refugee population,
b. there is no one particular government responsible
and accountable for the economic, social and poli
tical flight of refugees,
c. International Agencies servicing refugees have
uncoordinated assistance with varying goals
and directives. The International Agencies parti
cipate in refugee services are mainly the Inter
national Red Cross Society; the Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees, the Lutheran World
Federation.
Since there is no government responsible for the plight
of refugees this responsibility was assumed in part by various
liberation groups (political organizations responsible for the
final freedom of their country) and they have shared such
responsibilities with the following:
a. Sympathetic governments - African and International
b. The O.A.U. (Organization of African Unity)
c. Charitable International Organizations for example
the International Red Cross, and Oxfam of Britain.
d. Religious organizations for example the Luthern
World Federation and the World Council of Churches.
From Refugees - A World Report, pp. 62-63,
"Africa" printed in 1978.
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e. International Educational Organizations, the
African American Institute of the United States,
the Phelps - Stokes Fund of the United States
and the International University Exchange Fund of
Scandanavia, namely Sweden.
Liberation groups have developed on a political basis
and have obtained most of the financial resources from sym
pathetic governments, charitable international and national
organizations. However, these resources are limited because
of the increase in the refugee population in these host coun
tries. The refugee population is more in the increase with
the revolutions of young non-white Southern Africans (witness
the last disturbances in Elsies River, Cape Town, South Africa
in May and June 1980, when in the bloodiest attack since the
Soweto rebellion four years ago.) South African riot police
killed up to sixty Blacks and wounded 200 others. This re
volt was the latest in a wave of protests and strikes that
4
have shaken South Africa since April 1980.
Coupled with the above fact is South Africa's military
invasion of Angola, and its involvement in the rebel fight-
6
ing of Mozambique.
Receptive governments are normally those who border
the South African countries, namely the former High Commission
territories of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana, including
4
From the "Militant" - June 27th, 1980. pp. 2-5. Also
Washington Post, July 11, 1980. p. 1.
From the Militant" June 18, 1980, pp. 1-3S June 27, 1980
p. 2.
From the Washington Post, July 11, 1980. p. A27.
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Zambia, Mozambique and even Angola. These countries have
experienced high levels of inflation and are not economically
independent of the Republic of South Africa with its giant
economy in comparison with other Black African countries.
This limits the amount of contributions these countries
can provide. Most of the funds servicing refugees are ob
tained from foreign governments through the UNCHR Office.
For example in the "report of the Economic and Social
Council" Assistance to South African Student Refugees-Report
to the Scretary General
"A-34-345 11 July 1979, Thirty-Fourth Session,
Item 12 of the preliminary list states in its intro
duction that in resolution 31/126 of 16 December
1976, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-
General to take immediate steps to organize and
provide emergency assistance for the care,subsistence
and education of South African student refugees
in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. A mission,
dispatched by the Secretary-General to the three
countries in February 1977, assessed the situation
and recommended a programme which inter-alia, called
for the capital expenditure of about $7 million
and recurring annual costs estimated at $1.4 million
which would provide additional education facilities
and reception/transit centers for the refugee
students in the three host countries."7
Thus by October 1979 you found the following countries
contributing to this programme. They are as follows:
7
Report of the Economic and Social Council Assistance
to South African Student Refugees Report of the Secretary-
General, p. 3. July 11, 1978.
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United Nations Educational and Training Programme for
Southern Africa - Report of the Secretary-General, October
22, 1979, pp. 3-4.
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In addition, the following pledges are/were outstand
ing:
9















In the Report on UNCHR Assistance Activities in
1978-1979, and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programs and Budget
for 1980 should be noted that a United Nations Trust Fund
for South Africa was evolved.
"The UNCHR continued to administer funds on be
half of the United Nations Trust Fund for South
Africa. An amount of $200,000.00, was made available
for the period July 1, 1978 to June 30, 1979 to
provide for living allowances, medical care, esta
blishment of assistance education, travel and other
needs of refugees from South Africa. A detailed
report on the use of the funds is submitted every
year to the trustees. The contribution supplements
assistance provided by UNCHR from general and spe
cial programmes for statistical expenditures spent
9
United Nations Educational Training Programme for
Southern Africa-Report of the Secretary-General, October 22,
1979. p.4.
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on Southern African refugees by the UNCHR and fellow
member countries."10(See Tables I-VI with expendi
tures for 1978 to actual estimates for 1979, and
projected expenditures for 1980).
As this is already 1980, the fiscal year book of
UNCHR report will possibly be out in 1981. Also included
are UNCHR expenditure reports in Botswana, Lesotho, Republic
of Tanzania, Swaziland, and Zambia.
Charitable contributions have been primarily in the form
of scholarships for advanced studies beyond high school (post
high education) and also via food and clothing, but in reality
not contributing directly to the refugees' overall problem.
What should be noted here is that the scholarship aid is
directed toward the young South African student, but there are
a number of families with young babies and these families
also need food, clothing and shelter, and also some financial
assistance.
International host and religious organizations as men
tioned before, basically provide scholarship assistance. The
shipment of food and clothes to host countries has been imple
mented by internationally known organizations, the Interna
tional Red Cross and the Lutheran World Services, Oxfam of
Britain, to name a few.
The United Nations has addressed the legal status of
the displaced persons in the form of legal documents by amend
ing that all host governments should provide legal travel
documents for refugees, and also by redefining the term refugee.
10
Report on UNCHR Assistance Activities in 1978-1979.
and Proposed Voluntary Fund Programmes and Budget for 1980
(Submitted by the High Commissioner) August 19, 1979. p. x
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Here : is an extract from the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees.
Article I
A. For the purposes of the present Convention the
term "refugee" shall apply to any persons who:
1. has been considered a refugee under the
Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928
or under the Convention of 28 October 1933
and 10 February 1938, the protocal of 14
September 1939 or the Constitution of Interna
tional Refugee Organizations' decisions of
non-eligibility taken by the International
Refugee Organization during the period of its
activities shall not prevent the status of
refugee being accorded to persons who fulfill
the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section.
2. as a result of events occurring before 1st
January 1951 and owing to well founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, reli
gion, nationality,membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable
or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to a-
vail himself of the protection of that country,
or who, not having a nationality and being out
side the country of his former habitual resi
dence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such is unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it. In
the case of a person who has more than one na
tionality the term, "the country of his nationa
lity shall mean, each of the countries of which
he is a national, and a person shall not be
deemed to be lacking the protection of his
country of his nationality if, without any valid
reason based on well founded fear, he has not
availed himself of the protection of one of the
countries of which he is national.
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B. For the purposes of this Convention, the words
'events occurring before January 1, 1951' in
Article:
1. Section A, shall be understood to mean either
a. 'events occurring in Europe before
January 1, 1951,' or
b. 'events occurring in Europe or elsewhere
before January 1, 1951', and each contract
ing state shall make a declaration at the
time of signature, ratification, or acces
sion, specifying which of these meanings
it applies for the purpose of it's obliga
tions under this Convention.
2. Any contracting state which has adopted alter
native
a. may at any time extend its obligations by
adopting alternative,
b. by means of a notification addressed to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
C. This Convention shall cease to apply to any person
falling under the terms of section A if:
1. He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the pro
tection of the country of his nationality,
2. having lost his nationality; he has voluntarily
re-acquired it,
3. he has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys
the protection of the country of his new na
tionality ,
4. he has voluntarily re-established himself in
the country which he left or outside which he
remained owing to fear of persecution,
5. he can no longer, because of the circumstances
in connection with which he has been recognized
as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue
to refuse to avail himself of the protection of
the country of his nationality, provided that
this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee
falling under section A (1) of this article who
is able to involve compelling reasons arising
out of previous persecution for refusing to
avail himself to the protection of the country
of nationality,
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6. being a person who has no nationality he is,
because the circumstances in connection with
which he has been recognized as a refugee have
ceased to exist able to return to the country
of his former habitual residence. Provided
that this paragraph shall not apply to a
refugee falling under section A (1) of this
article who is able to invoke compelling
reasons arising out of previous persecution
for refusing to avail himself to the protec
tion of the country of nationality.
D# This Convention shall not apply to persons who are
presently receiving from organs or agencies of
the United Nations other than the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees protection or when
such protection or assitance has ceased for any
reason, without the position of such person being
definitely settled in accordance with the relevant
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations. These persons shall ipso facto
be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.
E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is
recognized by the competent authorities of the
country in which he has taken residence as having
the rights and obligations which are attached
to the possession of nationality of that country.
F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply
to any person with respect to whom there are
serious reasons for considering that:
1. he has committed a crime against peace, a
war crime, or a crime against humanity as
defined in the international instruments
drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crimes,
2. he has committed a serious non-political crime
outside the country of refuge prior to his
admission to that country as a refugee, or
3. he has been guilty of acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.
General Obligations
Every refugee has duties to the country in which he
finds himself, which require in particular that he conforms
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to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken for
the maintenance of public order.
Article 7
Exemption From Reciprocity
1. Except where this Convention contains more favora
ble provisions, a contracting state shall accord
to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to
aliens generally.
2. After a period of three years' residence all
refugees shall enjoy exemption from legislative
reprocity in the territory of contracting States.
3. Each contracting state shall continue to accord to
all refugees the rights to which they were already
entitled in the absence of reciprocity, at the
date of entry into force of this Convention for that
state.
4. The contracting states shall consider favourably
the possibility of according to refugees, in the
absence of reciprocity, rights and benefits beyond
those to which they are entitled according to para
graphs 2 and 3 and to extend exemption from
reciprocity to refugees who do not fill the condi
tions provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3.
5. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 apply both
to the rights and benefits referred to in articles
13, 18, 19, 21, and 22 of this Convention and the




Each contracting state shall accord to refugees
lawfully in its territory the right to choose
their place of residence and to move freely
within its territory, subject to any applicable




1. The contracting states shall issue identity
papers to any refugee in their territory who does
not possess a valid travel document.
Article 28
Travel Documents
The contracting states shall issue to refugees
lawfully staying in their territory travel docu
ments for the purpose of travel outside their
territory unless compelling reasons of national
security or public order otherwise require, and
the provisions of the schedule to this Convention
shall apply with respect to such documents. The
contracting states may issue such a travel docu
ment to any other refugee in their territory;
they shall in particular give sympathetic consi
deration to the issue of such a travel document
to refugees in the territory who are unable
to obtain a travel document from the country of
their lawful residence.
Travel documents issued to refugees under pre
vious international agreements by parties there
to shall be recognized and treated by the con
tracting states in the same way as if they had
been issued pursuant to this article.
Article 31
Refugees Unlawfully in the Country of Refuge
1. The contracting states shall not impose penalties
on account of their illegal entry of presence,
on refugees who coming directly from a territory
where their life or freedom was threatened in
the sense of Article 1, enter or are present
in their territory without authorization, pro
vided they present themselves without delay to
the authorities and show good cause for their
illegal entrance or presence.
2. The contracting states shall not apply to the
movements of such refugee . restrictions other
than those which are necessary and such re
strictions shall only be applied until their
status in the country is regularized or they ob
tain admission into another country. The states
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shall not apply to the movements of such refu
gee restrictions other than those which are :
necessary and such restrictions shall only he
applied until their status in the country is
regularized or they obtain admission into another
country. The contracting states shall allow
such refugees a reasonable period and all the




1. The contracting states shall not expel a refu
gee lawfully in their territory save as
grounds of national security or public order.
The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance
with due process of law. Except where
compelling reasons of national security other
wise require, the refugee shall be allowed to
submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal
to and be represented for the purpose before
competent authority or a person or persons
specially designated by competent authority.
The contracting states shall allow such a refugee
a reasonable period within which to seek legal
admission into another country. The contracting
states reserve the right to apply during that
period such internal measures as they may deem
necessary.
Article 33
Prohibition of Expulsion or Return ("Refoulement")
1. No contracting state shall expell or return
("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories where his life
of freedom would be threatened on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not
however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger




1. The contracting states shall as far as possible
facilitate the assimilation and naturalization
of refugees. They shall in particular make
every effort to expedite naturalization proceed
ings and to reduce as far as possible the charges
and costs of such proceedings.
Article 35
Co-operation of the National Authorities with the United Nations
1. The contracting states undertake to co-operate
with the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency
of the United Nations which may succeed if,
in the exercise of its functions and shall in
particular facilitate its duty of supervising
the application of the provisions of this
Convention.
In order to enable the Office of the High Com
missioner or any other agency of the United
Nations which may succeed it, to make reports
to the competent organs of the United Nations,
the contracting states undertake to provide
them in the appropriate form with information
and statistical data concerning:
1. the condition of refugees. ,
2. the implementation of this Convention,
and
3. laws, regulations and decrees which are
or may hereafter be, in face relating
to refugees.
O.A.U (Organization of African Unity) Amendment
These above laws then protected the refugees of
Europe, until the O.A.U. spelled out laws governing specific
aspects of the problems of refugees in Africa. This was in
1969. The only difference(s) with the 1951 Convention of
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the United Nations was in their (a) Preamble; (b) Asylum
and (c) Co-operation of the National Authorities with the
Organization of African Unity and was witnessed by the Heads
of African States, and Governments which::wexeConce again
in alphabetical order): (1) Algeria, (2) Botswana, (3)
Burundi (A) Cameroon, (5) Central African Republic, (6) Chad,
(7) Congo/Brazzaville, (8) Congo Kinshasa, (9) Dahouroey,
(10) Equaterial Guinea, (11) Ethiopia, (12) Gabon, (13)
Gambia, (14) Ghana, (15) Guinea, (16) Ivory Coast, (17)
Kenya, (18) Lesotho, (19) Liberia, (20) Libya, (21) Madagascar,
(22) Malawi, (23) Mali, (24) Mauritania, (25) Mauritius,
(26) Morocco, (27) Niger, (28) Nigeria, (29) Lwanda, (30)
Senegal, (31) Sierra Leone, (32) Somalia, (33) Sudan, (34)
Swaziland, (35) Togo, (36) Tunisia, (37) Uganda, (38) United
Arab Republic, (39) United Republic of Tanzania, (40) Upper
Volta, and (41) Zambia.
This was done in the City of Addis Ababa, the 10th
day of September, 1969.
These were then the following conditions:
a. The Preamble read as such:
We, the Heads of State and Government assembled
in the city of Addis Ababa from 6-10 September
1969:
1. Noting with concern the constantly increasing
numbers of refugees in Africa and desirious
of finding ways and means of alleviating
their misery and suffering as well as pro
viding them with a better life and future.
2. Recognizing the need for an essentially humani
tarian approach towards solving the problem
of refugees.
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3. Aware however, that refugee problems are a
source of friction among Member States and
desirous of eliminating the source of such
discord.
4. Anxious to make a distinction between a
refugee who seeks a peaceful and normal
life and a person fleeing his country for :
the sole purpose of fomenting subversive from
outside.
5. Determined that the activities of such sub
versive elements should be discouraged in
accordance with the Declaration and the
problem of refugees adopted in Accra, Ghana
in 1965.
6. Bearing in mind that the Charter of the
United Nations and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights have affirmed the principle
that human beings shall enjoy Fundamental
rights and freedom without discrimination.
7. Recalling Resolution 3212 (XXII) of 14
December 1967 of the United Nations General
Assembly relating to the declaration on
Territorial Asylum.
8. Convinced that all the problems of our
continent must be solved in the spirit of the
Charter of the Organization of African
Unity and the African context.
9. Recognizing that the United Nations' Conven
tion of 28 July, 1951, as modified by the
protocol of 31 January 1967, constitutes
the basic and universal instrument relating
to the status of refugees and reflects the
deep concern of States for refugees and their
desire to establish common standards for
their treatment.
10. Recalling Resolutions 26 and 109 of the O.A.U,
Assemblies of Heads of State and Government,
calling upon Member States of the organiza
tion who had not already done so, to accede
to the United Nations Convention of 1951 and
to the protocol of 1967 relating to the
Status of Refugees and meanwhile to apply
their provisions to refugees in Africa.
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11. Convinced that the efficiency of the major
Convention is to solve the problem of
refugees in African Nations by the High
Commissioner for Refugees.
B. Asylum
1. Member states of the O.A.U. shall use their
best endeavours consistent with their re
spective legislations to receive refugees
and to secure the settlement of those re
fugees who, for well founded reasons, are
unable or unwilling to return to their
country of origin or nationality.
2. The grant of asylum to refugees is a peace
ful and humanitarian act and shall not be
regarded as an unfriendly act by any Member
State.
3. No person shall be subjected by a Member
State to measure such as rejection at the
frontier return or expulsion, which would
compel him to return to or remain in a ter
ritory where his life, physical integrity or
liberty would be threatened for the reasons
set out in Article 1, paragraphs 1 and 2.
4. Where a Member State finds difficulty in
continuing to grant asylum to refugees, such
Member State may appeal directly to other
Member States and through the O.A.U. and
such other Member States shall in the spirit
of African solidarity and international
co-operation take appropriate measures to
lighten the burden of the Member State
granting asylum.
5. Where a refugee has not received the right
to reside in any country of asylum, he may
be granted temporary residence in any coun
try of asylum in which he first presented
himself as a refugee pending arrangement
for his resettlement in accordance with the
preceding paragraph.
6. For reasons of security, countries of asylum
shall, as far as possible settle refugees
at a reasonable distance from the frontier
of their country of origin.
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C. Co-operation of the National Authorities with
the Organization of African Unity:
In order to enable the Administrative Secretary-
General of the Organization of African Unity to
make reports to the competent organs of the Organi
zation of African Unity, Member States undertake to
provide the Secretariat in the appropriate form
with information and statistical data requested
concerning:
a. the condition of refugees,
b. the implementation of this Convention, and
c. laws, regulations, and decrees which are,
or may hereafter be in force relating to
refugees.1 *
Although the amendment of the O.A.U. has alleviated
a psychologically stressful situation for Southern African
refugees, the overall social and economic welfare services
for refugees have not been adequated addressed or resolved
by any of the organizations or institutions which have attempt
ed to alleviate this problem.
Thus then, the rationale for study in my research is
an attempt to develop a comprehensive human service plan to
address the needs of Southern African Refugees disengaged from
their land because of internal political and economic oppres-
12
sion by white settler regimes.
The purpose of the present Southern African refugee
is a long range goal of our refugees to oneday/someday returning
to their countries of origin, and when they do return to seek
ways and means to design and develop their own resettlement
11
From an Appendix "Refugees in Southern Africa" Gary
A. Walker, Pacific Consultants, Contract Afr-C-1424 November 1978,
12
For example the white settler regimes of the former
British Empire in Zimbabwe.
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programs for the development of their country or nations as
of present in Zimbabwe Cformerly "Rhodesia) we have the pro
blem of the rehabilitation - repatriation of those refugees
who have been in a diasporic situation for as long as 20
years. Since Zimbabwe is now "free" hundreds have returned
to their native land, and there are (1) no jobs and (2) no
identified and accessible social services to take care of
their immediate needs and long range social services. Some
of them have lost their families - so who do they turn for
help? Their families or family members have been deciminated
by the former white Rhodesian forces against guerilla forces
during the liberation war years.
The rationale for this study is that the refugee
population in the diasporic situation is going to be pro
longed and protracted. The Republic of South Africa and
Nimibia are the only two (2) remaining countries to be freed
13
of white colonial settler regime in Southern Africa.
(See footnote 13). Thus once again one has to envisage
a mass migration of Southern Africans to the stabilized in
dependent states of Africa, again countries like Botswana,
Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, and Mozambique. This time with
the added influx in population from such countries as Angola,
Mozambique, even Zimbabwe and Lesotho because of the social/
13
white settler regimes in the
rule and administered by white South Africans
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political disturbances occurring there presently. For ex
ample, Botswana has lost its President, who was very instru
mental in refugee aid work; Lesotho is witnessing internal
strife with the deposition of their long time Prime Minister,
Jonathan Lebua, Mozambique and Angola are experiencing poli
tical raids from their long time enemy - the white settler
regime of the Republic of South Africa.
Methodology
This study then is to assess refugee social welfare
in the above host countries and to provide an alternative
model programs, or expand an existing model. The research
design will be descriptive research using a content analysis
methodology.
Specific objectives in my research are to develop
economic opportunities for Southern African refugees in their
diasporic situation by creating a skill portfolio by asses
sing their skills, that should coincide with the developmental
needs of the host countries.
What I have attempted to do is by conducting a question
naire to assess some of the skills our refugees have. The
demonstrative sample was small9 about 18 refugee individuals
from the Atlanta and Washington area, from Southern Africa.
I also want to illustrate what past models have done,
and what present models are attempting to do. My present
model to be utilized will be the Zimbabwean model evolved
in Zambia, whilst they were still a refugee colony. I will
show how they utilized their skills in the settlement process.
Hypothesis
The lack of a social welfare model in the refugee host
countries have resulted in the inability to respond effectively
to the human needs of the Southern African refugees.
Assumptions
1. A well planned social welfare program will focus
on the special human needs of the refugees.
2. A social welfare program will aleviate the suffering
of the refugees by planning the adjustment in an
orderly manner.
3. A social welfare program will transcend the physi
cal needs of the refugees for food and shelter




1. At this juncture I cannot discuss the present
resettlement process, as it is too early to
assess and evaluate the present situation in
Zimbabwe.
2. There will be no opportunity to get just hand
feedback from refugees or governments who admini
ster these camps.
Survey instruments utilized would include a Sample
Questionnaire distributed to a small population of South
African students (Republic of South Africa) in Atlanta and
Washington, D.C. (June-August 1980). There were two groups
utilized, a young student refugee group and a professional
group-older members who had been in the U.S. for more than
a decade. The student group were recent arrivals, arriving
during the past 5 years. In all, 18 were interviewed, unfor
tunately I could not interview the Zimbabwean compatriots,
the Namibian compatriots, or the white South African military
draft dodgers. Thus for charts utilized, I will only be able
to use non-white or interviewees.
Data Analysis - *





















Other (Please specify) Students
Total Number of Students —
18
Table II
Southern African Refugees (Republic of South Africa)


















fi ;" v From Baron F. Burnett. South African Student Exiles in
the United States. pp. 73-91, 1972.
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Table III












Southern African Refugees (Rep, of S.A.) Age and Sex



























Southern African Refugees (Rep, of S.A.) Primary employment
skills of refugee population.
Skill Categories Number Percent
Medical Profession 0
(includes M.D.S, Pharmacists 1 5.5%
Nurses)
Professional, Technical 17 94.5%
and Managerial
Clerical and Sales 0
Service 0










I will currently use the Zimbabwean model as it is
liberated Southern Africa's latest example. Zimbabwe former
ly called Rhodesia fought a protracted liberation war against
their former white settler regime for over 20 years.
During their war of liberation the Zimbabwean set up
refugee camps in neighbouring countries such as Botswana and
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Zambia, Mozambique, and the Republic of Tanzania. I will
quote the Zimbabwean refugee settlements in Zambia, Botswana,
and finally the repatriation efforts of the International
word in the 1980s.
Zimbabwean Refugee Settlement in Zambia
This refugee settlement was organized by the Zambia
Christian Refugee Service (ZCRS). It began its operation
in 1967 at the request of the government of the Republic of
Zambia in order to assist in the operation of rural refugee
settlement. It was financed by the Lutheran World Federation
in co-operation with the United Nations High Commissioner
for refugees.
Here was the breakdown of the refugee population at
the beginning of 1970 in 1979 (according to UNCHR and Refugee,
Commissions, Ministry of Home Affair in Zambia.
15












Walker, Gary, Pacific Consultants. From a Report to
the Congress of the U.S. on "The Development Needs and Oppor
tunities for Convention in Southern Africa. (U.S. Agency for
International Development," November 1978.
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In this camp the Zimbabwean refugees developed their
own projects to make themselves self-sustaining and semi-
independent. For example, in their camps they had projects
such as art workshops; garment working shops; adult literacy
classes. They also had within their camp, a normal school
system, clinics providing adult and childrens services and
a maternity clinic. They also had agricultural or farming
projects. It also had political and cultural education. The
most important is that this camp utilized the existing skills
of the Zimbabwean refugee obtained in their mother country.
It also helped evolve new skills in the refugee. This was
to enable the Zimbabwean refugee to utilize such skills when
the war of liberation was over and they could return to a
free Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwean Refugee Settlement in Botswana
By June 1980, there was a decrease in the refugee
population in Botswana. From a total of 35,000 to a total
of 382. This was due to the repatriation of Zimbabweans
refugees back to independent Zimbabwe.
How did Botswana take care of the refugees from
Zimbabwe. What modelCs) did she adopt?
First of all in the early stages of their migration
in the early 1960's, the refugees from Zimbabwe were repre
sented by their political leaders who had already paved a way
in the host country to receive their respective refugees.
For example political parties such as ZANU (Zimbabwe African
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National Union/would have a representative in Botswana, who
would receive the members of their political party. Shelter
was already there in the form of a "political party house."
Perhaps there were plans to transport them abroad for post-
high education or military training.
With the advent of an escalating liberation war in
Zimbabwe there was an increase in the refugee population com
ing into Botswana. This refugee population were placed in
refugee camps based on political affiliation, or political
party membership.
Thus in Francistown, Botswana there were:
a. the Francistown Refugee camp which was administer
ed by ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union),
b. Selebe Pikwe Camp - ZAPU administered,
c. Dukwe Camp - ZAPU administered,
d. Gaberone Refugee Camp (United Nations administered)
These camps were autonamous and self maintained.
These camps were sometimes' seperated because of sex gender.
For example, the Francistown camp in Botswana was a male camp
with few females and children. The Dukwe camp was mainly
for women, with a few men.
The refugee camps in Botswana also had their parti
cular functions. At the Francistown camp refugees developed
their own projects. For example, art. work, a shoe making
shop, a tailoring shop. There was also a clinic run by the
International Red Cross. There were also educational programs.
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in february 1979 the refugees in this camp started to develop
projects on a short term and long term basis.
At the Selebi Pikwe camp the function was different.
This was a semi settlement camp and for shelter they had to
use tents. It was a semi-settlement camp for easy flight when
attacked by the white Rhosesian and white South African armies.
This camp had:
a. an adult literacy project,
b. a normal school system,
c. garment making shops,
d. child clinic,
e. farming projects,
f. educational projects for political and cultural
education, and
g. skills bank to tap the existing technical and
professional skills of the refugees.
The Dukwe Refugee Camp was mainly for women, but there
were a few men. Emphasis here was on;
a. agriculture,
b. handicrafts,
c. a clinic for treating all types of illnesses,
d. a maternity clinic run by the International Red Cross
e. a formal school system-preschool, primary and
secondary (high school in the U.S.),
f. recreation hall,
g. a bakery, and
h. a grocery shop.
The Gaberone camp (United Nations run) was merely a
resident camp with a mixture of all Southern Africans, that is
Azanians, Namibians, and Zimbabweans.
In order to service their refugee population, Botswana
was aided by the BCR (Botswana Council for Refugees), the






b. A Social Worker
c. A Political Party Leader responsible for discipline
of party members and political organizational
structure.
d. International organizations provided extra staff
eg. nurses, welfare officials, and doctors.
e. The Botswana government provided the school system,
and organized other types of vocational training
eg. handicrafts, infact it was the government of
Botswana that was responsible for the co-ordination
of all these camps.
In the 1980's Botswana has now to deal with refugees
from Azania (mainly Soweto), Malawi, Lesotho, Mozambique, and
Angola. What the Botswana government is doing, is to build
another refugee camp north of Gaberone called "Mosetsana".
This refugee camp will service the remaining refugee popula
tion by building villages for them. For example, there will
be villages for the Angolans, Azanians, Basotho., Malawians,
16
and Mozambiguecans.
Repartriation of Zimbabwean Refugees Back to Independent
Zimbabwe, Starting February 1980
At the request of the present government of Zimbabwe
under President Robert Mugabe, the Secretary-General of the
16From Mr. Mpofu-Chief Information Officer, Embassy of
Botswana, July 1980, and Mrs. Tenjiwe Lesabe, Youth Services
Co-ordinator (ZAPU) February 1979.
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United Nations had asked the United Nations High Commissioner
for refugees to co-ordinate for an initial period of humani
tarian assistance programme for repatriates and displaced
persons inside Zimbabwe. The estimated cost in volved was
$110 million, and about 114,000 tons of food necessary for
the persons concerned until the next April harvest of
April 1981.17
It is too early in 1980 tcfvaluate the suceess of
the repratiation project.
Presentation of Results
In conclusion, to develop a social welfare program for
refugees from Southern Africa in their various host countries
will prove to be quite difficult. Refugees are already been
serviced by various ways and means. The Appendixes attached
especially from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees will exemplify the types of services rendered-
whether on a short term or long term basis. The United
Nations, and International and host organizations have essen
tially two types of aid,
a. Educational by granting scholarship aid to
the student refugees.
b. by the African host countries, encouragement of
settling for this interim period.
Therefore, what should be noted is the different stages of
From UNCHR - News from the United Nations High Commis
sioner for Refugees. No. 2, June/July 1980.
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Food, clothes, shelter and
financial assistance (usually
a monthly stipend),
To the environment of the host
country - this is not a perma
nent basis. It has to be noted
and accepted that the Southern
African Refugees in the camps
of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland,
Tanzania, and Zambia is not to
stay permanently. The goal is
to finally go back to a free
Southern Africa.
This has been discussed before.
Resettlement is usually in
chosen areas where the refugees
can develop and utilize their
skills. This is also not oh a
permanent basis. The long
range plan is to return to their
country of origin when it has
been "liberated."
A. Repartriation or Return
At present this cannot be evaluated. My main examples
were the Zimbabweans and currently it is too early to assess
the success of resettlement.
Historically the examples of Angola, Mozambique show
us that these countries are experiencing economic difficulties
because of the presence of economic, military superior white
South Africa - which is aided by the western imperalistic
powers to deliberately improverish these newly independent




The Southern African refugee problem is going to be a
long and protracted one. But there should be optimism, Gary
Walker in his "Report to the Congress" on Development Needs
and Opportunities for Co-operation in Southern Africa presents
the following:
1. The U.S. Congress and other concerned countries
should develop a tetailed comparative analysis
of the performance of various bi-lateral and
multi-lateral channels of assistance on a cost
effective basis. The strenths and weaknesses of
the UNCHR (United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees),the 1CRC (International Committee of
the Red Cross), UNICEF (United Nations Internation
al Child and Educational Fund) and the church World
Service, USAID (United States Agency for Internation
al Development) and other organizations and bureaus
could be examined and recommendations made with
respect to the most effective vehicle for which
types of assistance and at what cost.
2. The peripheral role played by the O.A.U. and its
Bureau for the placement and education of African
refugees should be assessed in detail and recom
mendations made which would either strengthen these
institutions on this field or explain why they are
not able or willing to be more active.
3. Institution building in host countries could be
assessed. How might assistance be targeted to
strenthen the capacity of legal organizations to
cope with the refugee problems in their own country?
A number of asylum states in the region have local
Red Cross societies, Boy Scouts, Brigades with
various functions and committees whose responsibility
is to deal with refugee problems. What institutional
staffing, organizational and other constraints might
be lessened with what type and volume of assistance.
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4. Examine host government readiness to cope with
sudden influxes in terms of their planning and
organizing ability. Could a "Disaster Relief"
office be set up or strengthened in a appropriate
ministry to encourage continuous planning for
certain agencies and the preparation of occasional
reports assessing the country's state of readiness,
5. Greater examination of the interaction between
refugees and host nationals under varying circum
stances could yield valuable information. How
much resentment actually exists among local people
towards refugees who receive international assis
tance? Are there additional ways to integrate
refugee and non-refugee aid? What are the ecomic
and socio-logical implications of "spontaneous"
settlement of refugees in border villages?
6. An opinion survey and census among refugees could
be extremely instructive. A survey could provide
some objective indicaters of refugees' perceived
needs and provide a clearer understanding of how
much the refugee views his/her status, the host
country, donor officials, etc. It could als-o
double as a skills inventory and provide better
data on which donor agencies could base their bud
gets and target vocational and other training
programs.
7. There should be an. indepth study of the white
South African military refugees - why are they
deserting? And what contribution can they make
to the present Southern African war of
liberation.?18
In the final analysis it will be necessary to actual
ly conduct this survey in Africa (Botswana; Lesotho;
Swaziland; and Zambia) in order to objectively confine the
various need dimension.
18
From Refugees in Southern Africa. Gary A. Walker,
Pacific Consultants. Contract Afr-C-1424. November 1975.
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APPENDIXES
Definition of Terms arid Phrases
Potholm (1, pp. 86-90) identified six types of refugees
as follows:
1. The classical refugee (largely agrarian and
fleeing conflict cases),
2. Adaptive refugees (a classical refugee who may
come to prefer the host country or have been a
de facto immigrant originally).
3. An upwardly mobile refugee (one who comes to the
host country ostensibly for political reasons
but is actually seeking a new life or better
opportunity).
4. The vagabard refugee ("those who want neither
work nor opportunity, citizenship or repatriation,
but simply wish to see the world). Potholm states
that many of these refugees develop skills in
picking donor agencies which will respond to their
needs.
5. Mentally disturbed refugees (those who were mental
ly disturbed in their home countries and those who
become disturbed through being a refugee). And
finally
6. The infiltrator refugee (defined as the by product
of international intrigue and continued which mino
rity domination in Southern Africa and the existence
of repressive governments elsewhere). Potholm
points out that South African and Southern Rhodesian
agents have attempted to go abroad under the guise
of refugees in order to infiltrate MMS and
refugee settlements.
7. White South African Military Refugees - Young white
South Africans who have fled or are fleeing the
white South African army that is waging a war on
Namibia - and before its independence - Zimbabwe.
These white South Africans refused to be drafted and
to participate in white South Africa's military
onslaught on Namibia. They are opting out to go
to outside countries - mainly England, America and
Australia. The interesting fact about these "white
military refugees" is that they get instant refugee
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status whereas the original non-white or bla,ck South
Africans had to undergo numerious pressures before
they were granted refugee status. United Nations
adopted a resolution for military draft dodgers
to be accepted as refugees.
AAC All African Conference of Churches
AAI African American Institute
ACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative
and Budgetry Questions
ACC Administrative Committee on Co-ordination
ANC African National Congress
BPEAR Bureau for Placement and Education of
African Refugees
ECA Economic Commission for Africa
ICMC International Catholic Migration Services
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IRC International Rescue Committee
IUEF International University Exchange Fund
LWF Lutheran World Federation
OAU Organization of African Unity
PAC Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
PF/ZANU Patriotic Front/Zimbabwe African National
Union
PF/ZAPU Patriotic Front/Zimbabwe African Peoples
Union
SWAPO South West Africa's Peoples Organization
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNESCO United Nations Educations, Scientific
and Cultural Organization
UNETPSA United Nations Education and Training
Program for Southern Africa
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UNV United Nations Volunteers. Program
WCC World Council of Churches
WFP World Food Program
WHO World Health Organization
ZCRS Zambia Christian Refugee Service
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African Blacks
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Humanitarian Assistance for the
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High Commissioner for Refugees
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EDUCATIONAL AUD TRAINING PROGRAMME
FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Hduealionul and Training Programs, 'm Suiiihoin Alrica
lias been in operation lor fij'hl years. The number of lei! .vslups and irainim.'.
awards which the l'io;',r;imine has awarded ha, grown li.nu i ■■ 4 hi il'i>X to 744
in 1971 to 1,131 in I c>~;3, and at the present time as a u -,'i,i ..,i'i !•,..• concern and
generosity of Mcmbei Stales of llic United Vilions, 1.' n:i\>: pr.ple are en
joying training •ni'l cducauonal opporluniiii1. which wmid* . (In:! a jsl- have been
denied them Ihrr participants in llic Program Mil- include y.:i>:i(r people liorn An
gola, (.'ape V ei-.i». Guinea-Bissau. Mo7ambk|ii_-. Namibia. Sao I onie and Principe,
South Africa aiul Southern Rhodesia. Al tlir- time 35 Sialc from all regions of
the world are making linancial contribution, in the Pr»,g';inmr totalling S I .^
million, in addition, another ?A) States havr •ilered assislai.ce in kind, namely
scholarships 101 tiaininp in their own coimlue-. Situ'laiiv, "\ pical imi'oitaiK'e
arc the cnnirihutions to the well-being ol iiic students lung niadc by those
countnes which are host to large numbers of students.
The Ge-ner-ii Assembly at its 29th session reader! Mi.it, ii view of ihe dimen
sions whii h the Programme had achieved, il would he timer, to request ihe Ad-
visoiy Con in lit tee for the Programme (com pi ised of tcpresenf.i lives tiom Canada,
Denmark, :he United Republic of Tanzania, lr.dia, Venezifla. Zare and Zambia,
and oi which 1 have the honour to serve as (Haiimani to undertake in consulta
tion with !!!■■ Secretary-General an evalualii :. of Ihe I'lui;•mine's acinevemenis
and the way .111J means of its further d.-VLliiinnit. 1 h,s e-. • luadon exercise was
earned out in the early part of 1975. Its am< lusion.s, '.-iidoi A-d by the Cicnetal
Assembly al ;!s 30th session, underlined in pan cnlat llic I k.i hal Jhe Programme
has been a significant hih! worthwhile huiua, tarrin elfoji i>y the international
communily and that a continuation and c ; .insion ol 1 hi- Piogiammc was ile-
sirable at this ;:lage lo meel the inci eased nee is arising limn iccenl devclopmenis
in the lei litoi ies concerned. To this end, « In.■• expiessinu sin> ere appii'ciaiion to
those governments which have ol iered : oniri'iiions o' v;:i y-g naluiev .it under
lined I he ii!-ed lor continuing and even 1110: c ..■'ic-riius ciMiirii-niion-. I would not
mean to imply here that the Programme must 01 should expand indefinitely, hut
rather to suggest that at this key time, assuming even modest further growth,
the costs ol supporting some 1,375 students to the conclusion of tiieii training
programmes will require continuing efforts on the part of all concerned govern
ments.
inply . •> .;






nunu' is a humanitarian effort in which the United Na-
ii, i that in (lie years to come it will become increas-
■ : ii hu>; proven to be in preparing young people 10
,<> -.I their respective countries us they become inde-
i. ■ achieved. I with to thank, the Member Slates, the
(v vlio have ilenionstrated and who will continue to
i a-l<I support for the young people of southern Africa,
ri-c '.vhich 1 trust will be one of promise, hope and
ILL:. Dr. Saul 1\ Rae.
hi Representative of Canada to the United Nations and
my Cuinmiltee on the United Nations Educational and
























. . Mi •■i'ci! in Alrica, international concern for the educa
■■■ ■■ ' •■ ■ ■■' people living under colonial and white minority r<<-
■■ " '■'' ■ well as those who had fled from these areas, led to
>,i ■>' ' ; i • ■ : dikvlionjlTraining Programme for South West \lrica*
■■■: .< ••.' ! !•'. ih i-.i-i'i'lishnient of educational programmes tor the lern-
c I'-n ::■■;.■ •-. Administration (1962) and for South Africa (|9(>5).
■ ' - •'"■ ■' -ri n }'->hh, the General Assembly requested Ihe Secretary-
! < n ,ni: i'-. ■! wuh the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Diree-
. •! I \i -• <> :ii'; ue.ids of other appropriate agencies and oigan<:, as
l• !i" i . •'•i.relary General of the Organization ol African Unity
.:•.'.".' > ■■ .; -: mi ol consolidating and integrating these llure exist ■
:'■■'..• ■•■■ -. j':->>'i'oie the develiipmeni and expansion ot assistance
i.'-'i ill '■ Cniied Nations lvducalional and Training rrogramme
.11 : '■ ' xi ii'^A), which consolidated these three pronrammes.
'• ■■ ■ 'l| i!h-. new Programme also extended assistance for the
■ ■ '-."'■i i:' i ' ■ '< -'If .imis.
-;. • .. '■ '■'■■■■■• I'ii'grammc, as of its predecessors, has been lo edu
-.iiii ,-i::. ■■■■: ;■ iviir- as possible from the countries concerned, thereby
h-.-m n.' ? iriu ip.ne 1'illy in the political, economic and social lite ot
ini:s.
ojtraninii' i,. tin inn-d by annual voluntary contributions and has grown
Iv veai S;:ice the beginning of 1968 total contributions to the Pro-
j\:- c-U'..-.li■■! %H,(100,000. A number of governments have also offeied
for stud, in iheir own countries under the Programme.
•Later called Namibia
Policy
Scholarships are awarded for academic, professional and vocational studies
outside the territories concerned. The general policy of ilie Programme empha
sizes the granting of awards in educational aim naming him it<:\ ions in I In- African
continent. However, scholarships are awarded u> well-qu>dilV. d students for high
level study and training outside Africa in casts, for instance, where facilities for
the required studies are not available or are inadequate in Alrica.
Most awards are for studies up to the first university, degree'. In recent years,
however, there has been a marked increase in the number of awards for graduate
degrees.
Assistance under ihe Programme
Assistance under the Programme is granted in the form of individual annual
scholarships tenable at established secondary schools,* universities and advanced
technical and vocational courses.
Decisions on scholarships (granted on annual basis) are made by a Selection
Panel of Secretariat officials at Headquarters on the recommendation of United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) offices. Before making new grants,
however, priority is given to extending previous awards made under the Pro
gramme, provided the applicant has maintained a salisfactmy record. To date,
no candidate who has met that standard has had his award terminated before
completion of the course for which the award was originally made.
As the anticipated total amount of voluntary contributions is usually known
by the end of March in any given year, funds are allocated at th.it time for re
newals and lor new awards, livery effort is made to ensure that new awards are
fairly distributed among eligible groups.
On several occasions, the Programme has been called upon to assist in emer
gency situations.
For example, in 1973, about one hundred black students at the University of
Rhodesia were expelled, many of them fleeing to neighbouring countries. The
Programme received applications from those students who were in urgent need
of sponsorship to complete their interrupted university studies A number of
these students were directly sponsored under the Programme loi completion of
their degrees in African universities. Through ellorls ol othei sponsoiing organi
zations, practically all of the group of expelled students weie able to complete
their university degree programmes.
In 1975, at the request of the United Nations Commissioner lor Namibia and
in co-operation with the United Nations High Coinmissioiici for Refugees, the
Programme arranged scholarships for a number of young Nanubians who had
recently arrived in Zambia from Namibia and were in need ol secondary educa
tion. As of March 1976, 81 of this group of Namibians had been placed in
secondary institutions in the Congo, Ghana, Nigeria and Mauritius.
♦According to an agreement concluded in 1970, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNIICR) contributes towards the education of bona fide refugees from southern
Africa up to the first level of secondary school while the Programme concentrates on pro













i- /laniing of scholarships, the Programme- when not in a
■■.. :n uii'.oil for the referral of applications of well-qualified
i'i .• mi/aiions granting educational assistance to southern
iin.- Programme considers applications referred to it by other
sponsoring oii'anr/aiions. Thus, through co-operative measures such as these, an
additional nuiubei of ikseiving candidates have been able to obtain educational
assistance
Tin- u'-opcriiuiii iu-iween (he Programme and other sponsoring organizations
has been pai Ik ulai i\ i ■■ m-Ik i.ii in the standardization of allowances for sponsoied
students and tne icini ; : iii.-ip:ition in refugee counselling services.
l:'ligihiliiy it'/ iiwisi.i
National* I'lum S
gees I':imi ill'.1 • t.-I'
tance is ;i|';o I i.'ini' ^
zambique .(..uin..'ab
will coniiiiu^ lu hi-
entry mlo lull opera
Fund Ioi Namibia.
16 and 3?. .lilhotii'h
tional IKll'i: '
In «.U-t id mi)
Selection I' nu





origin \o .o lo
n iii \ i: i._-;i, Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, as well as refu
ll '::i--.. jie eligible for awards under the Programme. Assis
i.nJril foi a tiansilional period to nationals of Angola, Mo
s. m , (.'ape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe. Namibians
enable for assistance through the Programme pending the
tion ot ihe comprehensive programme of the United Nations
Aw aids -.ire normally given to candidates between the ages of
'Uii'lidaii's above this age group may be considered in special
i l!v it the courses envisaged are of a short term or voca
ooiild be awarded scholarships under the Programme, the
i1. ihr applicants'academic qualifications and certificates,
•' ii:: and other relevant information received Irom educa
i ,'.I>P oil ices, etc. The Panel also takes into consideration
.',. i needs of countries about to attain independence and the
•<•■■ i an.lidaie. Understandably, preference is given to candi
i.i1 a willingness evenlually lo return to their countries of
iii"ie lo the development ot theii countries.
Scope u) hit- J'uih:
I he opei.ilion.il
up ol annual vi .lun
Total mi ome ol I 'u
to :t.s,:V'!i i ;•> iv
■o,h, oi i he Programme are financed front a trust fund made
.ii>. i 'inn ibuhons from Stales, organizations and individuals
Imi-.i lund since I January I'ifiK, from all sources, amounted
■I M.inh l')7(i. Voluntary coniribulions from 35 Slates in
ll>75 loi.iH'-d :l I"1'I.')' conipaied wilh $?58,.'03 from II Stales dining the
lirsl year of ibe l'm"i rnnie's operation
In view ol the uuiease in contributions and pledges, and the greatly increased
demand from quulilied applicants, the Programme in 1975 was assisting more
than three times as many students as in 1968*
Of the 1 ..V/s scholarship holders during the Programme's operation in 1974/
1975, 3X'i cam. irom Southern Rhodesia, 369 from South Africa, 308 from
Angola, 157 from Namibia, 68 from Mozambique, 41 from Guinea-Bissau. 28
from Cape Verde ami IS from Sao Tome and Principe. They pursued their
studies in'It) countries, with Ihe majority, representing about 70 per cent, attend
ing institutions in Afri-.a.
•Awards under Ihe 1'iogr.imim: from 1968 to 1975.
Future of the Programme
During the last two years, the political situation in southern Africa has changed
dramatically. In Angola and Mozambique, for example, Ihe system of education
before independence was woefully inadequate and there was a grave exodus of
skilled personnel, including many teachers. To enable these newly independent
countries to embark on their own development course, the need for massive as
sistance programmes has been recognized in order to strengthen their educational
systems and to provide crash courses for their returning cadres in the technical
and professional services.
For those other countries and territories in southern Africa which have not
yet attained independence or majority rule, the same reasons for which the inter
national community established the Educational and Training Programme are
ever more compelling today, especially in view of the hastening pace of politi
cal change in southern Africa.
As far as the Programme itself is concerned, on the whole there has been
measurable improvement in recent years with regard lo the academic qualifica
tions of applicants, the performance of the scholarship holders and the level of
degrees obtained. There can be no doubt that the Programme has proved a sig
nificant and worth-while effort by the international community in assisting per
sons who hitherto had been deprived of equal opportunities for education and
training. In effect, the very success of the Programme to dale has cieuted a sit
uation whereby the increasing need for scholarships by qualified students has
proven greater than available resources. This situation has men heightened due
to the needs of the newly-independent countries, the ineiease in post-graduate
awards and the substantial rise in tuition anil related lee1, as well as Ihe cost
of living, in many countries
Therefore, in order to maintain the necessary expansion of Ihe Programme
to meet current needs, even more generous contributions on Ihe pail of the
international community will be required in the coming \eai Annex II mdicales
the number of students by nationality (total 1375) a.si:.led mulct the Pio-
gramme during 1974/1975. Many of these scholarships ueie in respim.se to
urgent requests for educational assistance during a period ot tapiil political change
in southern Africa. However, the rising costs of scholaclups due to worldwide
inflation and the level of contributions in I'176 have picvruteil the I'loi'ianime
from increasing its activities, especially the gianling of ncv a .ink.
It is hoped that the level of contributions in the I'mm<• vill not only offset
the rising costs of individual scholarships due to inflation but will also enable
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meetings of the Advisory Committee at United Nations
.ii upciaiion is maintained between the Committee and.the
I-, pci t.iiiimii to the development ol llu- Programme.
r, a p-.:..\ioi is in charge ol llu- ov.-iall .ulmmi.iraiion of the
[vi iii 'a.il u-.piiiisibihties being can'ied out by the United Na-
l.-.i,ni. ,i Co-operation (OTC). Away from lle.ulquarleis the
.-u'-'i-in.cni Programme'UN DP) office:-, in the liehl particularly
I i.ii'i-.-, ilie United Nations Office m '.leueva, assist in the ad-
■ I . :■• uii-.r...- :n t'.ieir respective areas.
iii:,. ■ .uiiiiimsteied mainly by personnel ot existing United
.* .i.!: ;,.initiative costs aic minini.il, and voluntary contributions
I .-iiiiii-is in the form of schol.nships fui the direct benefit of
those foi w litmii I'n I". i>i'i niimc was established.
In Kcny.i .iiul I iiiinpia. however, the day-to-day administration of awards
planted umlei ihe PiogKMiimc lias been transferred lo a joint relugee counselling
•.eivici1 ih.iuvh iiii ,ip i.itioii of the Programme continues to be supervised by
(he UNDP 1;,-mA'!i! t-!epie.-.cui:itives in those countries.
In the . . '.i'....!i .•! ihc Pio/iainnie, close co-opetation is maintained with the
'. :M>P .-sp. .i'i', ..: H:i lu-ld level, anil with the United Nations High Commis
sioner l.>i is.'iin'n-- iCXHCR). Liaison is also maintained with the specialized
..■.;ei,cie-. n. :he In.'e.i Nations; the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
pariicul.ii!> i\!ih us li'ireaii for the Placement and l.ilucaiion of African Refu
gees; as .'.el! ...-, ..in: i.ilier agencies assisting refugees oi exiles from southern
Afiica, :u-'!.r i> i!' Inlei national University 1 xchange 1-iind (HJliF) and the
( oniinoiiv. .-.ill h >.. .nl.ii iiit
ANNEX 1
\ITI 1( \ I IONS AND AWARDS, 1970/71 TO 1974/75
Total
Applicator.-;





























•The r.iiii:i:.U'.v :•. >-.n.ij).-'.i-il ul represent.iiives ol Canada, Denmark, India, the United Re-
[Hi'uli., u! 1 ,u-..-..iii:i, \ LiiLviiel.i, Z.;irc and Zambia. Representatives of the United Nations
Council lor N;.mil ..i, the Spi-ciaf Committee against Apartlu-iil, and the organization of
Ahi.an I'riuy i-.u ti^ipai.- a% observers in the work ol" the Committee.
ANNLX II


















































































































































































♦Balance of 1973 pledge, $66,887, paid in 1974.
ANNEX III
( ONI K1IHH IONS BY GOVERNMENTS - 1968-197S
(continued)
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!,.vVi.(.9O 645,879 811,168 007,472 1,166,467 1,499,797
APPENDIX III
Dedicated to the cause of the people— no good cause shall lack a champion and evil shall not
Vol LXXXI No. 24 Norfolk, Virginia Wednesday June 11,
By Derek T. Dingle
NORFOLK-Many say man's
inhumanity to man makes thousands
weep. But for some, like Monica
Moorehead, human suffering
procreates anger.
The 28-year-old educator of the
Tidewater area manifests this anger
constructively in an attempt to
obliterate oppression and imperialism
home and abroad. The vehicle that
Miss Moorehead has utilized in her
jSJSJ is the World Workers Party
The WWP is a left-wing
organization opposed to neo-
colonalism and suppression of the
lower class and advocates the
socialization of business and industry.
The WWP's inception came during
their involvement in the Congolese
struggle against Belgium's im
perialism in 1961. Since then, the
group has been a moving force in
other international revolutions.
Miss Moorehead, who has been
active within the group • since her
graduation from Hampton Institute
in 1974, has currently been involved
in the South African liberation
movement. She says the conditions in
which blacks have to live in the
country are unbearable due to the
system of apartheid (separation of the
races).
According to Miss Mooorehead,
the South African government has
divided the educational funds by race.
From 1978 to 1979, the South African
government has spent approximately
$900 dollars per white child, $440
dollars per Indian child, $281 dollars
per coloured (mixed) child, and $89
dollars per black child.
In addition to an inadequate
education, 40 percent of the total
black population live in bantustans,
which are South African con
centration camps. An estimated
100,000 blacks a year have been
forced by the South African police to
mine gold and coal for the country in
such camps.
As for black women in the country,
they are also designated to go to
bantustans on a notice of 72 hours or
less. Black women are compelled to
work in textile and food processing
plants, where they are paid slave
wages.
Miss Moorehead said that all these
problems that plague blacks are
devised under the apartheid system,
which exchanges decency for
monetary gain.'
"Apartheid is the highest form of
racism. It is propped up by a world
system that puts profit before
everything else," she said.
Last month, the incensed teacher
got her chance to voice her views on
the apartheid system as a
representative for the WWP at the
Conference on Women Under
Miss Monica Moorehead
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of blacks in Sc>ai,
security at hundreds of potential indus
trial targets and legislation ment that
obliges owners of industrial "key points"
designated by the Government to take
adequate steps to protect them. The new
law, with a maximum fine of $26,000, also
prohibited press reports of guerrilla at
tacks on strategic targets without prior
Government approval.
But the Government's immediate
worry was the Soweto anniversary cou
pled this year with a decision by militant
black groups to make June 15 Biko Day in
memory of Stephen Biko, the young black
activist who died of brain injuries in a
Pretoria prison in 1977. Police Minister
Louis le Grange contended that black
militants were planning to use the cere
monies to broaden existing unrest, which
has taken fewer than 10 lives.
Proclamation Is Appealed
The proclamation on gatherings out
lawed the kind of meetings in churches
that have marked the June 16 anniver
sary for the last three years in Soweto
and elsewhere. The meetings have at
tracted as many as 10,000 blacks to a sin
gle church in Soweto and have taken on
the appearance of political rallies, with
anti-Government speeches by politica
and religious leaders.
The principal commemorative gather
ings in Soweto this year were to have
been held at the Regina Mundi Catholic
church and were to have included
speeches by Bishop Desmond Tutu, gen
eral secretary of the South African Coun
cil of Churches, and Dr. Nthato Motlana,
unofficial leader of Soweto's one million
residents. Bishop Tutu, a figure of grow
ing importance in the black resistance
movement, telephoned the Justice Minis
ter Schlebusch, yesterday in an effort to
have the proclamation repealed.
The Bishop said later that he had asked
Mr. Schlebusch to accept the genuine de
sire of blacks to mourn the dead in the
1976 upheaval. He said he told the minis
ter that the country's 19 million blacks
were as offended by the ban as Afrikan
ers, the ruling whites, would be if a future
black government forbade commemora
tion of the Day of the Covenant, the anni
versary of the victory of the Afrikaners
over the Zulus at the Battle of Blood
Riveron Dec. 16,1838.
March Also Broken Up
Mr. Schlebusch was unyielding, and
Bishop Tutu urged blacks to stay at home
and avoid clashes with the police. "Si
lence can also be a protest," he said.
However, crowds of up to 400 blacks gath
ered outside the Regina Mundi as sthe
The goveiHRenl piouauiution, re
ported the New York Times, "was the
most severe restriction on political
activity in nearly 200 years."
Despite the ban, a reported 400
Blacks showed up at a church in
Soweto June 15. They were barred by
police. When some regrouped and tried
to march to another church, cops fired
tear gas and beat demonstrators.
On June 16, protesters again defied
the proclamation in several areas. This
time police opened fire in Soweto,
Bloemfpntein, and Noordgezicht, a
had claimed tne economic ooycott naa
failed.
In Cape Town, the absentee rate was
reported as high as 75 percent, with
fewer than 10 percent of 50,000 textile
workers reporting to work. Thousands
of stevedores stayed away from the
docks.
The authorities closed six teachers'
colleges in the area because of the
protests.
Facts on the number of killed and
wounded in the June 17 and 18 police
attacks are available only from "offi-
press Dan wui conunue inueiuuusiy.
The upsurge began in April when
Coloured students initiated a boycott
to protest the apartheid regime's sys
tem of segregated and unequal educa
tion.
Hit by high inflation and declining
standards of living, Black workers
moved into action in May. Thousands
of textile workers in Durban struck the
Frametex Company. Management re
sponded by firing 6,000 strikers and
calling in armed police.
The government's i^^mse to the
latest uprising is an escalation of vio
lence.
But the fact that the revolt is deep
ening in the face of this repression is
tribute to the fighting spirit and deter
mination of the Black majority of
South Africa.
"I am giving you five minutes to
disperse," a top police officer ordered a
group of protesters June 16.
A Black youth stood directly in front
of him and said, "It's our country, not
the government's countryw"
The new Zimbabwean government,
in face of a continuing wave of strikes,
announced on May 28 that it would .
soon establish a national minimum
wage to cover the country's approxi
mately one million Black workers.
At a news conference in Salisbury,
Labour Minister Kumbirai Kangai
said that Parliament would enact a
minimum wage law on July 1,, setting
minimum monthly wages of US$108
for industrial workers and US$46 for
domestic workers and agricultural la
borers.
Since Black wages had been kept
extremely low under the previous white
supremacist regime of Ian Smith, this
minimum wage law will require em
ployers to grant substantial wage in
creases, in some sectors doubling the
workers' current pay.
Kangai's announcement followed
three months of labor unrest that has
swept the county, drawing in tens of
thousands of Black workers in more
than 100 strikes, most of them for
higher pay.
The strike wave began shortly after
Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African
National Union (ZANU) won a sweep
ing victory in the elections held in late
February, defeating the candidates
favored by the white settlers and the
British and South African govern
ments. The country gained its formal
independence on April 18, with Mu
gabe becoming the first Black prime
minister.
ZANU*8 electoral victory and the
attainment of independence after years
of bitter struggle greatly fired Black
expectations.
Textile workers, shoe company em
ployees, bus drivers, manufacturing
workers, and many others walked off
their jobs in Salisbury, Bulawayo,
Gwelo and other cities in March to
press for higher pay.
ZANU leaders, although they at
times expressed sympathy with the
strikers' demands, nevertheless urged
the workers to return to their jobs.
Kangai toured the strike-hit plants,
addressing workers and asking them
to give the new government time to
work out its labor policy. Mugabe
himself broadcast an appeal on March
25 for an end to the strikes.
Some of the strikers heeded Mu
gabe's call. Others did not.
In early May, the strike wave again
went into an upswing. Some 4,000
Black coal miners, earning US$3 a °
day, walked off their jobs to demand
US$3 an hour. They were employed at
the Wankie coal mine in northwestern
Zimbabwe, a mine that is owned by the
Anglo-American Corporation, a giant
South African firm.
Some 8,000 workers at the Hippo
Valley sugar estates, also owned by
Anglo American, briefly struck before'
returning to work under Kangai's urg
ing.
On May 13, about 5,000 gold and
asbestos miners went on strike for
higher pay.
And on May 20 some 2,000 workers
at Zimbabwe's largest iron and steel
plant, located in the town of Que Que,
did likewise.
In addition to the labor unrest, there
have been mobilizations against the
police force, which is still predomi
nantly white-led.
On May 28, the same day as Kan
gai's announcement about the min
imum wage,- Blacks demonstrated in
Salisbury demanding replacement of
the existing police force with a "peo
ple's police" comppsed entirely of
Blacks.
The next day, about 500 person's,
most of them women, again demon
strated in Salisbury outside the parlia
ment buildings. Many of the protesters
wore clothing with ZANU's colors or
bearing Mugabe's portrait.
Riot police ordered the women to
disperse. When the women refused, the
police attacked them with clubs.
The continued strength of the white
settler minority—in the economy,
army, police, and civil service—places
significant obstacles in the path of the
Zimbabwean freedom struggle.
But as the victory of the Black
strikers showed, the settlers and their
imperialist allies are in a much weaker
position than before, and cannot hold
back the struggles of Blacks as they
did under the Smith regime.
From Intercontinental Press/lnprecor
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As Police Fire on Rioters Again
ByJOHN F.BURNS
Special to The New York Times ,
JOHANNESBURG, June 18 — The po-1paper reported that 42 people had been
ice again opened fire today on rioters in a
nixed-race area outside Cape Town, and
South Africa's Police Minister pledged to
'act relentlessly" to halt an outbreak of
itoning, looting and arson that grew out
)f a two-month-old protest against in-
squalities in the country's racially segre
gated education system.
At least two people were shot dead by
he police in incidents between dawn and
iusk today, increasing the bloodshed that
jegan yesterday and continued through
night. The focal point of the upheaval
again Elsie's River, a mixed-race
rea about 10 miles from the center of
ape Town, which was sealed off by the
police when the violence started. Spo
radic shooting could be heard from the
fringes of the area throughout last night
and into today.
With foreign reporters banned from
Hot areas and local reporters allowed in
only under police escort, the extent of the
killing was unclear. The Police Minister,
J.ouis Le Grange, said in a statement this
morning that there were 11 known dead
overnight, "and there could be more."
After checks with Cape Town hospitals
in late afternoon, the Cape Times news-
killed and at least 200 injured, almost all
of mixed race. But the Police Commis
sioner, Gen. Michael C. Geldenhuys, said
tonight that even 36 dead, a figure pub
lished by another Cape Town paper. The
Argus, was "definitely wrong and exag
gerated." The general said only that "a
number of people were killed" and de
clared that about half of those injured
had been attacked by rioters.
Worst Rioting Since Soweto
The Police Commissioner, speaking in
the evening, said that quiet was returning
to Elsie's River and other mixed-race dis
tricts near Cape Town, which he said
were calmer than they had been since the
situation there worsened suddenly on
Monday. A reporter for The Cape Times
who visited Elsie's River shortly before
dusk said that the area was tense, with
fires still burning and occasional inci
dents of stone-throwing and isolated
bursts of gunfire.
The upheaval was by far the worst
since the anti-Government uprising in
black, Indian and mixed-race areas that
began four years ago this week and ended
Continued on Page A6, Column 3
For Home deliver) of The New York Times, call toll-free:
i0O-W12r>X) In Ne» Jersey. 800-932-0300. In Boston, call:
i«l7) T8T-1010—ADVT.
Donald and Susan Newhouse
HAPPY 25th ANNIVERSARY
Best wishes—Freddy & Eta)TO—Advt.
—NEW YORK, THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1980-
Uqited Press International
Residents of Elsie's River, a mixed-race area 10 miles from Cape Town,
South Africa, aiding a manwounded bypolicemen who fired into a crowd.
THB NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1980
Death TollRises in South African Rioting a
Continued From Page Al
months later with at least 600 people
dead, most of them killed by police gun
fire.
But the indications so far are that the
young blacks at the center of the 1976 pro
tests are reluctant to revert to wide
spread confrontations with the police in
black satellite' townships like Soweto, out
side Johannesburg, which was largely
calm today after minor skirmishes on
Monday.
The relative peace elsewhere in the
country enabled the Government to con
centrate on curbing the disorders in Cape
Town and nearby population centers with
a heavy concentration of "coloreds," as
South Africans call the 2.7 million people
of mixed race who occupy a middle posi
tion between whites and blacks in the offi
cial racial hierarchy.
Intensity Surprises Whites
The intensity of the outburst surprised
many whites. While they have long
feared a violent uprising among the coun
try's 18 million blacks, whites have
tended to take for granted the quietude of
the mixed-race population, which traces
its origins to relations between black
Cape women and the forebears of the
white Afrikaners who rule today. With
many mixed-race people speaking Afri
kaans as a first language, Afrikaners
seeking security against blacks have
often seen them as natural allies.
However, bids for change in the official
position on mixed-race people met strong
resistance within the ruling National
Party, particularly among political lead
ers in the western Cape, where people of
mixed race are a majority. The party has
rejected appeals for an end to racial bar
riers between the two groups, and Prime
Minister P.W. Botha has said that mixed-
race people will never sit in a single par
liament with whites. The stand has stiff
ened attitudes among young militants.
who call themselves black and identify
with the revolutionary black under
ground.
The current rioting broke out in at least
half a dozen of the mixed-race townships
that skirt the southern and eastern flanks
of the city, as well as in the mixed-race
areas outside Paarl, a wine making cen
ter 45 miles to the east.
But the worst violence, and most of the
deaths, occurred in Elsie's River, where
tens of thousands of mixed-race people
live in drab, Government-built apart
ment blocks and cramped brick houses on
grassless ground, separated here and
there by clusters of corrugated iron
shacks.
Youths Stone Passing Vehicles
In the initial phase of the upheaval,
youths,gathered along reads into the city
and stoned passing vehicles. Some of the
vehicles were halted, overturned and set
afire, blocking roads. At least 15 white
drivers were injured, and some report
edly shot at the youths with firearms they
carried. ,
The situation deteriorated after dusk
and remained chaotic through much of
today. Gangs of youths roamed the street
attacking vehicles and setting fire to fac
tories, liquor stores, supermarkets, small
shops and schools. Dozens of buildings
were gutted, including a textile plant
where damage was estimated at close to
$4 million. Buildings that were not burned
were looted.
Reporters who were allowed in the riot
areas under police escort reported sev
eral instances of arsonists and looters
being shot dead by police patrols. In other
cases police were reported to have shot in
self-defense after their vehicles were at
tacked by angry crowds.
'Hooligan Elements'Cited
The Government account was that
what had begun as a' protest against ra
cial conditions degenerated into a ram
pageby "hooligan elements." The Police
Minister, Mr. Ie













Young Man Injured In Riots Near Cape Town, South Africa, Is Treated Before Being Taken To A Hospital
South Africa's 'Coloreds' Close Ranks With Blai
By John Kane-Berman
Conttitulion Special Corrcjpondenl
JOHANNESBURG - Fourteen-year-old Shirley
September's desk was empty when her classmates
arrived for lessons at Lavana Primary School in
Lavender Hill, Cape Town, on Wednesday morning.
She had died with a bullet in her brain the day be
fore, one of 42 reported dead in the racial violence
that swept through the city's segregated "colored"
townships this week (though police put the figure at
30).
Shirley was not very bright, said her teacher,
"she was a very friendly little girl and always
bad a smile for everybody. It was a terrible shock
A relative calm returns to Cape Town after
riots leave 30 dead and 174 injured. Page 26-A. ■
when we learned of her death."
Official permission for public gatherings per
mitting, Shirley will be given a hero's burial. For to
South Africa's 2.5 million colored minority she is a
martyr in the intensifying, bitter struggle for equal
ity.
"God's stepchildren" is how a South African au
thor once described Shirley's people, for their
situation is in many ways the most tragic of all in
this country.
They are the filling, someone else once
the sandwich between black and white nati
They are also the embodiment of white Soi
ca's guilty conscience, for they are the offs
sex across the color line, something which U
Afrikaner nationalists regard as one of the
sins of all.
Culturally, the so-called colored pe<
much closer to white Afrikaners than the;
black Africans. They share a language with
kaners, and many of them worship in (seg
"daughter churches" of the Calvinist Du
formed churches that are so influential an
See COLORED, Pi
uoloured (of flPKed ancestry), who
together with Africans and Indians
mske up the oppressed majority.
It was not long before the students
were holding mass meetings to discuss
behind the current unrest."
By March, sporadic protests by Col
oured students had spread to schools
in Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth. On
April 7, representatives from nineteen
As the protest movement continued
to. gain momentum—and to win
greater support from parents, teachers,
and community leaders—the police
started to crack down more severely.
growing militancy amongWack work
ers that disrupts the economy and
recurrent protests by students and
other youth who cannot find jobs."
From Intercontinental Press/lnprecor
Ford workers dealt blow to apartheid
The current rise in the anti-apartheid
struggle in South Africa was signaled
n late 1979 and early 1980 when
several hundred Black workers em
ployed by the Ford Motor Company in
Port !"' abeth waged a struggle for
h*Mr rights.
Strikes by Black workers in South
Africa are frequent, but this one was
listinguished by the strikers' open
mti-apartheid stand. They turned for
eadership to a Black anti-apartheid
jroup, the Port Elizabeth Black Civic
Drganization (PEBCO), headed by
r<ord workers Thozamile Botha.
I In propaganda aimed at justifying
its lucrative investments in South
[Africa, Ford passes off its South Afri-
pan subsidiary as a "progressive" em
ployer devoted to advancing South
Africa's Blacks.
But between 80 and 90 percent of the
Company's Black workers were earning
>elow the minimum poverty level, and
he real incomes of workers in the
ower grades had declined over eight
tears. Promotions of Blacks into
ligher job categories were still limited,
md racism in the factory was still
>ervasive.
The struggle at Ford began when 700
vorkers walked off the job October 31.
Phey were protesting Ford's dismissal
>f Botha for his anti-apartheid activ-
ty. After workers staged a rally out-
dde the plant, management caved in
. and reinstated Botha.
On November 13 Black workers
briefly stopped work to protest the
racist behavior of some of the white
workers. Two days later hundreds held
meetings in the engine and assembly
plants to air grievances. On November
21, workers at the Struandale assem
bly plant struck.
Management fired all the strikers.
About 600 workers struck the General
Tire and Rubber Company, linked to
the American firm, and were also fired.
Reinstatement of the workers became
the main issue in the struggle.
Some 1,000 Black workers boycotted
Ford's canteens. And strikes spread to
local paper and tire plants.
The workers turned to PEBCO for
leadership because they felt the Black
union at Ford was too subservient. It
favored accepting a management offer
to rehire the dismissed workers as new
hires without seniority or accumulated
benefits. The strikers formed a commit
tee that affiliated with PEBCO.
PEBCO's support to the Ford work
ers led to rapid expansion of its influ
ence. By mid-November, the organiza
tion was holding meetings of more
than 10,000 in Port Elizabeth and its
influence spread to other cities.
In an effort to stem the unrest, the
apartheid regime arrested several do
zen Ford workers and PEBCO
members. Two PEBCO leaders were
"banned," a restriction that limits
movement and bars political or trade-
union activity.
But attempts to hire scabs to replace
the striking workers failed. The strike
won support from anti-apartheid forces
throughout the country. Bishop Des
mond Tutu, of the antiapartheid South
African Council of Churches, and the
Azanian People's Organization
pledged solidarity.
On January 9, Ford management
accepted the workers' demand for rein
statement with full pay, pension, and
seniority rights.
The Ford workers' determination
had paid' off.
This victory inspired PEBCO to con
tinue rallies and protests against
apartheid, sometimes mobilizing thou
sands of people.
And the regime is still trying to
crush the organization. Top leaders
were arrested on January 10. They
were released February 27 in the wake
of big protests in Port Elizabeth, but
Botha and two other PEBCO leaders
were banned.
Bombings at oil installations
Bb t ff t t hiombs went o a wo synt etic
petroleum plants and an oil refin
ery in South Africa June 2, causing
$8 million in damage.
South African police are attribut
ing the bombing to the African
National Congress, an anti-apart
heid organization.
The ANC was banned in 1960
after attempting for more than a
decade to lead nonviolent protests
against the racist regime. Nelson
Mandela, the most prominent
leader of the ANC, was sentenced
to life imprisonment in 1964. He is
still a prisoner.
The New York Times reported
June 3 that an ANC spokesperson
in London had claimed responsibil
ity for the bombings.
The South African regime is try
ing to whip up a witch-hunt around
the bombings, targeting all expres
sions of hatred for apartheid.
"The possibility of a new round
of detentions ■ and bannings of
those deemed responsible for wid
ening unrest in the country" was
under consideration, John Burns
reported in the June 3 New York
Times.
The South African regime also
stepped up threats against Mozam
bique, which has granted political
asylum to members of the ANC.
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indiscriminate slaughter of Angolan
villagers as punishment for Angola's
support to the Namibian people. In
addition to trying to intimidate
SWAPO forces, the South African re
gime hopes to weaken and, if possible,
topple Angola's independent govern
ment.
De Figueiredo told the UN Security
Council the results of the first bloody
raids:
"They have killed over 370 men,
women, and children," he said. "They
have wounded more than 255 people,
many of whom will succumb to their
injuries. They have destroyed vehicles,
bridges, houses. They have killed much
of the livestock, depriving the remain
ing populace of its food and livelihood. .
They have mined roads and fields."
Contrary to the South African re
gime's original contention that its
invasion lasted only one week, De
Figueiredo disclosed that the South
African occupation and military at
tacks have continued. He detailed the
positions of South African forces in his
country as of June 23, weeks after the
South African regime claims to have
pulled out:
". . . since June 23, 1980, a motor
ized infantry brigade of the racist
South African Armed Forces has been
on Angolan territory. There is one
infantry battalion in Eval, one infan
try battalion in Mongua, and another
one north of Kwamato.
"Then there are two battalions of
paratroopers, one on the road between
Ankuaka and N'Giva, and one on the
road north of Neone.
"One company of armoured cars are
northeast of Ongo, and one motorized
infantry battalion supported by 32
artillery units of 155 mm, mortars, and
AML-90 armoured cars are in the area
H U r (
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Victims of 1979 S. African raid Into Angola
De Figueiredo placed the blame for
the South African terror where it be
longs: "For every child killed in
Soweto, in Namibia, in Angola, respon
sibility must be accepted by those
Western friends of Pretoria who help
the apartheid regime to survive. . . .
"If something is not done, and soon,
about the explosive situation in south
ern Africa, the whole world will see
and hear and smell blood—the rebel
lion against exploitation, the rejection
of imperialism, the denial of colonial
ism, and the destruction of apartheid.
"It will be the masses of the Third
World, Mr. President, and not only
Africa, who will fight for justice, equal
ity, and security against imperialist
intervention."
This warning was echoed by Cuba's
UN ambassador Raul Roa Kouri: "An
gola is not alone in its heroic resist-
peoples of Africa, the Non-Aligned
countries and the progressive forces of
the socialist camp." Thousands of Cu
ban soldiers are helping safeguard
Angola's independence.
Robert Mugabe, prime minister of
newly independent Zimbabwe, joined
other African leaders in condemning
the South African invasion of Angola.
At the annual meeting of the Organi
zation of African Unity, he called for
"a definite concrete program" of aid,
including military assistance, for
Black freedom fighters in South
Africa.
Mugabe also announced that the
South African mission in Salisbury,
the Zimbabwean capital, would be
closed. He charged that South Africa
was using the mission to recruit a force
of Rhodesian whites to be used to
"de&tabilize" Black governments in the
region, including that of Zimbabwe.
South Africa's invasion of Angola
came in the midst of deepening resist
ance within South Africa to apartheid.
Since mid-April, large-scale student
protests have swept the country, in
volving more than 100,000 in school
boycotts and rallies.
The student protests have coincided
with the outbreak of several major
Black strikes involving thousands of
teachers, textile workers, auto workers,
rubber workers, and others.
South African authorities have re
sponded with a major crackdown
within the country, arresting key
Black figures and killing and jailing
demonstrators.
Substantial gains have reportedly
been won by some Black strikers,
however, and the upsurge is appar
ently continuing despite the news
blackout by U.S. media,
\rv-r A if if ULNUM-A Vlll
By Nan Bailey
A counteroffensive by the Angolan
army has succeeded in pushing back
battalions of South African troops who
launched an invasion of Angola begin
ning June 7.
A photograph of one of the raiding
South African aircraft shot down by
Angolan troops shows the plane with
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organi
zation) markings. This evidence sup
ports charges made by Angolan lead
ers that the South African assault has
the backing of major imperialist pow
ers.
Sara Rodrigues, a correspondent for
the radical newsweekly Guardian, re
ports from Angola that a communique
released by the Angolan Defense Min
istry detailed the results of that coun
try's counteroffensive.
The army of the apartheid regime
carried out raids on Namibian guer
rilla camps and Angolan villages, kill
ing hundreds in the first few weeks.
But Angolan troops have now driven
the South Africans out of at least three
towns they had occupied—Mongua,
Evale, and Mulemba.
As the fighting took place, South
African, planes continued to strafe
villages and Angolan troop columns.
Luci" Lara, a leader of the MPLA,
Angola s ruling party, called on Ango
lans to mobilize to defend the country.
He warned they must be prepared for
further attacks and that the South
African "operations are not directed
only at SWAPO [the South West Africa
People's Organisation, which is fight
ing for the liberation of Namibia]—the
South Africans have much wiu-=. objec
tives."
Rodrigues also reports that Cuban
troops in Angola have been deliber
ately held back from the fighting so far
in accordance with an MPLA decision.
MPLA leaders explained that this is
being done to avoid spreading the
n ?• &, .. ■ i
eminent is pressing its attacks on
Black rights fighters within the coun
try.
A group of clergymen arrested in a
government crackdown earlier this
year went to trial July 1. All were
convicted of violating the Riotous As
sembly Act with their participation in
a march protesting the detention of
another church leader.
Three of the clergymen were sen
tenced to jail for fifty days while
thirty-two others were fined.
But resistance to the apartheid re
gime continues.
As Black GM and Ford workers
ended a strike which won them higher
wages, Black meatworkers in Cape
town went out on strike, challenging
management's refusal to meet with a
negotiating committee elected by the
workers.
Construction has been halted at a
Johannesburg coal conversion plant
after two days of protests by 2,000
Black workers angered at hearing that
one of their co-workers had been shot
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19. The number of refugees in Botswana increased substantially during 1978
primarily due to arrivals from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). During the
course of the year, over 25»300 Zimbabweans arrived in Botswana, though this
number was partially offset by the transfer of 11,600 persons to Zambia, of
whom some 3,000 women and children were air-lifted, due to extremely crowded
conditions in the transit centres. By mid-1979 there were approximately
20,300 refugees in Botswana, of whom some 96 per cent were in transit centres
or at Dukwe settlement.
20. The influx of Zimbabweans continues to strain the capacities of the transit
centres at Francistown and Selebi-Pikwe, where over 9,000 refugees are housed.
The situation with regard to refugees at Dukwe settlement is somewhat better, as
the agricultural settlement has successfully progressed to the point where over
10,000 individuals have established a community in a little over a year. Due
to the large numbers of Zimbabweans entering Botswana, it was-.decided to
increase the capacity of the settlement from its original target population of
10,000 to 20,000. The refugees at Dukwe, as well as those in the transit
centres, continue to benefit from WFP food aid. Medical services are provided
by the International Committee of the Red Cross as well as the Botswana Red
Cross, and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) has made available administrative
staff.
21. Faced with the task of providing assistance to South African refugees, the
majority of whom attempt to find accommodation in or near the capital, the
Government of Botswana and UHHCR are formulating plans for a residential/
educational centre outside the capital. The potential beneficiaries of this
centre would be South African refugees who are neither enrolled in an
educational institution nor employed.
22. The emphasis on educational assistance for South African refugee students
remains a priority in Botswana. The Educational Resource Centre in Gaborone
offers remedial programmes and correspondence courses to refugees prior to
their placement in educational institutions either in Botswana or elsewhere.
Essential buildings at the two secondary schools, which are presently under
construction with financial assistance from MHCR, will be completed in time
for the commencement of classes in January 1980.
GENERAL PROGRAMMES
Local integration
23. Assistance to individuals: In 1978, an amount of $55,266 was obligated
for assistance towards the local integration of individual refugees. Refugees
were assisted to realize projects of their own such as the establishment of
small businesses, crafts and farming activities. It is foreseen that the I979
allocation of $50,000 will suffice until the end of the year, and an allocation
of $58,000 is proposed for I98O, of which $10,000 would be set aside for the
provision of rent subsidies.
A/AC.96/564
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24. Transit, reception and residential centres for Zimbabwean refugees; Due to
overcrowding in the transit centres, it has been necessary to e*Q^J^JZ^JL
made available at Francistown and Selebi-Pikwe. In 1978 an amount of JbiJiPfJ-
was obligated to finance recurrent costs in the centres as well as the
procurement of tents and vehicles, and alterations to ^ancfto^pV^
included the addition of three domitones and a health post. "Jhe/
of $200,000 originally foreseen for 1979 has been increased by $356.
transit centres continue to provide the most basic necessities for Zmbabwean
refugees. Over 9,000 are now occupying space originally planned for l»5OO
individuals, however, and the Government of Botswana has recognized that the
present situation cannot continue indefinitely. For this, reason, a new centre
at Selebi-Pikwe is being planned which will alleviate the burden on the two
existing centres and permit the formulation of a programme of appropriate
educaSoml/vocational training as well as limited agricultural activity. It
is proposed to allocate $700,000 in I960 for the initial phases of site
development and basic construction of this new centre.
25. Residential centre for South Africans: As was mentioned in the
^reduction, plans are progressing lor a residential centre for South African
SfSes. The Government is considering a site at Mosetsanamontle, some 100 Ions
^Gaborone, for the centre. From the 1979 combined allocation of $350,000
for a residential centre and the low-cost housing scheme at Selebi-tfxkwe, an
amount of $314,000 remained available at the time of writ ing for the
establishment of the proposed centre. This amount has ^J^f^Jg 0QQ
$100,000 from the Programme Reserve and an additional allocation of 8W>00
is proposed for 1979 under the new ani revised projects formula, thus making, a
total of $554,000 available. Implementation of this project is expected to
continue into 1980; it is proposed to allocate $50,000 in 1980 to cover
recurrent costs for the centre until the end of the year.
26. As was reported last year/90 low-cost houses were constructed in 1978 in
order to provide accommodation for refugees of various origins, and $36,000
have been committed to cover recurrent costs in 1979. An allocation of
$39,000 is proposed for 1980 for similar purposes.
27. Dukwe settlement: The agricultural settlement at Dukwe, located
approximately 120 laas west of Francistown, has developed into a successful
community since April of 1978. As was mentioned earlier, the planned capacity
of the settlement has been increased from 10,000 to 20,000 an order to ,
accommodate increasing numbers of Zimbabweans seeking refuge in Botswana. In
1978 the allocation of $1.3 million was totally obligated for the initial
development of the settlement. The revised projections for 20,000 refugees
call for additional funds however, as the 1.2 million allocation approved by
the Executive Committee for 1979 will not suffice. It is thus proposed that
an amount of $1,760,000 be made available in 1979 under the new and revised
projects formula. The speed with which this, settlement has been established
Smartly dueto the fact that in certain instances the Government has advanced
funds when TJHHCR has not been in a position to make immediate payments. The
authority of the Executive Committee is requested to reimburse the Government,
should such a procedure prove necessary, once funds are available an October.
An allocation of $1 million is requested for 1980.
A/AC.96/564
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28. Lower secondary education; The Educational Resource Centre in Gaborone
has enjoyed remarkable success since it was established in 1977« Its flexible
approach to meeting the varied educational needs of refugee students has
provided a model for other areas of Botswana. In 1978* $30j°0° were provided
from the General Programmes to finance the operation during the last months of
the year. The approved 1979 allocation of $50,000 is deemed sufficient for this
year and an allocation of $55,000 is requested for 1980.
29. Funds have been made available from the 1978 and 1979 Special Programmes to
provide lower secondary scholarships for South African refugee students in
Botswana. With the prospect of approximately 160 places being available at
this level in 1980, an allocation of $119,000 is proposed for next year.
Counselling
30. As was the case in past years, the Counselling Service of the Botswana
Council for Refugees (BCR) is jointly supported by the Botswana Council of
Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), the International
University Exchange Fund (IHEF) and UNHCR. In 1978 HNHCR obligated $14,935
towards the total budget. With the increasing refugee caseload in Botswana,
it has.been proposed that a post of Director General be added to the staff in
order to co-ordinate BCR activities with the Government and voluntary agencies.
An amount of $3>45O has been made available from the 1979 Programme Reserve to
increase the original allocation of $25,000. An allocation of $27,000 is
requested for 1980.
Supplementary aid
31. In 1978, $249»524 were obligated for supplementary aid, 43 per cent of
which was used for assistance to South African refugees. It is anticipated that \
the 1979 allocation of $320,000 will suffice to the end of the year, barring any [
unexpectedly large influxes of refugees into the country. For 1980, an
allocation of $296,000 is requested.
Programme support and administration
32. An amount of $64,059 was obligated for programme support in 1978 against
an allocation of $54»OOO« The increase, in the main due to travel, was
financed by transfers between allocations. To maintain the Branch Office at
its present strength, allocations of $68,100 and $79,800 are proposed for 1979
and 1980 respectively.
SPECIAL PROGRAMMES
33- United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa; From the allocation
administered by UNHCR on behalf of this fund for the period 1 July I978 to
30 June 1979, $53,000 were made available in 1978 to provide relief and
maintenance for South African refugees in Botswana.
34» Special Programme for southern Africans; Funds made available to the
High Commissioner in response to his special appeal of 8 June 1977 on behalf of
southern Africans were utilized to finance several projects during the course of
1978 in a total amount of $5,628,268. Of this amount, $4.2 million were f
obligated for the construction and equipping of one junior and one senior *
secondary school which will provide an additional 96O places for students in }
Botswana. Out of this total, the number of places available for refugee
A/AC.96/564
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students will "be in proportion to TJKHCR's contribution to the total cost of
these schools. A further amount of $590,320 was obligated to construct and
equip 90 low-cost houses for refugees at Selebi-Pikwe. The refugee student
population in Botswana has placed a heavy "burden on the educational facilities
of the country, as was recognized in the Secretary-General's reports on the
subject (documents A/32/65 and A/32/65/Add.l). In an effort to lessen the
"burden, an amount of $447,000 was obligated to construct and equip a 72-bed
hostel at the University College of Botswana. A total of $325,000 was
obligated to finance an emergency air—lift of Zimbabwean women and children
from transit centres in Botswana to Zambia, in order to relieve serious
over-crowding in the centres. Several smaller amounts were obligated to
cover transportation costs for students accepted in schools abroad, running
costs of the Educational Resource Centre and rent subsidies of refugees living
or in transit in Botswana. Similar efforts are being financed from the
General Programmes in the current year.
35. In 1979, an amount of $48,000 was made available from the Special Programmes
for southern African refugee students at the lower secondary level.
Contributions in kind for southern Africans in 1979 have so far totalled $27,550.
PHHCR EXPENDITURE IN BOTSWANA
(In thousands of US dollars)
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198. Refugees mainly from South Africa continue to arrive in Swaziland in
increasing numbers. There were approximately 700 urban refugees at the end of
1978, in addition to some 3,000 rural South African refugees who, with their
herds of cattle, have entered the south-east part of the country, and for whom
the Government has only recently requested TJNHCR assistance. A third of this
group has arrived in the past few months and was initially assisted from the
Emergency Fund. Nearly 45 per cent of the group consists of school-age children;
199- Local integration measures are considered a priority for promoting
self-sufficiency and efforts are being pursued to identify durable solutions for
both urban and rural refugees. A number of proposals to establish small
enterprises have been received from refugees. Those without specific skills will
be assisted within the context of a programme which will provide training in such
fields as electricity, ceramics, woodworking and weaving.
200. Emergency assistance in the form of food, domestic utensils, "blankets and
clothing has been provided to the group of 1,000 refugees who fled from
South Africa during the past year. Plans are being prepared to assist them and
some 2,000 other South African refugees to resume their traditional farming
activities.
201. The Mpaka Refugee Centre was constructed in 1978, following recommendations
made in United Nations General Assembly reports on Emergency Assistance for
South African Student Refugees (documents A/32/65 and A/32/65/Add.l). The Centre,
comprising a lower secondary school, boys1 and girls1 hostels, a dining facility,
transit centre and staff houses, was damaged by storms early in 1979. The school
was, nevertheless, opened in May 1979.
GENERAL PROGRAMMES
Local integration
202. Assistance to individuals? As was reported in previous years, opportunities
for the local settlement of refugees in Swaziland have proved limited. The 1978
allocation of $51,000 was, therefore, not utilized and was transferred within
General Programmes. However, it now appears that it will be possible to establish
refugees in small enterprises, and to this end the approved 1979 allocation of
$5,000 has been increased by $1,000 from the Programme Reserve. Any additional
expenditure this year will also be financed from the Reserve and to ensure the
momentum of this effort an allocation of $35,000 is proposed for 1980.
203. Rural refugees; Initial assistance to some 1,000 newly-arrived South Africa?
rural refugees has been financed from the Emergency Fund (for details see
paragraph 208 below). A tentative plan of operations has been drawn up for the
settlement of this group, as well as over 2,000 other South Africans, in rural
communities near Ndzevane in the Lubombo District in south-eastern Swaziland.
Health facilities and schools will be provided but the major emphasis will be
placed on agriculture. An allocation of $200,000 is proposed under the new and
revised projects formula for 1979. Since technical surveys will be undertaken
before the plan of operations is finalized, the entire allocation may not be
obligated in the current year. The authority of the Executive Committee is,
therefore, requested to carry over any remaining balance for commitment in 1980.
An allocation of $300,000 is proposed for 1980 to continue the agricultural
settlement of this group.
TMffflB EXPENDITURE IN SWAZILAND
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these refugees have been made under General Programmes.
SPECIAL PROGRAMMES
TTnited Nat.inns Trust TMnd for South Africa
relief and maintenance of South African refugees xn
Assistance to southern African Refugees
currently heing financed from General Pxogra-es.
School: Prior to the opening of the MpaKa^Centre, Jj-r
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UNITED REPUBLIC OP TANZANIA
Introduction
231- Taking into account a small influx during- the year and the results of a
census carried out in the Ulyankulu settlement, it was estimated that the total
number of refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania was 160,000 by the end of
1978. Of this total, some 129,500 were Burundi, most of them living in
organized rural settlements, 25,000 Rwandese, 4,100 Ugandans and smaller numbers
from southern Africa and other African regions.
232. Most of the Office's activities in the United Republic of Tanzania during
1978 year focused on assistance to organized rural settlements. Implementation
of UNHCR assistance programmes in the settlements for refugees from Burundi is \
governed by tripartite agreements between the Government, UNHCR and the
Lutheran World Federation/Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (LHP/TORS), the j
latter acting as implementing agency. Both the Government and LW/TCRS contribute j
in cash and in kind. These settlements are those at Ulyankulu and Katumba i
(the largest refugee settlements in Africa), and the new settlement at Mishamo. ]
1
233. Since the establishment of Ulyankulu in 1972, the number of refugees has j
risen to a level which far exceeds the agricultural and economic capacity of . I
the settlement. Consequently, it was agreed in 1977 to transfer some 25,000
refugees from Ulyankulu to a new settlement at Mishamo. A census completed in 1
March 1978 revealed that the Ulyankulu population was around 47,250. j
234. At the request of the Government, and in compliance with the recommendations
of a viability survey conducted in May 1977 and with the findings of a detailed
soil survey carried out by the National Soil Service (NSS) in 1978, the three
partners have agreed to postpone the handover of Ulyankulu settlement to the
authorities until 30 June 1980. This decision was made- in order to permit the
reduction of the original 13 villages to 11, the relocation of refugee farms
to more fertile land, and the re-arrangement of water supply systems and the
road network. This programme and the overall consolidation of the settlement
are designed to enable the refugees remaining in Ulyankulu, after the transfer of
some 25,000 persons to Mishamoj to become entirely self-sufficient.
235« The Katumba settlement, which currently accommodates over 66,000 refugees,
was established in 1973 and was officially handed over to the Government on
30 June 1978. Since 1 July 1978, all recurring costs have been incorporated
in the district budget.
236. The new rural settlement at Mishamo is designed to accommodate the excess
population of Ulyankulu and 12,000 to 15,000 refugees from the border area
of Kigoma region. The purpose of the Project is to assist refugees to become
self-sufficient in agriculture and to integrate them into the local community
and national economy. Detailed studies of water resources, land fertility, as
well as engineering and layout plans were all completed in 1978. The plans
foresee the establishment of 21 villages at Mishamo; each village to consist
of 375 family plots, with an additional 25 plots to allow for future expansion.
The villages are surrounded by arable land, providing each family with
5 hectares.
237. The rural settlement for Ugandan refugees at Kigwa was established as a
joint undertaking by the Government and UNHCR in 1973. The refugee population
remained at 2,000 in.1978. The handover of Kigwa to the Government was postponed
to December 1979, because construction of a community education complex and 'the
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second phase of the water supply system had not been completed, due to a
shortage of building materials and logistics problems. It is anticipated that
the Government will complete these constructions prior to handover.
238. The caseload of some 3,500 refugees living in urban areas, in particular
the capital, comprises mainly students in need of scholarships; others require
local settlement assistance, supplementary aid or resettlement opportunities.
Assistance projects in favour of this group are mainly administered by the
Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT). During the period under review many
individual urban refugees including South Africans, have been provided with care
and maintenance pending their placement in academic or vocational institutions,





239. Ulyankulu settlement: In 1978, UNHCR obligated $625,000, LWF/TCRS made
available some $225,000, while the Government provided land and services. A
survey was undertaken in 1978 to determine the viability of TJlyankulu and
Katumba settlements and $7,776 were obligated for this purpose. A water
development programme, including the maintenance of boreholes, construction of
two more dams and improvement of water distribution system continued throughout
the year. Contrary to previous years, throughout 1978, "toe settlement
headquarters and the refugees had adequate water for domestic use. The pipeline
which was laid in 1977, from one of the larger waterholes to one of the driest
sections of the settlement has been completed and is operational, with two
alternating pumps. Every group of ten houses has been provided with one water
tap, thus eliminating excessively long walks for water from the village to dams
and water ponds.
240. A variety of food crops are grown at the settlement. However, as a result
of extensive flood damage in 1978, sales of the crops, particularly tobacco,
generated an income of only $517,962 for refugees. This amount represents a
decrease of $90,934 in comparison with the earnings of the sale of cash crops
in 1976/77. With their income, the refugees were in a position to contribute
some $6,000 for the construction of the village grocery and butchers shops.
The livestock and poultry development programmes, begun in recent years,
progressed well. While arrangements were being made to register the
multipurpose co-operative at TJlyankulu with the Tanzania Rural Development Bank,
efforts were also pursued to form a village co-operative for each of the 11
villages to be reconstituted in Ulyankulu. Construction of basic infrastructure
was undertaken last year, mainly utilizing refugee labour and locally produced
building materials. In following with the Government policy of Universal Primary
Education (UPE), the total number of classrooms has been raised from 45 to 90.
241. The 1979 approved allocation of $400,000 has been entirely committed in the
first half of the year. This allocation was approved to cover six months until
handover; it has proved insufficient to cover the new capital investments
and recurrent expenditures mentioned in the introduction; it has, therefore,
been increased by $150,000 from the Programme Reserve. A new allocation of
$270,000 is proposed to cover the costs of the last months of 1979- An
allocation in 1980 of $630,000 is proposed to finance assistance to the
settlement until mid-year when the Government will assume full administrative
and financial responsibility for Ulyankulu.
A/AC.96/564
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242. Katumba settlement; In 1978, LWP/TCRS contri'buted an amount of $159,000
and DKHCR obligations amounted to $678,118. These monies were in addition to
other contributions made in cash and in kind by the Government, and
ypp. Pood crops are grown and maize and tobacco are cultivated mainly for
commercial purposes. In 1978, refugees earned $668,000 from cash crop sales;
this represents an increase of some $105,500 over- income earned in 1977*
Construction of buildings and settlement infrastructure continued at a
satisfactory pace, with an emphasis on self-help labour. Within the framework
of the Government policy of TJPE as well as the overall consolidation of the
settlement, the construction of one dispensary was completed and work is
progressing1 on four additional permanent schools, 90 UPE classrooms, and
20 teachers' houses.
243. Mishamo settlement: In 1978, UNHCR obligated an amount of $1,491,432
•towards this project LWP/TCRS made available an additional $250,000, while the
Government provided land and services. In addition to some 200 auxiliary staff
who were already stationed at Mishamo, about 1,000 refugees were transferred
from Ulyankulu to Mishamo by the end of 1978. Each family "'had already started
to cultivate its five hectare plot. All the refugees were provided with
preventive medicines before leaving Ulyankulu and basic necessities such as
food, clothing, blankets, sets of agricultural tools and domestic utensils.
Within the context of agricultural development programmes, two TCRS agricultural
project officers have developed research farms of one acre each, in five
locations in the settlement, to study the suitability of chemical and natural
fertilizers and various types of local and imported seeds.
244. Construction of temporary and basic infrastructure was pursued last year
mainly using refugee labour and locally produced materials. Two staff houses,
a day care centre, a dispensary, a village co-operative shop, a library,
117 "improved houses" and 123 pit-latrines were completed. The water
development programme has resulted in the completion of four hand-dug wells in
the first village. A primary school has been established; it has seven classes
and a total enrolment of 135 pupils.
245. Prom the 1979 approved allocation of $2.5 million an amount of $610,000 has
been committed in the first half of the year to finance the power supply at the
settlement headquarters, the development of a water supply and distribution
system, the purchase of vehicles and agricultural equipment, tools, seeds,
insecticides, fertilizers; village development; aid to co-operatives;
construction of buildings and basic infrastructure; rural development activities,
and recurring expenditures. As was reported last year, the overall budget for
the Mishamo settlement, which is included in a detailed plan of operations,
totals $18.5 million and covers the period 1978 to 1983. An allocation of
$4,750,000 is proposed for 1980 to cover extensive and intensive assistance
programmes for a total of over 37,000 refugees.
Refugees from Uganda
246. Kigwa settlement: In 1979, UNHCR increased the approved 1977 allocation
of $90,000 by $35,000 from the Programme Reserve, to cover unforeseen expenses
related to the construction of the community education complex and to the second




247 In 1978, $61,422 were obligated for immediate relief, care and maintenance,
travel and other assistance mainly to southern African refugee students.
Assistance measures include care and maintenance and the establishment ol a
farm project under- the auspices of PF/ZAOT, to enable the beneficiaries to
become self-supporting- in food production. In the first half of the current
year $30,000 have been committed from" the approved 1979 allocation of
$100,000. An allocation of $225,000: is proposed for 1980, primarily to cover
UMCE contributions towards the establishment and operation of an African
National Congress (ANC) vocational training- school/Community Centre at Morogoro,
as well as to assist other southern African refugees living in the
United Republic of Tanzania or in transit through the country.
Lower secondary education and vocational training
248. In 1978, the total allocation of $80,000 was obligated to provide
scholarships to 120 students. Half of the approved 1979 allocation of
$100,000 has been committed. An allocation of $118,000 is proposed for 1980 to
cover educational assistance for some 250 students.
Counselling
249. In 1978, UMCR contributed $8,235 to cover the salary of a refugee counsellor
under a project operated by the CCT, in addition to the newly fruited social
worker, who functions as an assistant to the counsellor. The All Ata-C*
Conference of Churches (AACC) and the International University Exchange Fund
(IUEP) also participated in the financing of this service. Some 600 refugees
sought guidance and material assistance in the course of the year. Prom the
approved 1979 allocation of $12,000 an amount of $9,654 has been committed.
An allocation of $12,000 is proposed for 1980.
Supplementary aid
250. In 1978, $20,000 were obligated on behalf of some 450 refugees of various
origins, including Ugandans, Rwandese, Burundi and southern Africans, for food,
medical care, accommodation, clothing and travel. The funds were administered
partly by the CCT and partly by the UHHCE Branch Office The total approved
1979 allocation of $20,000 has been committed, and an allocation of $25,OUU is
proposed for 1980.
SPECIAL PROGRAMMES
251. Education Account; In 1978, $296,872 were obligated to; enable 127 refugee
students to pursue their studies at the higher secondary level, in academic or
vocational training institutions and at university. Assistance under this
project was administered partly by the Government and partly Itf CCT. By
mid-1979, $91,000 had been committed to provide scholarships to refugee students
at the various levels.
252. Other trust funds; As was reported in previous years, an amount of
$1,985,714 was obligated in 1976 as a contribution towards t&e construction of
a secondary school with boarding facilities for some 320 pupris in Tunduru.
In spite^f the prolonged delay in construction work due to foreseen logistics
problems, transport difficulties and the outbreak of cholera in^the area, it is
expected that most of the buildings will be completed during 1979- The World
Bank is involved in the technical supervision of this project, which is
















r^s basis as nationals of the United Republic of
Aaaistance to southern African refugees
1978, UKHCR committed $350,000 towards the construction of a c
to be administered by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and which
ldeIcfommodation, vocational training and -habilitati- f-Ut
for South African refugee students. The construction of this centre
S^Seefd to begin as soon as the plans have been approved A voluntary
agency donated an ambulance in 1979 in support of this effort.
ITnited Nations Trust Fund for South Africa
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rhe government's attempt to enforce the use
>f Afrikaans in black schools sets off a pupils'
ebellion. Within days the Johannesburg and
■retoria townships are ablaze.
Workers on the Move 38
Millions of black and coloured workers strike
against apartheid. The biggest strike in South
Africa's history.
The Continuing Struggle 55
Despite the killings and mass arrests, black
youth is consolidating its protest in South
Africa. Though many have fled the country,
those remaining are organising a continuing
struggle.
Die Cape Goes Up 17
rhe news travels a thousand miles to the Cape.
Hack demonstrations protesting the Soweto
cillings are murderously smashed by the riot
>olice.
Strike and Counter Strike 21
>upils and workers in Soweto organise a suc-
:essful three-day strike. The police organise
lostel-dwellers to attack pickets and student
demonstrators.
In the Townships 42
South Africa is in serious economic trouble.
Increasing unemployment and soaring living
costs fuel black demands.
Arming Apartheid 47
Western investment contributes directly and
indirectly to the hardware used by the riot





Solid Colour 26 Nationalist Impasse 54
Coloured township solidarity with the Blacks There is no way in which Vorster's ruling Prime Minister John Vorster
deals apartheid a body blow in the Cape, party can meet black and coloured demands /-!_„«—«.,..,♦ mill nut h» intimirint
White reprisals are savage. without destroying apartheid itself.
Government w o be timidate,




The South African regime is based on
violence and repression, but the level of
violence currently being practiced by the
police is unprecedented. In i960 at
Sharpeville 69 Blacks were killed in ten
minutes, but since June 1976, officially
the death figures are 386. Despite the so
called abolition of petty apartheid, and
Vorster's policy of detente, the black
urban areas in South Africa are now
treated by the white police as enemy
territory.
And the official figures are a gross cover
up of the truth. The policy of instant
violent repression, with peaceful demon
strations being met with tear gas and
bullets, means that the toll of dead and
injured is actually incalculable.
Rumours are rife of morgues filled to
overflowing, refrigerated lorries stuffed
with the dead. However despite massive
censhorship the truth as revealed by
newspapers and eyewitnesses is shocking
enough. Yet the attempts by the police
and South African government to
suppress the reality of what is happening
in the townships is aided by the media's
acceptance of the regime's racist analysis.
Any demonstration is a riot, any
protester is a hooligan or tsotsi.
The crimes of the police and the brutality
of the regime are not the only aspects of
the situation obscured by this colla
boration with the official propoganda.
The larger distortion is a denial that the
black explosion in South Africa which
has rocked the white apartheid regime to
its very foundations is an explosion of
consciousness. liberal optimists in and
out of South Africa have long embraced
the dream that, given the great wealth
and resources of South Africa, the
government might in the course of time
be persuaded to divert a slightly larger
cut of the profits in the direction of die
Blacks - that the pain and frustration of
black existence might be gradually
lessened. That particular myth has
crashed in flames at the same time as
the South African economy. As black
unemployment rockets towards 2 million,
and white unemployment begins to
appear in the statistics the lesson is driven
home that sitting on a goldmine is no
longer the key to all economic problems.
It is no longer possible to buy time. The
crisis has increased the pressures on
blacks to an unbearable degree — and it
has coincided with the emergence of a
new generation of young Africans who
are not content with the submissive
attitudes and low-key demands of their
parents. They have seen the success of
black liberation movements against white
minority regimes in Angola and Mozam
bique. In Angola they have also seen the
physical defeat of white South African
troops. In Rhodesia majority rule seems
inevitable.
The struggle against apartheid and white
supremacy has been firmly established
both inside and outside South Africa. But
the history of confrontation and repres
sion since June has enormously boosted
the growth of black consciousness. Apart
from anything else the original demands,
for the removal of Afrikaans as a teaching
medium, have borne fruit, despite furious
denials from the administration that the
concession would be made. Perhaps the
greatest blow to apartheid has been the
solidarity demonstrated between black
and coloured (mixed race) workers. It
has always been a major plank of apart
heid policy that the coloureds should be
treated preferentially, with officially
recognised trade unions, and skilled
technical jobs in industry. The coloured
demonstrations in Cape Town and
elsewhere effectively destroyed the myth
that by dividing the racial groupings
the white government could divide the
loyalties of black workers.
"
i r ^;
This map shows the
nation-wide areas of
unrest which started
in Soweto, on June
16.
1. June 16: Soweto.




3. June 18: Univer
sity of Zululand at
Ngoye, new
Empangeni.
4. June 18: Tokosa
and Daveytown,
near Benoni.
5. June 18: Natals-
pruit and Kathle-
hong, Germiston.
6. June 18: Vos-
borus at Boksburg.
7. June 18: Tembisa,
near Kempton
Park.
8. June 18: Kagiso
at Knigersdorp,
West Rand.
9. June 18: Univer
sity of the North,
Turfloop, near
Pietersburg.
10. June 20: Seshego
township, Pieters
burg.
11. June 21: Duduza
township, Nigel.






13. June 22: Low-
veld; Lekozi town
ship near Nelspndt.








16. July 18: Univer
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20. July 26: Ndwed-
we, Natal.
21. August 2: UWC
boycott at Bell-
vUle South.
22. August 4: Sowe
to violence flares
again.




24. August 8: Mont-
shiwa township,
near Mafeking.
25. August 9: Mdant-
sane township,
near East Loadon.









The townships of Soweto
The Cape
Hector Petersen was the first to die in Soweto on 16 June 1976.
SOWETO JUNE 16
When Hector Peterson, a thirteen year old school boy, was shot in the back at point
blank range outside Orlando West High School, the bullet came from the
pistol of a white policeman. It was a spark that was to set South Africa alight,
leaving hundreds dead and thousands crippled and maimed.
The tide of South African history had
turned. As the full story unfolds, it ts
clear that the official version under
rates the extent of the uprising and con
ceals the severity of the killings.
Afrikaans
The immediate issue was the Afrikaans
language. Until two years ago, Blacks in
secondary school were taught in English.
Now the authorities, despite resistance
from teachers, school boards, headmas
ters and students, were trying to enforce
a rule that half of all subjects would be
taught in Afrikaans, the language of the
most hated and reactionary section of
Whites.
All year, opposition to the change built
up...
Monday 17 MayPupils at Orlando West
Junior Secondary walk out. The 1600
pupils say that they have had enough
and will not go back until Afrikaans is
withdrawn. The following day, two
higher primary schools, Belle and Thu-
lasizwe also strike. Newspapers report
'children milling around the grounds,
some dancing and skipping unconcer
nedly while teachers waited patiently
for them to change their minds'.
The Inspector of the West Rand Edu
cation Council is puzzled: 'Have you
ever heard of 13 year old children strik
ing? The public does not realise that there
are many who want to spread unrest in
South Africa. I don't know who is behind
the strike - but it is not the children*.
The strike spreads. Pimville Higher
Primary pupils walk out. First reports
of striking pupils stoning police cars
emerge. Some pupils drift back to school.
Saturday 5 June Talks between Vorster
and Kissinger are announced for next
month.
Sunday 6 June Pupils set up pickets
and try to prevent a return to school.
Some schools are stoned.
Tuesday 8 June A police car in the
grounds of Naledi High school is set
alight, and the police stoned. Tear gas
is used to disperse demonstrating students.j
The Parents Association in Soweto res
ponds immediately: 'This is not the way
to put an end to Afrikaans in the schools.
Go back to school and leave it to us to
deal with the matter*.
Thursday 10 June Pupils throughout
Soweto refuse to take a Social Studies
paper in Afrikaans. The following day
Morris Isaacson School comes out on
strike. More trouble at Naledi High
where police are investigating the "burnt
car. Windows are broken and telephone
lines cut.
A warning that the situation is getting
serious is sent to the government by the
Institute for Race Relations, but they
are accused of 'over-reacting' by the
Ministry for Bantu Education.
Sunday 13 June The Parents Asso
ciation calls a meeting on the language
question for 4 July in an attempt to
cool the growing tension.
Tuesday 15 June Pupils of the
secondary schools in Soweto plan a walk
out and a meeting for the next day at the
stadium in Orlando West.
Day One
Wednesday 16 June Exactly what
triggered off the uprising will prdbably
remain a mystery. Certainly there was
enough tension and excitement around
Soweto that day to have sparked trouble
in a dozen different places. Before 7.00
am 15,000 schoolchildren had massed.
Their intention was to march on Orlando
Stadium, the huge open space at the
centre of Soweto.
The demonstration had been carefully
planned for two days by a committee
of senior pupils from several Soweto
schools. Although these students were
not yet having to learn subjects in Afri
kaans, the rumours that they would
shortly be forced to were persistent.
From all directions, students leavinghome
met up with others from their schools.
They were to converge at the Orlando
West Junior Secondary; chosen not only
because it was central to the march on
the Orlando Stadium, but more because
this was the first school to take up the
strike.
Singing and cheering, the students made
their way through the tail end of the
morning rush hour towards the stadium.
Boys and girls aged between 12 and 20.
Students from Orlando North, Naledi
High and the Morris Isaacson School,
where many of the leaders came from.
Alongside them, thousands of primary
school children, many from Soweto's
best known school, Orlando High.
The pupils carried placards made out
of exercise-book covers and old card
board boxes: "Down with Afrikaans";
"Afrikaans is a tribal language"; "Blacks
are not dustbins"; "Afrikaans is oppres
sors language".
As they passed schools they called to
students to come and join them. As the
different groups merged, the entire hill
and the surrounding area were covered
in youngsters. 'As I drove into their
midst, they made way for me and stood
on both sides of the road with their fists
raised and shouting "power" at the tops
of their voices. They were in an extremely
jovial mood. The whole atmosphere
was quite a happy one.' (eyewitness)
One of the principals of a school emp
tied by the marching students called for
the police. 'A student told the others:
"Brothers and sisters, we have just received
a report that the police are coming. I
appeal to you to keep calm and cool.
Don't taunt them, don't do anything to
them. We are not! fighting." (Weekend
World)
The police arrived; Both white and black,
they came in vanloads armed with semi
automatic rifles, sub-machine guns, tear
gas and batons. The police had loud
nailers, but no attempt was made to talk
to the pupils. Outside Orlando West Junior
School, where the strike had started six
weeks earlier, the police formed a line in
front of the pupils. 'We thought they
were going to disperse us with loud nailers
or a loud speaker, or maybe talk to us.
But they talked to themselves.' (Barney)
The students were waving placards and
singing "God save our nation' in Sotho,
and they shouted Ve don't want police
here'. 'Then a white policeman threw
H—B
a canister, and we saw this smoking
thing coming and we thought it was some
kind of bomb, so we ran back, but after
wards we saw it was only smoke so we
came back again.' (Barney)
Then other policemen started throwing
tear gas. The students held their ground.
In the front ranks students rubbed shoul
ders with ten year olds.
'A white policeman in uniform then pul
led out a revolver and aimed it at the
pupils standing just in front of him. A
coUeage of mine said "look at him, he's
going to shoot the kid".'
The policeman fired and more shots
followed. The students then attacked the
police. The schoolboy killed was 13 year
old Hector Petersen. The pathologist's
report suggested that when the bullet
entered he had his back to the officer
and was bending forwards.
Photographer Samuel Nzima of The
World said later: "The first shot was fired
before the children started throwing
stones. Then absolute chaos broke out.
The children ran all over the place and
stoned the police.
10.00 am News of the shooting raced
round Soweto. There were 15,000 stu
dents absent from school that day, and
what had started as a peaceful and
united march turned into an uprising.
Pupils, many of them in school uniform,
surged through the town, screaming their
anger and frustration. A number of child
ren lay dead on the road outside Orlando
Junior School, others ran bleeding
through the streets.
Barricades were set up and vehicles set
alight. As more police arrived students
ran out of side streets, attacked them
fiercely with stones, and ran away again.
Government buildings and government
property took the brunt of their anger.
One white official was pulled out of his
marked car and held hostage.
^Nearly all the administrative offices of
r he Bantu administration were attacked,
'and burned or smashed up. Post offices,
beer halls and bottle stores are the
property of the Bantu administration and
its major source of income. Slogans
8
Black police load bodies as Whites look on.
appeared on walls and the students
shouted 'less liquor, better education'
and \ve want more schools and less
beer halls'.
12 noon The destruction of buildings
representing government oppression was
accompanied by the outright use of FN
rifles and sub-machine guns by the
police. Many reporters told of indis
criminate shooting at Blacks.
Children killed
"I saw a young boy of six or seven fall
with a bullet wound. He had a bloody
froth on his lips ... I took him to the
Phefeni clinic but he was dead when we
arrived." (World reporter)
"The children began stoning the police.
Some surrounded the police and stoned
them from all directions. Shots were
fired. I remember looking at the child
ren in their school uniforms and wonder
ing how long they would stand up to the
police. Suddenly a small boy dropped to
the ground next to me. What frightened
me more than anything was the attitude
of the children. Many seemed to be
oblivious to the danger. They continued
running towards the police — dodging and
ducking. I began to take pictures of the
boy who was dying next to me. Blood
poured from his mouth and some child
ren knelt next to him and tried to stop
the flow of blood." (MS Kumalo, South
African Sunday Times®
Police reinforcements poured into Sowe
to. By midday the wiiole township was
out of control. At tMs point the South
African police's new para-military anti-
urban terrorism unit was called in. It was
the first time the unit, using hand-picked
men from stations a31 over the Reef,
had been used against Macks.
3.30 pm One unit of 55 men and three
officers led by Colonel Theunis Swane-
poel entered Soweto. A crowd of four
to five thousand had gathered at Orlando
West. Vehicles had been overturned and
set alight and the crowd were throwing
stones.
'It was a chaotic situation. Four vehicles
were burnt. It was tise most waansinnig
(demented) scene I have come across in
my life.' (Swanepoei) He said he realised
that he would have to fight through the.
crowd to break them up. They used only
high velocity rifles.
Tear gas would have lad no effect and a
baton charge would Jiave been suicide.'
Swanepoel claimed to recognise the leader
of the crowd 'from the movement he
made with his hands'. He fired a single
shot at him, but he disappeared into the
crowd. Then he fired a further eight shot*
at the 'lieutenants of the leader on either
side of him' and tlse crowd disper*f
(Colonel Swaoepoel was formerly ntfi
Some reports suggested that Hector Petersen was shot by black policemen. Eye
witness accounts, however, stress that on June 16th black police were posed for
photographs pointing their pistols. They were then ordered back without firing
and white marksmen took over. Later newspaper reports that confidence in the
South African economy had not been shaken on the New York Stock Exchange
attributed this fact to the pictures which had appeared in the American press,
showing 'black policemen shooting at rioters'. American investors felt that this
was not 'another Sharpeville'. __^^^__^__^_^^^^^_
interrogator for the security police
and has been denounced by name by
the United Nations General Assembly.)
Security Net
Many of the students believed that these
units were the army. "They were wearing
camouflage overalls and carrying rifles.
Most of them on 16 June were really
young boys, who looked as though they
were still being trained. They used auto
matic rifles; there is not one shot, you
just hear drrrrr..." (eyewitness)
Far from controlling the situation, para
military units only added fuel to the con
frontation. A black plain clothes police
man and a white official of the Bantu
Affairs administration were 'captured',
beaten up and held hostage.
Police action was restricted to 'sorties'
from the central police station and a
security zone close by. Units of police
would locate groups ofpupils and students
and then the confrontation followed, the
pupils throwing stones and the police
shooting down any students who stood
their ground.
One large group of students, at the far
end of town, stopped a huge trailer lorry
full of beer. The cargo was smashed and
the lorry set alight. Then the local ad
ministrative office of the Bantu Affairs
administration was set alight and the
records destroyed. The officials fled.
The demonstrators marched to White
City No 1 Office and ransacked it before
setting it alight. Police helicopters,
which had been called in, tried to break
up the crowd by dropping tear gas
canisters. In an area stretching from
Mzimhlope through Meadowlands up to
the Zola-Naledi complex, at least ten
Putcp buses, nine administration offices,
a post office, golf clubhouse, a bank and
a library were gutted, and eight bottle
stores and two bar lounges destroyed.
Reporters arriving on the scene were not
allowed near any of the bodies that lay
on the open ground. Police guards were
placed on the bodies and reporters told
•it's none of your business'. The bodies
were eventually taken away in police
vans.
7.00 pm To the people returning from
work in Johannesburg that evening, the
events in Soweto came as a complete
surprise. As thousands of men and
women poured out of Inhlazane Station
they were met by security police. No
attempt was made to explain the situ
ation. As a huge crowd gathered the
police charged with batons. Tear gas
was thrown but the crowd of commu
ters responded by throwing bricks and
stones at the police, and before long
older people had joined the students
and youths on the streets of Soweto.
As night fell the township was ablaze.
Buses that had brought back the wor
kers from the cities were taken over and
set alight. One was hijacked and driven
through the front of an administration
building. Under cover of darkness bands
of people roamed the streets removing
furniture from smashed buildings, and
the liquor shops were emptied. There
were many reports of 'looters' being
shot, and the death toll rose.
Yet by. nightfall police would only admit
that three people had been killed, 'a
young black, an old man and a black
policeman'. Figures were relased later
admitting 25 dead and 200 injured. The
sxact death toll on day one of the up
rising will never be known.
As time goes on stories emerge of a
concerted effort on the part of the
authorities to obscure the number of
deaths. Rumours persist of the police
burning bodies, of heavily guarded
mass graves, and the removal of large
numbers of dead by truck out of the
Johannesburg area.
That night the township was cut off
by the police. Only troop reinforce
ments were allowed in. By the next
morning a huge contingent of heavily
armed policemen was on standby and
planning to move into Soweto in ar
moured vehicles.
Day Two
Thursday 17 June 'Uncontrollable
fury and the burning hostility of the
people' was the mood of the township on
day two. (eyewitness)
The newspapers tried to claim it was the
tsotsi (hooligan) element taking over
where the students left off. Shops were
destroyed throughout the townships.
Groups of pupils went to shopkeepers
and demanded to see their trading licen
ces. If the shops were owned or part-
owned by Whites, they were burnt down
immediately.
The police on Day Two used different
tactics. They shot at random. Anyone
who raised a clenched fist or shouted
'power' at the security forces was a 'ring
leader'. Children, bodies holed by bul
lets and arms still clenched in the power
9
salute, lay on the bloody ground. Eye
witnesses tell of police shooting their
victims in the genitals. (Barney)
The unrest spread beyond the South
Western Townships.
Small groups of students left Soweto
to spread the news of the killings and
to encourage other pupils and students
to support them. Kagiso township, just
to the north of Soweto, erupted. At
Tembisa, on the other side of Johan
nesburg, the students organised a march
in sympathy with the students of Soweto.
At the same time, 400 white students
of Witwatersrand University expressed
their solidarity with a march in the
centre of Johannesburg. The black
pupils and white students in the front
ranks were joined by black bystanders.
A crowd of Whites in shirt-sleeves carry
ing chains and crowbars, and later repor
ted to be plain clothes police, tore into
the march and attempted to break it up.
Evening papers carrying pictures of Blacks
and Whites heading the march said that
the march later reformed and eventually
dispersed peacefully.
Alexandra
News of Soweto had reached Alexandra
township the day before, and the anger
of the schoolchildren erupted as; they
made their way to school that Thursday.
By 7.30 am the West Rand Adminis
tration Board offices were badly damaged.
Dozens of vehicles had been set alight
and two Putco buses were burning fiercely
near the centre. A huge road block was
set up in the centre of the township with
the words 'why kill kids for Afrikaans'
written in large letters across it. The
police quickly set up headquarters in the
damaged WRAB office block and hund
reds of riot squad police moved about
the township armed with automatic
weapons. Argus reporters told how the
township echoed to the sound of auto-
I matic fire and the screams of young child-
yen.
ISoweto
Putco suspended the bus services, leaving





Blazing beerhall — Soweto
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Riot squads and local police in operation in Soweto, June 1976.
numbers on the streets. The pall of
smoke that hung over the township made
it impossible for the police to co-ordin
ate their operations from the air. At
various points students and residents had
set up barricades and created 'no-go areas'.
Newspapers described police activity as
varying between 'indiscriminate killing'
and 'inaction*. The police opened fire
without warning, and I saw several people
fall, I looked at them and three appeared
to be dead.' (Star)
One reporter in a police patrol described
how the patrol was 'ambushed' by youths
hurling stones. 'Our driver trying to avoid
the rocks ran into some barrels placed in
■; the road by the rioters, immobilising us.
■ Police leapt from the armoured car
* firing. Both policemen in the car with
me fired their pistols. The stone-throwers
disappeared behind the, store. Although
the plain clothes men reckoned at least
two of the youths had been Mt, we did
not dare to stop and check.'
At Zola, Dcwezi, Moletsaae, Mofolo
North and Naledi, the rebellion continued.
Offices and shops were looted. Trucks
were overturned and cars stopped and set
alight by groups of young people. 'Passing
police vehicles ignored them.' (Star)
Orlando Police Station, the centre of the
police operation against the rebellion,
was surrounded on all sides by chanting
schoolchildren. At intervals police armed
with rifles and sub-machine guns would
leave to investigate 'incidents' in the
township. In most cases they fired shots,
threw tear gas canisters and then re
treated, making no attempts at arrest. On
the rugby pitch opposite the police
station air-force 'Alouette' helicopters
would land, pick up loads of tear gas and
fly off again. 'About 9.00 am, police
brought in the blood-spattered body of
an African. It lay on the grass outside
die station all morning.' (Star)
A 'Super Frelon' helicopter flew low
overhead. Inside it was the Deputy Chief
Commissioner of Police, conducting an
on the spot investigation. As a result the
Witwatersrand Command (army) was
put on standby.
As well as sealing off Soweto, the police
ordered people in Roodeport, Mondeor
and other places bordering on Soweto not
to leave their areas. All leave was can
celled. Anxious Whites were informed
by officials of the municipal services in
Johannesburg that essential services would
not be affected by the "riots' as the black
municipal labourers were housed in hos
tels 'elsewhere*.
9.00 am A clash was reported between
police and pupils in Dobsonville. Several
people were killed. In Naledi, described
as the main trouble spot, angry young
sters created a 'no-go area'. In Klipstown
the roads were made impassable by
crowds throwing stones. In Dube, the
'middle class' area of Soweto, Barclays
Bank was burned down and food delivery
vehicles halted by students.
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Alexandra, Friday 18 June. An armed policeman keeps angry bystanders at bay after a black driver and his passenger
were shot dead as they drove through the township. The car overturned after the killings. Moment later the crowd
saized sticks and dustbin lids and attacked the police surrounding the car shouting 'Why don't you kill us too?' A volley





Besides the bodies brought to Orlando
Police Station, the hospital at Barag-
wanath on the outskirts of Soweto was
filling up with the victims of the police
shootings. A five year old girl, Tandi
Plaatjies, was one of the first repoited
victims. She was brought in with a boy
of about 14 who was never identified.
The gates to the hospital were manned by
police anti-riot squads, and at one point
black nurses in the hospital, 'mostly
women in starched white uniforms',
attacked them for the way they were
delaying the admission of badly wounded
children. A young boy who had been shot
three times by the police was kept wait
ing outside the hospital gate. He had been
the victim of police action on the playing
fields of Masekhene Primary School.
Shortly afterwards another child was
brought from the same place. At this
point police cleared reporters from the
hospital gate.
As night fell the police admitted that the
death toll had risen to 58 (two Whites),
with 788 (five Whites) injured. (Sunday
Times 20.6.76). They could see no end
to the violence and the trouble was
spreading. Asked if he felt the situation
was in danger of getting worse, Major
General W.H. Kotze, in charge of the
anti-riot squads, replied: 'Can it get
worse? We have no contact with the
rioters and they have no contact' with
us.' He refused to say how many police
were being deployed or what type of
units were in use, although journalists
on the scene estimated that there were
well over 1,000.
Although Soweto was quieter by mid
night, the neighbouring township of
Kagiso erupted. What had started as a
demonstration by black pupils became
increasingly violent towards nightfall
as they were joined by older people
back from work. Five people were killed
by police. Soweto's hospital was full,
so casualties of the evening's shootings
in Soweto and Kagiso were taken to
iLeratong Hospital near Krugersdorp.
■Official figures for admission were 66
Wery badly injured.
In Johannesburg the evening newspapers





Preparing to move into the townships
Day Three
Friday 18 June News of the killings
and brutality spread through the town
ships and reserves of South Africa. A
thousand kilometres away in the Cape,
police were taking 'all necessary pre
cautions' around the black townships of
Guguletu, Langa and Nyanga. The violence
spread with the news, sometimes as a
spontaneous outburst of anger, some
times in direct response to the tightening
grip of the authorities attempting to head
off the uprising.
At 5.00 am workers waiting in Vosloorus
township for buses to Johannesburg be
came angry because the buses were being
delayed by road blocks and security
checks. When the buses arrived at last, the
waiting crowd stoned them and then set
light to them. A police mortuary van that
arrived on the scene was stopped at the
same time, overturned and destroyed.
By first light a huge pall of smoke hung
over Alexandra township to the north
east of Johannesburg. By early morning
the whole of the business district was
burning, and large areas of the town were
turned into 'no-go areas' by the angry
students and residents. Thick black smoke
drifted across the prosperous suburbs
of Lombardy East and West.
Traffic between Johannesburg and Pre
toria, and out to Kempton Park and
Jan Smuts airport was disrupted, and
police used road blocks to divert traffic
around Alexandra.
On the campus at the black University
of Zululand near Durban, 500 kilometres
from Soweto, nearly 2,000 students
assembled to protest. By 7.00 am they
had set light to the University buildings
and had driven out all the white staff.
Three buildings, a church, the admin
block and the library, were burned.
Flames could be seen in Empangeni, 18
kilometres away. News that a similar
protest planned at the (black) University
of the North and directed at the Depart
ment of Afrikaans had been quashed by
security forces only inflamed student
anger. But by 11.00 am the Zululand
campus was surrounded by para-military
units and the protest had been quelled.
A heavy security ring had been thrown
around Johannesburg's black townships
to control the uprising and to prevent
news leaking out of its extent. But by
late morning it was apparent that nearly
all the townships around Johannesburg
and Pretoria were in uproar.
There were angry scenes in Tokosa
and Daveyton in the Benoni district
south of Soweto, in Natalspruit and
Katlehong at Germiston, and in Vos
loorus at Boksburg, just south of Johan
nesburg. And to the east of the city at
Tembisa near Kempton Park there were
reports of attacks on police and adminis
tration property.
Soweto
Meanwhile in Soweto the uneasy lull
that had settled over the township during
the night was broken by the outbreak of
further violent protests. More buildings
were burnt. The lack of detailed infor
mation reflects the restrictions placed on
journalists. Reporters were told of fierce
fighting between a task force and black
youths in the Klipspruit neighbourhood
of Soweto. The numbers killed and injured
were never announced. But Colonel
Gerber, the assistant police chief, said
that the situation in Soweto was *tiu
unchanged and Very confused and ugly.
At this stage it is impossible to say
whether the army will be called in.' Just
how haphazard the police shooting was
is illustrated by the fact that a famous
footballer Ariel 'Pro' Khougoane was shot
through the head as he drove through the
Rockville Shopping Centre in Soweto.
News of his death spread like wildfire.
One reporter who slipped through the
police road block reported: in Soweto
now a white skin is a death warrant —
unless under the protecting guns of the
police. And the white police are edgy
and angry. They are unable to understand
what is going on and are none too gentle
with black suspects. The black police,
there are hundreds concentrated at
Orlando Police Station, say little and do
as they are told.' (Star)
The bodies of dead protesters, bundled
into blankets, lay around the police
station precinct. A large crowd lingered
'sullenly' not far away, and occasionally
a tear gas canister would be lobbed and
they would move back. The commanding
officer of operations in Soweto admitted
that he was 'perplexed by the black
mind'.
Press men close to the police station were
'hustled away' when repeated screams of
'Baas, moenie my slaan nie' ('Boss, don't
hit me') were heard coming from the
cells. Police jostled round the door and
window to see what was going on inside.
People returning from work to Soweto
in the evening had to walk. What few
buses and taxis did run stopped at the
outskirts of the town and dropped their
passengers. Many workers didn't want to
use the buses anyway, and there were
sporadic outbreaks of stone-throwing
directed at the Putco buses.
The chairman of the West Rand Adminis
tration Board admitted that all Soweto's
administration buildings had been des
troyed, together with a substantial propor
tion of government property. All the beer
halls and bottle stores had been looted
and burnt and at least 120 vehicles burned
but. 'Even a bank and a library have been
burnt out. This was simply because it is
white man's property.' (Star)
A reporter on the Rand Daily Mail, Mateu
Colonel Swanepoel once head of Security
Police interrogation, led the riot police
attacks in Soweto.
Nonyane sat outside the police station in
Orlando throughout the night of the 17
June. He heard people screaming in the
charge office.
'He saw a group of 20 students being
tortured by black policemen outside the
charge office in the middle of the night.
The students were led into a courtyard
and made to hop for twenty minutes
while police hit them with batons and
rubber hoses all over their bodies.
'Bodies of people killed in the rioting
were laid outside the police station and
the pile grew throughout the night. In the
early hours of the morning the students
were again brought out, forced to hop for
another 20 minutes and then told by
policemen to load corpses into the
mortuary van. As they did so the van
attendant kicked and assaulted them.'
(Evidence given to the Cillie Commission
RDM 25.9.76)
Day Four/Five
Saturday/Sunday 19/20 June An
uneasy peace settled over the townships,
although most areas were reported as
being Very tense' throughout the week
end. Many of the deliveries of basic
foodstuffs to the townships were stopped.
In Soweto dozens of shops were closed,
but any vans trying to make deliveries
were stopped by angry residents and
either sent back or destroyed. The deputy
fire chief of Johannesburg admitted that
fire and ambulance services had not been
operating in Soweto since Thursday.
There is no danger of fires spreading in
Soweto among the small individual
houses' he added. (Sunday Express)
The Authorities Give Way on Afrikaans
Mr M.C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Educa
tion, claimed that Afrikaans had not
been compulsory anyway and schools
could apply to deviate from the 50/50
principle of half of all school subjects
being taught in Afrikaans, it was clear',
he said, 'that the tragic circumstances in
Soweto were caused by misunderstanding
and confusion.'
No such mediation was offered by the
Deputy Minister, A.P. Treurnicht, who
asserted that 'it was in the Bantu's own
good that he learned in Afrikaans. And
where government builds schools and
pays subsidies, is it not their right to
determine in which language pupils must
be taught' (Weekend World).
Casualties
The police admitted that at least 97
people had died and more than 1,000
were injured in the uprising. They did
add that an unknown number had been
shot during 'looting and troublemaking'
over the weekend.
The Soweto Parents Association called
a meeting to discuss the huge problem
of burying all the victims.
Day Six
Monday 21 June Rebellion and
violence spread to African townships
around Pretoria, and there was renewed
protest in other parts of the Transvaal.
By the end of the day another ten people
were dead. By midday there were tower
ing columns of smoke over Mamelodi,
Pretoria's 'showpiece' urban township
- 'never before the scene of political
rioting'. (Cape Times)
In Atteridgeville, within sight of Pre
toria's skyscrapers, the shopping centre
was set alight and crowds of blacks con
fronted the police throughout the day.
Petrol bombs were thrown into many
of the township's bottle stores and by
mid-afternoon smoke filled the area.
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Further north in Mabapone, the main
targets were the buses belonging to the
African Bus Service. More than a dozen
red and white buses lay burning along
the township road, and the company's
main terminus was set on fire.
Trouble started outside the local high
school when pupils refused to go to
the classrooms after morning assembly.
Again, thje first victim of police bullets
was a boy of 13.
In Mamelodi trouble spilled outside the
townships and at one point threatened
to spread into the white suburbs of
Silverton and Jan Niemand Park.
The main road between Mabapone and
Pretoria was blocked most of the day
by large groups of young Blacks, and em
ployers in Pretoria claimed that very few
workers from the township turned up for
work. Of those who did manage to get
through, many were stopped at road
blocks outside the city. Nervous security
police seemed uncertain of the intentions
of Blacks they let into the city. Many
were turned back.
In the afternoon five Whites were attacked
by a Black in John Vorster Square in the
centre of Johannesburg, shouting 'black
Africa' and 'Take revenge for the children
of Soweto'. After a chase, a Black was
wounded by police buDets and taken to
the central police headquarters. Minutes
later he plunged to his death from the
fourth floor of the police building.
Day Seven
Tuesday 22 June The police figure
for casualties the day before was ten
killed, but the crowds milling around the
Hillbrow Mortuary in Johannesburg sug
gested that the casualties were much
higher. Many families left weeping, but
others were told to 'come back later
I when more bodies had been received*.
lOne family from Naledi in Soweto, iden-
■fying the body of their 18 year old
Haughter, said: 'There were lots of bullet
I holes in her body'. Many families repor
ted having to pay as much as R200 (£140)
to get the bodies of their children out of
the mortuary.
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While many of the townships round
Pretoria were reported quiet, in Ga Ran-
kuwa, north-west of the city, the pattern
of unrest was repeated. What had started
as pupil protest outside the High School
in Zone 1 ended with the school being
burned down and textbooks destroyed.
Mamelodi was described by police as
Very tense', and although firing was
heard during the day in the centre of the
township, police prevented any press in
vestigation. Later there were reports of
six killed.
A similar pattern of rebellion erupted in
Lowveld and Lekozi near Nelspruit,




Police tell the parents to get their child
ren off the streets. 'Children will be
injured because the police are forced to
act harshly and we don't want to hurt
children.'
This statement sparked off a discussion
among young people in the townships.
It is quite clear that the traditional
leaders, the parent organisations, had no
control over the situation. One student
said: 'We cannot take it any longer. It
is our parents who have let tilings go on
far too long without doing anything.
They have failed. We have been forced
to fight to the bitter end.' (The World)
The Minister of Bantu Administration
and Development, M.C. Botha, alleged
that the riots had been deliberate and had
been planned and prepared by Whites.
Blacks had been incited. The government
had to contend with 'reckless liberals'
who were exploiting misunderstanding
among black people.
The latest casualty figures released by the
police claim that 176 have been killed
and thousands injured.
The townships appeared quiet apart
from isolated incidents in Lynville/
Witbank, and Daveyton near Benoni. The
movements of security forces to the
Platteland suggested that they anticipated
the trouble spreading.
By 25 June the two State mortuaries at
Hillbrow and Fordsburg were filled to
capacity, despite the far that a constant
stream of parents and relatives were
taking bodies away. The police ordered
the surplus of bodies to be held at the
hospital mortuaries.
At the weekend a highly ominous go
vernment plan emerged, to make die
Makgotla — tribally-based vigilante groups
in the townships - legal.
Meanwhile the parents of the scores of
pupils killed in Soweto plan a mass
funeral. Strong contingents of police
patrol the townships, and in the streets
of Soweto 'hippo' patrols rumble con
stantly through the streets.
Thursday 1 July Considerable anger
was aroused in Soweto by the govern
ment decision to ban the mass funeral of
victims. On Tuesday and Wednesday
funerals took place all over the Reef
without incident. Many unidentified
victims of the uprising were given a
pauper's funeral — buried in unmarked
graves. The townships are quiet but tense.
The following Sunday, M.C. Botha per
mitted the principals of each school to
choose the main medium of instruction.
At the beginning of the week, many
charged with rioting are set free. But
behind (he luD and the widely reported
releases, the police began rounding up
leaders of the black organisations.
Thursday 8 July Reports emerged
that many children, some as young as
eight, were being held in police cells.
Major General Kotze and Brigadier Roos
of John Vorster Police Headquarters
denied all knowledge of children still
being in custody. But when told that
reporters had seen them they said: 'What
do you think would happen if we let
them run around the streets? Do you
think that we would ever find them
again?' No precise charges were to be
brought against the children.
The lull persisted until 19 July. There
were constant rumours of further unrest,
but nothing definite happened. The
police stepped up security operation!.
But persistent press reports of further
Sowetochadren shoat defwnce and give 'power' salutes around burnt out delivery van.
rebeilim continue. Fort Hare University
was dosed until further notice. There
were scattered cases of arson reported
in Soweto, Sharpevflte, West Transvaal
and NeSspruit.
Thursday 22 July After being closed
since 16 June, the schools were officially
reopened. The majority of the township
schools remained empty. Civic leaders
and teachers made it known that the
pupils were not at school because they
were loo frightened of police violence.
Heav% armed police continued to patrol
the steeets of Soweto. The sight of an
armomed patrol was enough to send
peopte fleeing from the streets. In the
face of criticism the head of Soweto
CID, Colonel Visser, said he saw 'no i | .
reasom for police being blamed when they i a
are olmously there to protect the public , -1
in cases of intimidation'.
Tuesday 27 July The schools began
to BEL, but Mamelodi High and Irene
Farm School were set alight and exten- > |
sively damaged. These two cases of arson , |
markei the beginning of the next stage > f,..
in the uprising of Soweto. Over the next
ten days or so 50 or more schools went
up in flames. On the evening of 27 July
six schools and a youth club were des
troyed in Soweto. The next day another
five Soweto schools were damaged by
fire; Zola High, Orlando West High, plus
Eiselen High, Phiri High, Tladi Primary,
and, in Diepkloof, Madibane High. The
flames spread throughout the Transvaal,
'Hippo' meets Soweto roadblock
Natal and the Orange Free State.
The police admitted that police security
patrols were being continually hampered
by bands of stone-throwing youths in the
townships.
Sunday 1 August In the previous
week, student leader Mashinini called for
a return to school: 'We can only conque"
when we have a strong standpoint and
stand as one.' The Soweto Students Rep
resentative Council was formed to repre
sent the interests of the pupils and
students in Soweto. The burning of
schools is condemned and a call made
for a return to school.
Tuesday 3 August Searching for the
leaders of the Black Consciousness Move
ment, police entered a number of schools
to interrogate and arrest. Shots were
fired as students took on the police.
Students poured out of the schools
in Soweto and Tembisa.
Wednesday 4 August A huge eruption
of violence took place in the townships
around the Reef. The press emphasised
the spontaneous nature of the eruption,
but it was quite dearly the result of an
intensification of police activity directed
against students, and particularly the new
student leaders, returning to school. The
action was centred on Alexandra and
Soweto.
Police encircled Soweto with a "huge
blockade". Demonstrating students in
school uniform attempted to persuade
workers not to go to work. A stretch
of the main line to Johannesburg was
torn up and all trains into Johannesburg
were cancelled. Buses taking workers to




During the morning the thousands of
students who had attempted to persuade
their elders not to go to work joined
up and marched towards Johannesburg.
They broke through one police road
block but were halted by massive units
of anti-riot police at the New Canada
Railway Junction. Although students
made no attempt to break through the
cordon, and the front rank held up
notices saying 'We are not fighting,
don't shoot', 12 of them were shot
down and three died immediately.
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Two of the pupils were shot point blank
by tear gas canisters and seriously injured.
Thursday 5 August Student
marches on the second day of the new
upsurge of student protest were confron
ted by security police implementing a hit
and pursue procedure. There were shoot
ings in Pimville and White City and
reports of a massacre of pupils cornered
in a yard deep in Soweto. The following
day General Prinsloo, the South African
Commissioner of Police, announced that
the police were on standby throughout
South Africa and large reinforcements
had been sent to Soweto. He added: We
are not happy with the situation in
Soweto. The disturbances are showing
no sign of coming to an end and it seems
that responsible people in Soweto cannot,
or will not, do anything about the situ
ation ... We cannot allow our system of
justice to fall to pieces to meet the de
mands of a handful of students.'
In the last two days police sources ad
mitted nine people shot dead and over
40 injured.
Sunday 8 August The marches,
the stoning, the firing of schools, con
tinued, reaching a climax with students
marching through Montshiwa township
near Mafeking on the afternoon of 8
August and burning down the Legislative
Assembly building. The police admitted
that more than 200 people had been ar
rested in the recent unrest including most
of the alleged 'leaders of the Black Con
sciousness Movement' {The Argus). In
Hammanskraal another 197 pupils, 97
of them women, were arrested by police
after the burning of a school building.
Wednesday 11 August The schools
were empty again and not even the
teachers turned up for classes. Kruger
announced that 'indefinite preventative
detention' had been introduced to wipe
out the 'Black Power Movement, which is
the main cause of unrest in the townships.
The ideology is completely negative and
completely destructive, and it does not
hold any possibility for discussion or
anything like that at all, and it is a very
difficult thing to try and contain.' {The
World)
Saturday/Sunday 14/15 August
Winnie Mandela, symbol and leader of the
Black Parents Association, was arrested.
Twenty six black students were anested
during a peaceful protest in Mdantsane
near East London, and following the
arrest of Mrs Mandela, 38 other key mem
bers of the Black Parents Association
were also picked up. No black organis
ation was spared, and by the end of the
weekend more than 60 prominent Blacks
were in detention. Appeals to Kruger to
'meet' black leaders to avert further
conflict were met with the retort: "There
is no-one to see, they are all behind bars'.
Tuesday/Wednesday 17/18 August
On Tuesday the main trouble spots were
the townships around Port Elizabeth.
Police admitted killing eight students on
the first day.
Throughout Wednesday heavy firing was
heard coming from the area as students
massed to march on the White-owned in
dustrial area. The fighting lasted all day.
Brigadier Kriel of the riot police claimed:
"The violence is the final throes of the
unrest that has disrupted South Africa
for nearly two months'. The two-day
struggle around Port Elizabeth left 33
dead.
The official figure for deaths since 16
June was given as 231 dead and 1,200
injured.
In a speech which greatly amused his
Nationalist audience and which was
widely reported in the press, Kruger said
of the blacks: 'He knows his place, and if
not I'll tell him. The Blacks always say
"We shall overcome", but I say we shall
overcome.' He also admitted that many
of those arrested 'may never be charged
but may be held indefinitely under the
new "preventative detention" laws'.
(21.8.76)
By the end of the month 800 people were
officially detained, including 77 leaden
of the Black Consciousness movements
{The Star 30.8.76).
THE CAPE GOES UP
A thousand miles away in the black townships around Cape Town, die tension bnflt up.
Police surrounded schools, in an attempt
to ensure that there was no repetition of
the events in Soweto. This meant that
pupils could no longer use the schools
for studying after hours.
Minor incidents involving riot police
and students at the Universities of Cape
Town and the Western Cape occurred.
The sight of vanloads of heavily armed
riot police roaming the area became
commonplace.
Wednesday 11 August The black
townships of the Cape witness the start
of a wave of protest that has not yet
ended. Our source in South Africa des
cribes how it happened.
'At 8.15 am Langa High school students
congregated on the sports field, instead
of assembling in front of their teachers to
break up for their classes, which is the
customary practice. A visibly apprehen
sive crowd of onlookers from all walks
of life materialised gradually.
'Nobody asked what was the matter, or
what the students were discussing. The
meeting itself was well out of earshot,
but student after student could be seen
gesticulating, obviously striving to ham
mer a point home. A distinct feature of
die meeting was the fact that the dis
cussion was neither confined to nor
monopolised by the recognised clique.
'As the meeting dragged on, three van-
loads of riot police sped past the school
towards Langa police station. It was now
8.4S am. The crowd, which had been
growing spasmodically, became restless.
About ten students appeared from the
direction of the railway station and
greeted the crowds, who responded en-
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husiastically with Black Power salutes.
Police entered the school, and spent
ibout 30 minutes inside. They left again,
vithout trying to address the students.
Vhen teachers tried to negotiate with the
tudents they were booed until they had
0 retreat to the offices.
About 45 minutes after the police had
eft, the students left the school and
rickled into Washington Street in a
peaceful demonstration in solidarity
vith the victims of Soweto.
The students advanced towards the
>achelors' quarters area of town, fol-
owed by a group of teachers determined
:o see that the demonstration remained
jrderly. They in turn were followed by
1 convoy of riot police vehicles^
The entire procession was almost sur
rounded by the crowd, which began
shouting at the police. As the demon
stration approached a bottle store, stones
were thrown by the crowd. The students
turned back towards the centre of the
township, and the stone throwing
stopped.
'Eventually, after marching a little
longer, the students returned to school,
ind at 2.00 pm they broke up formally.'
Exactly when violence broke out is
unclear, but 'soon afterwards the police
riot squad moved into Washington Street,
which was crowded with thousands of
people of all ages, and warned the mobs
to disperse. Police then moved away from
the spot, but stopped again a short dis
tance from the Langa police station as
another crowd formed in an open space
beside a primary school.' (Cape Times
J12.8.76)
A police officer gave the screaming
crowd five minutes to disperse, and with
in minutes tear gas was fired straight
at the massed crowds as stones and
bottles began to rain down on police
vehicles.
Riot squad dog handlers singled out
people from the crowd and set_ the
on them. "The man was brought
^jwn screaming by the snarling dog
and arrested - his clothing tattered




Chained by the neck a Black is led away by a plain clothes policeman.
A woman shouted 'You come to kill
innocent black people and children.
Why don't you get out of our town
ship?' She was arrested.
By a quarter to six the bottle store was
ablaze, a single quarters block was on
fire, and the police were again using
tear gas to disperse the crowd.
Arrests
In the adjacent townships of Guguletu
and Nyanga, similar demonstrations
took place in the morning, and were met
with immediate violence by the police.
Students from Fezeka and I.D. Mkize
schools, who tried to march to Langa
to link up with the demonstration there,
were dispersed by a volley of teargas
canisters. They reformed and went to
Nyanga, and marched from school to
school bringing out more pupils.
Then they continued their march,
moving towards the Walter Teka primary
school. At the entrance to the school,
the riot police were waiting. They gave
them eight minutes to disperse, and
when they didn't, police fired teargas
into the marchers and managed to arrest
30 of them. Those who could retreated
to the bushes that separate Nyanga from
Guguletu.
Within ten minutes they were on their
way to Guguletu police station. The
station was surrounded by the angry
crowd, who were washing down their
faces with bottles of water as a defence
against the teargas thrown at them.
Volunteers surfaced to put the demands
for the release of the arrested students.
Eventually all the students were released
— except one. The anger of the crowd
redoubled, police fired tear gas canisters
repeatedly, vehicles were stoned.. The
last student emerged ...
All the eyewitness reports of the demon
strations in Langa and Guguletu stress
that they were peaceful until the police
attacked.
Police action
i am convinced trlat the situation could
have been contained. The interference of
the police aggravated a potentially
explosive situation. ... It is a fallacy to
attribute all violent incidents to the
skollie (hooligan) element, the way the
press did.' (Langa Shop owner)
'It was a peaceful demonstration till the
police arrived. It is only a pity that the




police fired on the mobs because the
people then adopted a militant stand.
When your kids are shot you cannot
keep your cool. I saw people fleeing in
panic and shot as they were running
away.' (A resident)
It is very unclear when the police started
shooting to kill, or who the first victims
were. All we can say definitely is that
armed police killed sixteen unarmed
Africans that day, and wounded at least
51 more.
6.00 pm As people came home from
work in Cape Town, they joined in the
demonstrations. The bottle stores, long
resented by the black inhabitants of the
townships, were set on fire.
Heavily armed
As night approached, police operations
took on the character of a search and
destroy mission into occupied territory.
Henrie Geyser of 77ie Argus describes
such a mission into Guguletu. 'Clouds of
smoke filled the air and flames lit up the
night sky as several buildings and beer-
halls burnt... We left the police station
about 9.30 in convoy of six mesh protec
ted police vehicles and accompanied by
about 80 heavily armed policemen.
The atmosphere was tense as the convoy
cruised through the scarred township.
Rocks and bottles smashed down on the
police vehicles.
'From where we stood we could see the
flashes of gunfire as the convoy used
rifles and teargas to break up the crowd
. . . other police carried the wounded
to a large police vehicle ... 20 minutes
later we were back at the police station
where dead and dying were transferred
into waiting ambulances.'
From inside the police station, where
reporters were then confined, the crackle
of machine gun fire could be heard
through the long night. Loud explosions
echoed across the Cape Flats some time
before midnight - probably gas cylinders
exploding in the fires.
Thursday 12 August Early in the ,
morning, Colonel Kotze, the officer in I
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The riot torn areas were cut off - people
could only enter and leave the area
under police supervision. The injured
could only reach hospitals through them
and those who didn't want to give them
selves up were effectively cut off from
medical attention.
Many victims who were brought to
traumer units were seen peppered by
buck-shot - an excruciating and very
effective method of controlling "mobs".
Others had multiple broken bones and
perforation wounds of 9 mm Paanal-
sellum bullets, others had slashed skin
It is alleged that a black doctor who was
treating his injured people, was discover
ed. When they came to arrest him the
people refused Jo let him eo and the ,
Utter in University of Cape Town Student Magazine
police shot the doctor in the leg.
In traumer units ,22 inch calibre bullets
were excised - this they said, was proof
that there is interfaction fighting and
that many of the casualties weren t
police caused at all, yet it is alleged that
many South African Police carry their
own weapons besides the standard 9 mm
Panalsellums.
These are but a few incidents alleged to
have occurred - few of which were
reported in the daily press, but from the
above one could conclude that medical
services are being held for ransom at the
price of political gain.
If this is true, it is contrary to medical
ethic and shouldn't be tolerated.
4TH YEAR MEDIC
charge of police operations in Guguletu,
felt able to make a statement. The situ
ation, which had been out of control at
10.00 pm the night before, was 'easing.
Police had resorted to the use of shot
guns, firing birdshot into crowds of
'looters'. The measures had proved
'effective'.
But it wasn't long before Langa police
station was once again surrounded - this
time by Langa High school students
carrying placards saying 'We are not
fighting'.
The police told them to disperse - and
fired tear gas canisters at them. An eye
witness describes what happened next.
'During the hullabaloo several shots were
fired and one student fell dead and two
were injured. Frantic efforts were made
by the students to pick up their dead
colleague but they were thwarted as the
guns were pointed at them.
•It was the most poignant moment of
my life. It was like a revelation of what
naked brutality is, the students weeping
but still defying the teargas in a vain bid
to pick up their fallen colleague.
('There we were, unable to do anything
except to exclaim. The girl students
screams tore the air.'. (Eyewitness inter
viewed by CIS informant)
The students retreated to the high school
where, from a helicopter hovering over
head, teargas canisters were lobbed at
them.
In Nyanga a crowd of schoolstudents and
20
others gathered at a roadblock on the
Lansdowne Road, and confronted a line
of policemen. Six riot vans of police
reinforcements with dogs rushed to the
scene. Teargas was thrown, and most of
the crowd moved away when the gas
reached them, but some began throwing
stones at the police.
The police fired a short volley. When the
crowd dispersed, three bodies lay on the
ground.
2.00 pm Once again Langa students
marched on the police station. One
student, carrying a white flag, disap
peared inside and stayed for three quar
ters of an hour. He reappeared flanked
by six policemen asking for a list of
names of those arrested. The pupils
marched quietly back.
8.00 pm The townships were
totally cut off from the outside world
by the police. One hundred and thirty
riot police had been airlifted in by
Hercules transport from the Reef. With
Brigadier Visser, they had gained their
experience in Soweto.
'I have been sent down to put a stop
to the rioting here and that is just what
I am going to do' claimed the Brigadier.
Journalists, though not allowed into
the townships, reported that heavily
armed police with dogs were combing
the township, and that at intervals gun
shots could be heard.
By that night, most of the social, business
and administrative machinery of Gugu
letu, Langa "and Nyanga was in ruins.
Beerhalls, post offices and government
buildings had all been destroyed.
'Anti-riot vehicles roamed ceaselessly
along the sullen streets and past the fire
gutted shells of public buildings. Late last
night police officers reported the town
ships tense but quiet.' (RDM 13.8.76)
Friday 13 August The three town-
i ships are quiet, with only one stoning
incident being reported. All deliveries
of milk, bread and meat to the shops had
been disrupted, and deliveries were only
going to selected ;points on the outskirts
of town-
Saturday 14 August For the
moment an uneasy c?lm had returned
to the Cape townships. On a blackboard
in a school in Nyanga a crude map was
drawn, writes one of our informants.
On it were the words "'Cape Town com
rades, Mdantsane comrades, Soweto
comrades, Maputo comrades ... all these
comrades must unite. NO RACIALISM.
NO COLONIALISM. EQUALITY.'
Sunday 22 August The student
shot dead by police at the head of the
demonstration on Thursday 12 August
was an 18 year old pupil at Langa High
school His fellow students wished to
mark his death with a mass funeral
procession.
The drief magistrate at Wynberg ordered
that Hie funeral be restricted to parents
and dose relatives. The students defied
the fern. They were met with tear gas
grenades and baton charges from the
police at the grave side.
Monday 23 August Five hundred
Blacks demonstrated in Guguletu, singing
and chanting. They were dispersed with
Langa High school students made a state
ment. 'We want our fellow students who
have been detained to be released, and
other detainees, regardless of colour.
Equal job, equal pay. Free education. We
will never attend classes unless these
demands are fulfilled, and the South
African government will experience aaoy




Tuesday afternoon. A policeman and an interpreter on a police 'hippo' address a crowd of hostel dwellers outside
Mzimhlope Hostel. As be finishes speaking the hostel dwellers singing war songs and brandishing assegais go on the
rampage.
i i
Weekend 21 /22 August Over the
weekend, A.N.C. leaflets calling for a
three day general strike were put under
the door of every house in Soweto. This
operation was organised by the Soweto
Students Representative Council and in
volved careful planning the week before.
Black office workers had been approached
and asked to make copies of leaflets cal
ling for the stayaway. At the same time
rumours of the strike spread among wor
kers, and pickets were out at many stations
the previous week of people who thought
the strike ought to start immediately.
'We had realised we had gone as far as
we could, and it was now important that
we strike at the industrial structure of
South Africa.' (Mashinini) Street corners
in Soweto were covered in posters sup
porting the call.
Monday 23 August Before first
light the streets were full of people stand
ing around uneasily. Those who had
decided not to support the strike had
left the township the night before, and
slept at work. But most waited to see
how everybody else would react. Pupils
set up pickets at the stations and it was
soon clear that the strike would be fully
supported.
The taxis were not operating, and no
buses had been running within the town
ships for some weeks, so anyone trying
to go to work would have been conspi
cuous. On the outskirts of town, Putco
buses had police security escorts, and
every bus carried a police marksman.
The trains ran virtually empty, despite
the fact that the groups of students
picketing the stations were far out
numbered by riot police in armoured
'hippos'. At the entrance to Soweto a
huge contingent of police stood guard.
A small group of hostel dwellers ignored
the strike, refused to listen to the pleas
of the pupils picketing the stations, and
boarded the train for Johannesburg.
At Phefeni station a larger band of
hostel dwellers armed with kieries
Ikwooden club-sticks) was confronted by
Kupils. Police used teargas to disperse
mhe crowd. By 11.30 am. even the wor
kers who had broken the strike were
trickling back into the township.
The evening papers reported that the
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"What would Gatsha Buthelezi say if he saw Zulu Inkatha putting Black Power
in its place?"
DIE VOLKSBLAD (A - AUGUST 26)
A Nationalist cartoon applauds the police-inspired — buf short-lived - Zulu
'backlash*.
absentee rate throughout Johannesburg
was 80%, and added that employers
were threatening the sack for anyone
who stayed away in sympathy with the
strikers. The Johannesburg Chamber of
Commerce reported that 'the stayaway
hit industrialists, retailers and insurance
companies. Either nobody turned up on
the black staff, or considerable numbers
stayed away.'
Pupils picketing Orlando station were
fired at three times by police trying to
disperse them. In one incident 'a by
stander on his way to work' was shot
dead, and at least six other people were
wounded.
The strike did not spread to Pretoria,
but in the Mamelodi township large
groups of students attempted to stop
people going to work. Buses were stoned
and set alight. Police reinforcements were
rushed to four schools after pupils had
threatened to burn them down. Police in
vans, armed with hand guns, semi-auto
matic rifles and clubs confronted groups
of black students.
In the evening there was more violence
in Soweto as the police carried out their
threat to "protect anyone who went to
work. Workers returning from the city,
most of them hostel dwellers, were met
by police at the station. Students picket
ing the stations were picked off by
police sharp shooters, and on several
occasions whole groups of demonstrators
were blasted by fine buckshot.
What happened in the next few days is
confused. To the outside world it was
presented as a spontaneous 'backlash*
by Sowetans who wanted to go to work.
The fact that the backlash was confined
to the hostel dwellers and had been
predicted by the police and employers
throws some light on its nature. Evidence
that emerged later, and a closer reading
of events, indicates that the backlash
was planned and fuelled by the security
forces.
On Sunday 22 August, Major General
M. Geldenhuys warned: 'Agitators who
attempt to enforce a work stayaway in
Soweto will experience a backlash from
law abiding citizens in the townships.
People in Soweto are getting sick of
these people, and because of this the
police are not worried.'
On Monday night, 23 August, a number
of homes were set alight as a reprisal
against those who broke the strike.
Tuesday 24 August The morning
of the second day of the strike found
most people in Soweto supporting it.
The World carried a warning from Colonel
Visser, head of C.I.D.: 'Go to work and
disregard the groups ofyoung intimidatort
telling people not to go to work. People
must go to work and just thrash the child
ren stopping them.'
Gatsha Buthelezi - Chief of the Zululand Bautustau.
Johannesburg: Zulu tribesmen armed with traditional weapons stand








Again there was *«"« confusion early in
the morning a* »h»uundi of workers,
men and worn**. Uned the township
roads seemingly »«»*rt»ta as to whether
to go to work ,m »ot Early editions of
the evening paPei <*f Star earned a ban
ner headline on l»* front Pa8e; Soweto
Backlash Killing "ild recounted an event
of the previous nfcht when two students
picketing the sta»i>'" near the Mzunhlope
hostel were bem-" t0 dea^ ^ hostel
dwellers returning Horn work Thei story
impUed there Iwl been further k>llu»g»
but no other n'*' carried *•
But on Tuesday afternoon the long pre
dicted and alremlV reported 'backlash
actually happen«».l fn a supposed reprisal
for the burning "' some rooms in the
Mzimhlope hi»i-«. a thousand Zulu
impi went on th*1 •«'"Page •
First reports toM *>f hundred* of Zulu
hostel dweUers. ^ied »*> .a massive
frnpi (tribal b^M.U, armed with sticks,
assegais and ptie** fl°n8 bladed )'
charging throupl, the streets breaking
into homes ana -Hacking householders.
The centre of n-livity was the area by
Mzimhlope ho*«*l 'Police ■». reP?rted
to have watch*'! from theu hippos
without taking «':t'°n ■« the warriors
rampaged throng the area of Orlando
West, scouring •"««" ™* h?m" "
search of "ch^y children.' (RDM
25.8.76)
The propaganda continued: 'I have no
knowledge of i»'cSe rampaging Zulus,
but if it is hapr""'S I am not surprised.
If people want ••' organise themselves
into resisting »<"""* we $an t stop them.
People are getfC'ii vetV fed UP ^lth ^e,
things that arft Jiappenmg in Soweto
(General Prinslf"/
In the outlying Meadowlands area of
Soweto, mmo..» ^t^ ZuJus are
coming' spread v>>* w^dfire' ""^ "If11/
residents left »*ir homes and fled
According to -/fitnesses bands of
hostel dwellers M by police 'hippos
roamed the »tr~u, md when groups
of youths trie! '" block their way, the ;
poUce fired t.t. ^™ ««h shotguns.
Hostel dweller, "«« then allowed a
free hand tofree hand to y them into their
homes. Many h"*»»» were bumed down-
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he police version was that they had
verted a number of potentially dan-
erous confrontations by firing buck-
hot. When hundreds of residents, par-
icularly women, sought the protection
f the police around Orlando police
tation, they were turned away and
old "you did not want protection to
o to work, so why do you want it
ow?' (Star).
Jacklash
len carrying butcher knives, pangas,
>mahawks, kieries and stones started
asing people around. What amazed
e was that as they assaulted people,
teavily armed police stood by and did
lothing to protect the residents. The
tostel dwellers wildly swinging their
weapons snouted *we will kill these
eople' (Star). Another Star reporter
onfirmed the story, and pointed out that
lie main target seemed to be young men.
he 'backlash' dominated the news,
here were reports of six to ten killed
>y Tuesday evening, and Baragwanath
fospital full of people with bullet and
tab wounds. But elsewhere in Soweto,
upils were organising pickets on exit
jads to prevent people going back to
rork. On one road, they set up a barri-
ide, but police broke it up with rifles
id shotguns.
, reporter who spent the night in Orlando
'est saw a different side of the 'back-
ish'. 'After witnessing neighbours fleeing
le township to seek refuge in townships
eeper in Soweto, after watching houses
sing stoned and raided by heavily armed
ulus, I chose a coal box to shelter in.
t 2.15 in the morning a police loud
liler warned Zulus (in Zulu) to stop
iding houses; "We didn't order you to
»troy West Rand (Administration
oard) property. You were asked to fight
jople only, so you are asked to with-
raw immediately." This restored peace
> a terrified Orlando West after hours of
olence.' (RDM 26.8.76) This reporter
later detained.
Inesday 25 August On the day
e students tagged 'D' day, the strike
ild firm. Employers admitted that
isenteeism was high, in some sectors
I
better, in some worse, than in the previous
two days. For the third day running,
there were large pickets at the station.
Workers who broke the strike were
jeered, and some students shouted 'Give
our regards to your masters. We'll catch
up with you tonight'. There was no repor
ted increase in the number of hostel
dwellers going to work.
Asked how many victims the backlash
had claimed, police said they were still
'collecting' bodies. Stories that women
had been captured and raped in the
township were rife.
In Pretoria, Mr Kruger, Minister of Police,
told reporters 'People are allowed to
protect themselves against physical in
timidation. The situation will calm itself
once people realise there is a strong
backlash' (Star 25.8.76).
As Kruger spoke, a group of about a
thousand Meadowlands residents raided
the Mzimhlope hostel in an attempt to
rescue the women they believed were
being held hostage inside. Police in
hippos outside the hostel fence fired
FN rifles at the crowd. The crowd scat
tered.
Orders to kill
A journalist who managed to get inside
witnessed further evidence of police
involvement. "There I saw a policeman
dressed in camouflage suit armed with
an FN rifle. Through an interpreter the
policeman said "You are warned not to
continue damaging the houses, because
they belong to the West Rand Adminis
tration Board. If you damage houses
you will force us to take action against
you to prevent this. You have been or
dered to kill only these troublemakers" '
Indeed, two hostel dwellers from Pholo-
mong were shot by police that day.
Police said they had found 20 bodies
in the riot area that day, and 13 of them
had panga wounds. General Prinsloo
appeared on TV and described reports
that police were urging hostel inmates
to attack trouble makers as hitter non
sense*.
But under cover of darkness, heavily
armed groups of men moved out o
the hostel. In front, and on each side,
'hippo' armoured cars moved with
them. A Star reporter had heard, just a
few minutes earlier, a black uniformed
policeman telling them to eat and drink
well so 'they could kill on full stomachs'
(Star 26.8.76).
Residents of the area, grouped together
to defend themselves against the expec
ted onslaught, had to flee as the police
opened fire. They left their belongings
in the street as the 'Zulu impis' advanced.
Eye witnesses saw three people shot by
the police, and their bodies thrown into
police vans. Two other bodies with bul
let wounds were left lying in the street
(World 26.8.76)
Back to work
The 'backlash' sweep continued. In White
City Javabu more than ten people were
wounded when police opened fire on
groups of people standing on the street
and near shops. The mother of an eight
month old baby was shot in the back.
Other areas suffered this police-led
assault: Naledi; Tladi; Moletsane; Mapetla;
Mofolo; Molape and Rockville. Barag
wanath hospital was full. The over
stretched ambulances were diverted to
Leratong hospital in the West Rand. Taxis
and cars passing by were pulled in to take
the dead and wounded to hospital. (World
26.8.76) .
Thursday 26 August The strike
was over. From five in the morning the
streets were full of people going to work.
Buses and trains were running as usual,
and employers in Johannesburg and the
industrial area reported almost full at
tendance.
But the 'supervised rampage' of the night
before had left many dead. Kriel of riot
control told the press that 21 people had
died so far, ten as a result of police action.
At dawn a large convoy of trucks full of
heavily armed men was seen moving from
the hostels on the outskirts of Soweto
deep into the township. Wherever the
convoy went trouble was reported, and
the main targets seemed to be the schools.
<a»
A Soweto worker dies in police orchestrated 'backlash'.
Despite a news blackout, a number of
newspapers had residents phoning in and
saying that children were being attacked
at school, and whole schools had been
evacuated. The worst affected neighbour
hoods were Naledi, Mofolo, Dube, Tladi
and Emdeni.
Selected targets
Despite police denials, newspapers were
now giving evidence of overt police col
laboration in the 'backlash*. 'Star repor
ters saw one group of hostel dwellers
moving into Zone 7, Meadowlands, along
side a police "hippo". They reported that
the police appeared to be firing ahead.
They did not interfere with the hostel
dwellers . . . Star reporters also said that
two black policemen in a police van
(licence no. TJ 320 824) went through
the affected area today urging people to
arm themselves to fight "Black Power
tsotsis". When a group had formed and
was going towards Meadowlands High
School, the reporters said they saw
police in 'hippos' and vans open fire on
approaching residents. They reported that
they had seen several people hut by gun
fire.' The police refused to comment, and
just said 'Soweto hostel dwellers stayed
inside their compounds all day.' (General
Prindoo, Star 27.8.76)
Not that the police had it all their own
way. Evidence that the 'backlash' was
planned and stage-managed emerged more
and more strongly. On 15 August Mrs
Winnie Mandela had filed a deposition
before Justice Coetzee giving evidence of
a vigilante force being organised in
Soweto in the name of members of the
Urban Bantu Council. At a meeting of the
vigilante group in the house of the 'mayor'
of Soweto, overseen by a plain clothes
police sergeant, a decision had been taken
'that in future children who stopped any
workers from going to work or who asked
any workers returning why they had gone
to work SHOULD BE KILLED.'
It was also said that they had received
permission from the government to re
establish the Home Guard and 'remove
all dirt'. Members of the Black Parents
Association s/ere listed by name and the
group decided: 'when the next sign of
trouble breaks out and any damage is
caused to any house belonging to a
committee or school board member or a
policeman, then steps should be taken to
attack the homes of the Black Parents
Association' (Sworn testimony of wit
ness).
The police officer allegedly took note of
the decision and promised to convey it
to police headquarters, and he 'assured
the meeting that no-one would be prose
cuted for carrying weapons and police
would co-operate with the people present'
(Sworn testimony of witness 15.8.76).
Police plot
It was now widely felt within the town
ships that the whole backlash had been
planned and orchestrated, and that
the Zulu Inkatha Cultural Movement had
been the vehicle for the operation.
Michael Mzobe leader of the Dube hostel
inmates made an impassioned plea to 'our
brothers at Mzimhlope hostel' to stop
1 fighting other Blacks.
i
| By Thursday 26 August, the Zulu Bantu-
i stan, Chief Buthelezi was calling on the
hostel dwellers to stop the fighting. The
police made every effort to isolate the
hostel dwellers from these appeals. Kruger,
Minister of Police refused to allow
Buthelezi into the Mzlimhlope hostel tel
ling him to 'stay out of Soweto and not
interfere in the situation there' (The
World).
Mr Thula, head of the Inkatha movement,
wasj also warned off by a senior Security
Branch officer, and forbidden to speak to
anybody.
Friday 27 August In the after
noon, Buthelezi went into Soweto
despite the ban. On Saturday Kruger
warned that he would take a 'serious
view' of any newspaper that printed
allegations made by the chief. Only
the Sunday Tribune dared publish his
statement.
What Buthelezi heard convinced him of
heavy security police involvement in the
activity of the hostel dwellers. He accep
ted that the hostel dwellers had been in
timidated when they went to work. That
groups of hostel dwellers had gone to the
station to protect those coming back
from work. That they had been joined by
'heavily armed groups later and that
what was noticed by some, was that their
red boots looked similar to those worn
by the police.' That people had been
transported by the police to various parts
of Soweto and encouraged to retaliate.
That hostel dwellers had been given
dagga (marijuana) and had been allowed
to smoke it in the presence of police.
That Whites in camouflage had urged
the crowd to Bulala zonke - kill them all.
'To me therefore, there appears to have
been some stage managing of the whole
tragic mischief, which people allege was
done by the police.' (Buthelezi, Sunday
Tribune 29.8.76)
True to their word, employers carried
out their threat not to pay those who had
supported the strike. 'Most black workers
who stayed away from work this week
will find empty pay packets today' said
the Director of the Transvaal Chamber of
Industries. In a week in which the price
of bread rose 25%, unions warned that
'starvation could aggravate the unrest.
Empty stomachs know no laws'.
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areas. The atmosphere of the demon
stration was jovial rather than aggressive.
'The riot squad arrived in mesh-protec
ted vehicles; they were wearing camouf-
aged battle dress and were armed with
»hotguns, rifles and teargas guns. Imme-
Jiately the Principal asked them to leave
because their presence was unnecessary,
they ordered him to stand aside.
The commanding officer ordered his men
o line up and without warning, teargas
vas fired at the children. They were then
>aton charged by the riot squad.
The children fled across the school
grounds until they were cornered against
the 8ft high fence. Most of the boys
managed to scale the fencev The girls
were trapped and were severely beaten
up.
It was only because of this that an angry
:rowd of parents and children later
gathered in Dissel Road outside the
school. This prompted the return of the
iot squad to "break up an illegal gather-
ng".' (Teacher, writing in The Guardian
1.11.76)
K senior police officer commented "The
supils are apparently unhappy that they
vere dispersed by teargas and rubber
Jipes. They object to being hit by the
jolice' (Argus 24.8.76).
5.00 pm Outraged students gather
n groups, stoning passing cars. As bus
services were withdrawn and all police
patrols replaced by the riot squad, the
:rowds grew.
Phey roamed the streets, tried to set fire
o the showpiece municipal building, and
>roke down the doors of the Ned Geref
>utch Reformed Church. Riot squads
:ame to the rescue of the church, tem-
lorarily scattering the demonstrators,
>ut they regrouped and turned their at-
ention to the township centre.
11.00 pm Two thousand coloured
ben women and children demonstrated
Wand around the centre, locked in a
Bning battle with riot police.
Vednesday 25 August Once again
he pupils of Bonteheuwel High refuse
to go to
school.
classes and gather outside the
The riot squad convoy arrives. As it
moves past the school stones and rocks
rain down. The squad stops - and fires
a volley of teargas canisters at the pupils.
An angry crowd ofparents and bystanders
collects, and begins shouting at the police
and throwing stones at them.
The pattern was repeated at Modderdam
and at Arcadia High. At Arcadia one van
circled the school firing teargas, and was
stoned in return.
'A crowd collected — mainly women and
children. Police trucks moved behind the
school and were met with jeers from the
crowd.
'Pupils from the Modderdam High School
then joined the crowd and the emotional
tirade of cheers, jeers and boos was punc
tuated with blasts from single barrel
shotguns.
Murder
"Then four plainclothed detectives arrived
in a small blue car. One jumped out and
was assisted by another policeman in
grabbing a demonstrator and dragging
him to the car.
'Women screamed and swore at the
policemen as stones hailed down. One
detective, baton in hand, gun in the
other, opened fire.
The detectives then got into their car -
and fled while stones rained down on the
vehicle and women screamed abuse.
Then everyone turned towards the body
of Christopher Truter.
'He was attended to by a member of the
crowd while his sister cried, and his
brother ranted. Riot police still on the
scene tried to quiet him, saying: "It's
not a bullet wound, it's from a stone.
Your own people did that."
'But he would not believe them and
neither would the crowd. Minutes later
the brother was pushed into a riot squad
van.' Christopher Truter died on 1 Sep
tember, shot in the head. (Cape Herald
31.8.76)
The swollen crowd suxged angrily around
the ambulance that came to get the
boy, shooting and threatening the police
escort, arid throwing stones as it left.
12.00 pm The whole township had
erupted, with the shopping centre the
focus of attention. Everywhere large
crowds assembled, chanting and jeering
at the police. As police attacked and
broke up one crowd, another collected
somewhere else. Rocks were hurled at
all passing vehicles.
Hospital arrests
5.00 pm A large group of coloured
protesters burst out of Bonteheuwel
onto a bridge over the N2 trunk road,
and forced the rush hour traffic to run
a gauntlet of stones and rocks.
While traffic police sealed off all roads
into the suburb, riot squad reinforce
ments moved in, their vehicles sweep
ing through the township, hurling tear
gas canisters at demonstrators and into
backyards. Parents gathered up small
children and ran for cover. Clouds of
stinging tear gas filling the streets.
The rent office was set alight, and a
supermarket blazed. The police started
using gam as well as tear gas and batons.
At least one man was shot dead, and
many more wounded. Many of the in
jured hid in the townships following
police arrests of those admitted to
hospital with bullet wounds.
Police described Bonteheuwel as a 'slag-
veld' - as battlefield.
Thursday 26 August Sporadic con-
frontaticms continued during the day.
Police timed out new tactics. A riot squad
attacked a crowd with tear gas and
batons. Then they withdrew, but they
left several of their number concealed in a
nearby house. The crowd reformed. A
'decoy' ear drove past in the direction
of the hidden police, drawing the stone-
throwing crowd forward. As the crowd ;
drew closer, the hidden police stepped i
out of the house, letting loose into the ,
crowd with shotguns, and the rest of the ■




1 September, Sandra Peters
an 11-year old Coloured girl, was
"sent by her grandmother to the butcher
to fetch some meat. Schoolchildren were
demonstrating peacefully in Klipfontein Road
: the time. A neighbour's child was watching from
the balcony of a shop. She saw Sandra walk past, and
then saw the police start shooting at the crowd. She ran
back to Sandra's mother, Kathleen Peters. "When everyone ran
off, Sandra was left lying on the pavement", she said.
Mrs Peters and Sandra's sister Josephine rushed to Athlone police station
to find out what had happened to Sandra. They got no answer; instead, they
were both arrested and thrown in jail. They were not released until 3.00 pm
the next day.
Sandra had either been shot twice or the bullet had split in her head. She was
critically wounded. She needed an urgent operation, but before they could
operate the doctors needed the approval of a parent. Sandra's-father is dead,
and the doctors could not find Mrs Peters until the next day because she was
in jail. Sandra died on Friday night, 3rd September.
Friday 27 August Though
quieter the situation remained tense.
That night, Prime Minister Vorster
lashed out at the commentators. "Those
people who cry "Wolf, wolf are doing
South Africa an ill service. They are
placing the whole future of South Africa
into the hands of the enemy.
The enemy want to find us in a crisis
and they want us to admit that we
have a guilty conscience. But looking
over the history of South Africa's
achievements, I say we have no reason to
feel guilty about anything. I want to
make it clear that nowhere in the world
have .four million done so much for 18
million as in this despised South Africa.'
His Afrikaner audience cheered loudly.
Weekend 28/29 August A women's
hostel at the University of the Western
('ape, and Belgravia secondary school
In the coloured township of Athlone
me burnt down. A church hall is set
flight and a car is petrol-bombed in
Bonteheuwel.
Monday 30 August Students continued
their boycott of classes. Singing and
carrying placards saying 'We abhor
police brutality and violence', and 'We
want rights not riots' they marched
round the school grounds in heavy,
drizzle.
At the coloured University of the Wes
tern Cape the rector threatened students
who failed to attend classes with being
barred from exams. Attendance was
still well down.
Principals promised that schools would
soon be back to normal. Police Minister
Kruger said he wouldn't see any black
or coloured leaders until he was sure
the unrest had finally ended.
Police imposed an information blackout
on casualties. No-one knew whether a
person who disappeared was in the
morgue, in jail or in hospital, if they
were alive, dead or dying.
The weekend lull proved to be short
lived, and tension mounted again as
police carried out a wave of arrests and
detentions. As well as students, the
police detained the leaders of the Coloured
Labour Party, and (the next day) Joe
Thloloe, President of the Union of Black
Journalists.
Wednesday 1 September The
day before, the crowds had dispersed
quickly when the riot squads attacked
with tear gas. This time the police hoped
to break the Athlone protest once and
for all.
First they blocked off the roads. Then
they rushed into the crowd of demon
strating children with dogs and batons,
inflicting as much injury as possible.
The news of this attack spread rapidly,
and parents, residents and pupils from
other areas converged to support the
protest. Rocks and bottles were used
as missiles, and oil drums, lumps of con
crete and metal fencing provided barri
cades. Labourers from a building site
hurled bricks at passing police vehicles.
The police continued to 'trap and attack'.
At one point they spread their vehicles
around Klipfontein road and then moved
in from the many side roads. They had
already set up road blocks on either
side of the demonstrators.
The vehicles drove the demonstrators
into the centre of the trap - and then
attacked with batons and shotguns.
Despite this and many other punitive
police attacks, the demonstrations con
tinued for most of the day.
Into White areas
At the same time in Cape Town's city
centre, African school children were
demonstrating. Two hundred African
students assembled at Cape Town station
Soon they were joined by students
arriving in trains from the seven schools
in the black townships of Langa, Gugu-
letu and Nyanga.
To the stunned amazement of Cape
Town's Whites, they streamed through
the city centre, with their placards
denouncing job reservation and the pass




protesters or anyone else — and ignored
police warnings to disperse' (5.9.76).
Though the protests continued in the
city centre for another two hours, the
crowds slowly dispersed. When they re
turned to the townships, as often as not
they were met with gas and shot-gun
fire, for the wave of protest had spread
far beyond the city centre.
In Maitland several hundred pupils march
ing to the station were scattered by gas
and batons. Some fled into houses, others
into the Post Office. They were trapped,
dragged out and beaten. Many were
arrested. The riot squads raced from
ichool to school.
The Riot Squad attacked Trafalgar High
School in District Six, close to central
I^ape Town, leaving many injured and a
15 year old boy, Shaheed Jacobs, shot
iead. The children of Trafalgar were
Standing on the playground watching tear
gas being fired in the city below.
A police car stopped in the road outside
ind a policeman jumped out and baton-
:harged a boy of nine or ten. As the
police pulled off the watching pupils
)ooed. Immediately the car stopped and,
without warning, policemen fired tear
5as.
The children fled into the school build-
ngs. There was chaos inside as hundreds
>f children tried to find water, their
aces streaming. Later some pupils went
nd tied posters to the playground fence
tating: 'We want rights not riots' and
Give us Justice'.
Almost immediately two riot vehicles
ppeared and without warning police
hot more tear gas, birdshot, and rifle
hot at the fleeing children.
A marksman picked pupils out from the
|op of one of the riot vehicles with his
ifle. A bleeding boy fell, to the ground.
e principal ran forward to help him,
ut was ordered back.
the confusion and anger some child-
threw stones from vantage points
side the school. The police then jumped
le fence and charged into the school via
open side entrance. In one classroom
policemen stood guard at the door
ith rifles while four others beat up one
teacher and three boys inside.
'On the same day, at Alexander Sinton
High School in Athlone, many children
were injured during a brutal attack on the
school by the riot squad. Many children
and bystanders were shot; a polio victim
was beaten up and is now permanently
crippled in hospital; others broke arms
and legs when they jumped from upstairs
windows to escape police who threw
tear gas into classrooms and then entered
the rooms, protected by masks, and beat
up both children and teachers.' (Letter
from two South African teachers to
The Guardian 1.11.76)
After a bloody two days something over
400 people had been arrested, and an
unknown number lay injured and dead.
Pupil Uprising
Weekend 4/5 September Over the
weekend, while community and church
spokesmen made speeches calling for
reforms, more police were sent into Cape
Town from the predominantly Afrikaner
Transvaal.
Meanwhile Vorster was arriving in Zurich
to meet Henry Kissinger, and passing off
the protests as Communist attempts to
harm the talks. The following week
marked the 10th anniversary of his
premiership.
Fires and stonings continued throughout
the weekend on the Cape. Five schools
were extensively damaged, and Athlone
Library and Magistrates Court buildings
were set alight.
Monday 6 September The week
started quietly. Attendance was low at
the schools, and on Monday night the
education authorities decided to close
all coloured schools for the rest of the
week. The police were drawing up new
tactics, including special measures for
areas where Whites might be affected.
According to a police spokesman, 'Mini
mal tear gas will be used, and greater
use will be made of birdshot.'
Tuesday 7 September This was a
day of protest all across the Cape, taking
in District Six, Cape Flats, Crawford,
Athlone and Guguletu, on to Stellenbosch,
Ravensmead, Parow and Tiervlei, and out
as far as Hout Bay, Somerset West and
Diep River.
The pupils started early. Some formed
demonstration marches which were in-
variety broken up. Some, from the
beginning, kept in small groups of around
20, stoning cars and converging on focal
points such as Alexander Sinton High
School.
Others slipped into the city in buses,
trains and taxis, avoiding the police
cordons. In the city centre the pupils
now used hit and run tactics, breaking
car windscreens, dodging police, forming
up into larger groups, them dispersing
rapidly as the police acted.
The new tactics had been learned quickly.
At first the police tried to avoid using
their guns, so that when they attacked,
the protesters stood their ground and
hit back, dodging, ducking the batons
and throwing rocks in return. They often
made fools of the police.
'A young uniformed policeman, chasing a
student, tripped and fell insensible to
the ground after his fleet-footed target
dummy-ran him into a pole. He was taken
away in an ambulance to loud jeers and
whistles from construction workers and
bystanders next to a nearby building
site.'
The police soon iut on the pressure. At
one point four truckloads of riot police
screamed up wearing gas masks, carrying
shot guns, FN rifles and Uzi machine
pistols, and with Alsatian dogs. The
crowd fled for cover as the firing broke
out, a barrage of shotguns, rifles, service
revolvers and tear gas guns.
Bullets ricocheted off the facade of
Barclays Bank as the crowd fled past.
A black man lurched, walked round in a
tight circle with a puzzled expression on
his face, then collapsed dead on Che
pavement, shot in the chest.
In the street three girls were carried
bleeding to a light truck, moaning and
crying. Blood welled through the fingers
of a girl in schooluniform as die clutched
her stomach. She was laid face down in
the back of the van and shielded by
student*.
"Black Power was strictly for
the Blacks. Coloured Power
was something that people just
thought of-a pipe dream,
but not real, not something to
die for. Now all that's changed
- and it's the children who have
brought about that change."
Police immediately charged at the group
round the van and clubbed them as they
snouted 'No violence! No violence!'. Ig
noring the injured girls the police mo
tioned the driver to get on his way.
Away from the city centre the level of
protest had risen significantly. As well
as stoning vehicles and making road
blocks the demonstrators were attacking
all identifiable elements of the regime's
infrastructure, from police vehicles to
schools and liquor stores.
ITie inhabitants of Ravensmead, a ram
shackle coloured township 12 miles north
of Cape Town with a large squatter popu
lation, conducted a major battle against
the police. What began as a march of
children and adults quickly escalated as
a road block was set up in one of the
main streets and set alight.
As the police moved in they were con
fronted with a wall of flame as petrol-
soaked tyres were ignited. Petrol bombs
flew, as well as stones, setting buildings
and police. vehicles alight. The police
responded with automatic weapons, but
were unable to control the situation.
Many factories in the nearby Parow
industrial area were forced to shut down,
and as late as 10 pm more police rein
forcements were being sent in.
Wednesday 8 September In the
early hours of Wednesday morning the
police managed to clear most of the
streets of Ravensmead, but the town
ship was littered with the debris of the
previous day. The streets were choked
with burnt out cars, tyres, glass from
smashed windows and rocks and stones.
This provided the ammunition for Wed
nesday's confrontations, and again the
battle built up throughout the course of
the day.
Once more the factories of Parow were
forced to close down, and white staff
had to be escorted out of the area under
a hail of rocks. As the struggle in the
Cape reached its climax the protest
spilled for the first time into the white
suburbs. Cape Town's Retreat district
was worst hit, as demonstrators stoned
vehicles, broke into shops and other
buildings, making off with the goods
and lighting fires. Petrol bombs were
thrown at white houses in Fish Hoek
from moving vehicles.
This was also the day on which Vorster
broke his long silence, when he ad
dressed a Nationalist Party meeting in
Bloemfontein. To the delirious applause
of 6,500 Party faithfuls he stated that,
'the government is always prepared to
talk about anything which will improve
conditions for Blacks in South Africa,
but not on the question of one man one
vote . . . There is no way of governing
South Africa other than by the policy
and principles of the National Party . . .
The government will not be blackmailed
by violence into giving one man one
vote in South Africa . . . Law and order
must be restored immediately and main
tained . . . The police have contained !
the disorder under difficult circumstances
and with a minimum of violence ... If it
does not stop, and stop immediately,
other steps will have to be taken'. (Rand
' Daily Mail and others 9.9.76)
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X the same meeting earlier in the day
jruger reiterated the official line that
le government would not talk with
riyone participating in the protests, and
lat the black people of South Africa
ould not get by without the white man.
le went on to incite all Whites tcr take
ip arms against the protesters. 'The day
i past when people can sit at home
[linking the police will protect their
roperty. There are not enough police
. . The task of protecting business
remises is primarily that of the owners.'
le went on to advise business men to
orm their own security forces, and to use
orce if necessary. He told the white
udience that they were entitled to use
iolence to defend themselves against
iolence. If a person had to kill somebody
o protect himself or his property, he was
mtitled to do so.
»outh Africa's gunshops had already sold
>ut, as from the beginning of the protests
Vhites rushed out to arm themselves with
sverything from heavy calibre revolvers
o semi-automatic rifles.
deaths Concealed
Figures for dead and wounded are virtually
mpossible to come by, but at just two
lospitals on the Cape - Victoria and
jroote Schuur — doctors and sisters
:ounted a total of 73 dead on the night
jf Wednesday, 8 September. No visitors
ivere being admitted, nor was anyone
being discharged. At Woodstock Hospital
black staff were having to steal medical
squipment in order to treat victims
privately. All hospitals appear to have
been under heavy armed guard. (University
of Cape Town Riot Information Service
14.9.76)
'All the people we have spoken to state
that the actual death toll is very much
higher than official figures. These people
include religious leaders, nurses, teachers,
Ewho have lost relatives, and
in the Moslem community. One
claims that 70 babies died of tear
gas poisoning at the Peninsula Maternity
Hospital. Parents who have been to col
lect the bodies of their children from the
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mortuary, and mortuary employees, have
said it is full.
The chief engineer who is to build the
new Cape Town mortuary said he was
refused entry even though he had written
permission from the City Council to in
spect the functioning of the mortuary.
Bodies are not released for burial until
relatives have signed a document stating
that the dead person was "actively invol
ved in rioting".' (The Guardian 1.11.76)
Vigilantes
'fliursday 9 September The Sunday
Tribune called this the 'worst day of
unrest since the outbreak of Black/
Coloured violence in the Cape just over
a month ago.' Given the death-count
of 73 at only two hospitals the previous
night, the estimates of Thursday's
deaths - under 20 - are hopelessly
inadequate.
The police admitted to shooting 12
people dead in Manenberg alone, where
the battles stretched late into the night.
Many factories around Parow and Bell-
ville closed down completely. There were
attempts to fire two white schools, and
a number of others either closed down
or had round the clock vigilante patrols.
Further away from the city, at Paarl,
the demonstrations were carried right
into the Huguenot business district. In
the same area the Helshoogte Pass be
tween Stellenbosch and Banhoek re
mained partly closed following extensive
attacks on cars and trucks. Vehicles were
only allowed through in police-protected
convoys.
At the Afrikaans University at Stellen
bosch white students were arming them
selves - and also, reportedly, being
armed with FN rifles. As well as guarding
their campus they were going into action
alongside the riot squads against the
'rioters'. Meanwhile Kruger flew into
Cape Town with Smit, the white Minister
of Coloured Relations, to hold talks with
coloured 'leaders'.
Friday 9 September The level of
protest in the townships immediately
surrounding Cape Town began to ease.
Elsewhere it continued unabated, spread
ing from Paarl as far afield as Mossel Bay,
George, Oudtshoorn and Wellington.
In Port Elizabeth 550 pupils of two high
schools were arrested and herded into the
police station yard. 'Admission of guilt'
fines of R30 were summarily handed
out, and at least half were detained.
Friday also saw the opening of the
Coloured Representative Council (or
simply an advisory body). The president
of the (white) senate announced a long
list of 'concessions', which had been
agreed between Vorster and the coloured
representatives. These were mainly aimed
at the coloured middle-class, consisting
of various trading concessions for busi
nessmen, plus a few improved facilities
in public buildings.
Saturday 10 September The Penin
sula was now comparatively quiet, but
the weekend was marked by a series
of shootings of Blacks and Coloureds
by trigger-happy Whites seeking out
victims. Four of the six known to have
been killed were shot by Whites in
civilian clothing.
Three major points emerge from this
period of struggle in the Cape. The first
is that it was the children who were at
the core of the protests. The second is
that an enormous cover up operation
had masked the true extent of police
violence.
The third is that the Coloureds have
rooted their struggle firmly in the same
ground as the Blacks, traumatising the
Whites of the Cape in the process.
'If you'd told the parents a month ago
that Manenberg and Athlone, Goodwood
and Bonteheuwel, Paarl and Oudtshoom
would be burning and their children shot,
wounded, or under arrest, they wouldn't
have believed you . . . Black Power was
strictly for the Blacks. Coloured Power
was something that people just thought
of - a pipe dream, but not real, not
something to die for. Now all that's
changed - and it's the children who
have brought about that change.' (White





















Black 'Specials' armed with FN rifles.
Mr J. Kruger,
Minister of Justice,
Police and Prisons, has
encouraged white









as soon as they appear
on the shelves.
in some cases white
civilians have been




|he State's answer to workers' militancy.
Monday 13 September 'Azikwelwa'
b Zulu for 'We do not work'. Over the
vcekend 'Azikwelwa' leaflets were distri-
mled throughout Soweto by the Soweto
indents' Representative Council, calling
hi a three day strike. Versions appeared
a Zulu, English and Sesotho. Their
iiievances included: the killing of
hildren by Kruger's police; detention
viihout trial; the docking of wages of
hose who had gone on strike before; the
I tucks on demonstrators by some hostel
vurkers.
here was a special message for the
mstels - 'Hostel people do not fight',
or everyone the instructions were to
eep off the streets.
ioweto was still asleep at 3am on
Utnday - 'A time when thousands are
dually up and about preparing for work'
UDM 14.9.76) The usual morning rush-
u»ur never began. Only nurses, exempted
uun the strike, and a few, mainly old
xiople queued at the bus stops and taxi
auks to get to work.
that day half a million Blacks joined the
[uike on the Reef. The trains ran almost
fcpty, and by 8am only nine of the
Kannesburg Transport Department's
pus drivers and conductors had turned up
|tu work out of a workforce of 132. The
aucellations that resulted made little
luterence, as there were hardly any
3*
passengers.
Some sections of industry and commerce
reported only 2% attendance by African
staff, and none more than a third. Many
employers who knew of the strike had
tried to make up production in advance
the previous weekend. The Chamber of
Commerce reported that firms drawing
their labour from townships 'like
Alexandra' had less absenteeism.
News of a massive police operation in
that township soon revealed why. Several
hundred police had sealed it off
completely. A house to house search had
been made, but any adults or children not
at work or school were either arrested or
sent there. Over 800 Blacks were taken to
jail from the township.
Police 'Protection'
Initially the police pretended that the
operation was not connected with the
strike, but was 'a crime preventative
operation aimed at flushing out criminals
and layabouts' (RDM 14.9.76). Later
Brigadier Kriel admitted that it was 'a
clean-up operation, aimed at protecting
those who wished to work, and rounding
up agitators' (ibid).
There were other police efforts to break
the strike. In Diepkloof township for
instance, two policemen entered Mr Ben
Motshabi's home and found him in the
kitchen. When asked why he was at home
he said that going to work was dangerous.
The police forced him to go out into the
road, where they flagged down a black
motorist and despite his protests made
him take Mr Motshabi into his car.
3.30 pm Soweto had taken on almost
a holiday atmosphere with people
wandering through the streets and boys
playing games of soccer. But as those who
had gone to work returned home, they
were confronted by angry residents and
hostel inmates. Police moved in with guns
to protect them, shooting dead at least
two people and injuring many others. In
one hostel two inmates were killed by
their fellows for strike breaking. This
time there was no doubt about the unity
of the workers of Soweto. On the
previous Sunday 1000 residents and
hostel inmates had met in a bid to patch
up their differences. The main purpose
was to ensure that the hostel dwellers
knew about, understood, and would
support the strike. This way police efforts
to turn hostel inmates against the demon
strators—as they had done in the first
strike-could be foiled. 'As one Soweto
student excitedly pointed out: "The
hostels are now on our side"'. (The
World 15.9.76)
The day was comparatively quiet else-
where, but there were sporadic incidents
at the Cape, and in the coloured township
of Conville. There a farmer was hit on the
head by a stone as he drove past demon
strators. He pulled out a gun and fired
four shots at them. He was joined by
other motorists and police, who also
opened fire. A coloured girl aged 13
was lolled and two men seriously injured.
In Bonteheuwel, in a similar incident,
three young coloured people were shot
by a white motorist.
Tuesday 14 September The strike
stayed firm but the police machine swung
into action first thing in the morning in
Soweto. Gunfire could be heard in the
eastern area of the city. In the Phefeni,
Phomolong and Mzimhlope townships
they opened fire in the streets and at rail
way stations when the strikers attempted
to picket. A number of people were
reported injured.
Once the morning picketing was over
Soweto became quiet. There were slightly
more people at work that morning. Many
who had worked the previous day slept
over in their offices and factories. They
were joined by the few who came in on
Tuesday morning, either because of
financial necessity or because of threats
by employers. 'I have five children and no
husband—what can I do?' said one
restaurant counter assistant (Star
15.9.76).
All attempts at protest by pupils were
met with mass arrests. In New Brighton
outside Port Elizabeth, pupils from
Cowan and Newell African schools were
marching to the police station to protest
at the arrest of Kwazakele High School
pupils the day before. 'The march was
brought to a quick end by prompt police
action.'(RDM 15.9.76)
Summary Justice
They were dragged off to the jail and
special courts were set up to mete out
summary penalties. 271 were sentenced.
Boys received eight cuts with a cane. Girls
, over 18 received a R50 fine-or 50 days
'■■ w prison. Girls under 18 received
suspended sentences.
As this was happening 250 students
arrested the previous Friday and as yet
unsentenced were having their cases
adjourned until the end of October in
another Port Elizabeth court. Near
Durban 285 pupils aged between 12 and
23 were also arrested when they
attempted a protest march in sympathy
with Soweto students.
It was generally quiet in the Cape Penin
sula. One youth was shot dead and
another badly injured in Guguletu. A
group of youths had tried to stop a post
office van passing through the township.
Police inside the van had opened up on
them with FN rifles.
Cape Town's students and workers had
been planning a strike in the Cape ever
since the first one in Soweto. It was due
to begin the next day, and leaflets had
been distributed throughout the
townships:
Biggest Ever Strike
But the authorities were doing their
utmost to disrupt the strike. The Cape
Town Chamber of Commerce released a
hard-line 'no work no pay' statement.
The police promised protection to those
who went to work.
At least three leaflets were circulated in
the attempt to disrupt the strike. Two,
printed in English and Sotho, opposed
strikes outright. A third, widely
circulated among passengers at railway
stations and bus terminals read:
'WORKERS PLEASE NOTE', 'OUR BIG
STRIKE FOR WEDNESDAY AND
THURSDAY IS NOW POSTPONED
UNTIL NEXT WEEK. WE WILL CALL
ON YOU AGAIN.' And thousands of
anti-strike leaflets were dropped from a
helicopter over the townships.
There were angry scenes in Soweto again
that night as some of those who had gone
to work returned. The police were out in
force breaking up the pickets, at
Mzimhlophe, Nancefield, Dube and
Diepkloof in particular. At least three
people were shot dead. Whilst most news
papers took (at face value), police reports
that only three people were shot dead in
the three days, The World reported that
at least 16 had been killed in the first two
days alone.
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Strike and anti-strike leaflets
7.00 pm A fire was started which
gutted the big Con Chem-Products
chemical factory at Kew, close to
Alexandra.
Wednesday 15 September Half a
million black people were on strike in the
Reef, and this time they were joined by
up to 80% of the quarter million Coloured
workers 1,000 miles away in the Cape. It
was, without doubt, the biggest strike in
South Africa's history. Among the
companies badly hit in the Reef were
Metal Box, where only 15 of 250 workers
turned up at its main Industria plant;
Advance Laundries, where only 50%
turned up; Premier Milling; OK Bazaars
(50-70% away); Checkers (60-70% away).
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A temporary lull in Black/White confrontations
In the Cape women workers led the
strike. The clothing industry, 90% of
whose 50,000 strong workforce are
women, had to resign itself to two days
lost production.
The Cape Stops
Most other industries and services were
hit as well. At the docks 80% of the steve
dores did not come to work. Milk and
bread could not be delivered, and
engineering, steel industries, garages and
shops were affected. Many construction
sites closed.
Although there were sporadic attempts to
set civic offices and schools on fire, and
occasional stonings, the Cape ;was
relatively quiet.
In Port Elizabeth, however, protest flared
again. Buses, trucks and cars were stoned,
and by 11am all buses had been
withdrawn from the New Brighton town
ship. Another 150 pupils were arrested.
Rigid Control
At Thaba Nchu, Bloemfontein, police
were pelted with stones when they
removed students who had not handed in
declarations signed by their parents,
accepting financial responsibility for any





Soweto that evening more Blacks were
illed and injured as police again tried to
eak up pickets and impose rigid control
on the city. At Merafe station they fired
from the bridge over the railway into the
40
groups of pickets.
Thursday 16 September it was
back to work day in Soweto, with tens of
thousands of workers flocking to railway
stations taxi and bus ranks. Some
students felt the strike should continue,
and police attacked small groups of
pickets attempting to stop people going
to work. Groups of students gathered
along the railway line between Naledi and
Ikwezi. Police travelled along it in a two
coach train, firing teargas and shots at
them as they passed.
In Cape Town it was the second day of
the planned strike, and more workers
than ever responded, particularly in
industrial areas. The strike was estimated
at 70-80% complete in industry, and 40%
in commerce.
Solidarity attacked
'Many employers tried to discourage
workers from participating in the
boycott. They warned them beforehand
that they would not be paid for the days
they stayed away. On Wednesday, some
employers announced the dismissal of
workers who had stayed away from work.
But the workers were not intimidated.^
Even more workers stayed away from'
work on Thursday than on Wednesday.
The workers were determined to take
their stand alongside the other
protesters.' (Umanyano September 1976
-this workers' paper was subsequently
banned).
During the night the housing offices in
Macassar, the coloured township near
Somerset West, had been fired and
seriously damaged. In many white
residential districts at the Cape, vigilantes
were out all night patrolling the streets.
8.15pm A power failure plunged the
area into inky blackness, and the protest
flared up again. Throughout the Athlone
district and in Manenberg, Grassie Park,
Bishop Lavis and Kewtown, barricades
were erected across streets, piles of tyres
set alight at intersections, and drain
covers pulled up to block roads. Bottle
stores and shops were broken into and set
alight. Any vehicle moving was stopped
or stoned; police had to escort vehicles
out of the area in convoys. Attempts
were made to sabotage the main railway
line to the black and coloured townships.
Young coloured detainees near
Cape Town




Riot police attack coloured demonstrators in Cape Town
Three jeeploads of police reservists in
camouflage uniform cleared burning tyres
from Eastern Boulevard on the fringe of
the white areas. A spokesman said: "This
is only the beginning. Soon we may be
doing more than putting out fires' (RDM
17.9.76).
Police opened fire on the crowds, and
described the toll of dead and injured as
'heavy'. Officially 12-one a 15 year old
schoolgirl- were shot dead. More than SO
were admitted to hospital with serious
bullet wounds.
Friday 17 September The strike
in the Cape ended, and the coloured and
black workers went back under threat of
victimisation and sacking. The streets
were littered with debris from the
previous night: burnt mattresses, car
seats, boxes and tyres; fragments of glass
and large rocks.
Henry Kissinger was arriving in South
Africa at 3.38pm- That morning in
Soweto pupils at Sekano-Ntoane High,
Morris Isaacson High, Jabulani Junior
Secondary, Tladi Junior Secondary and
Thesele Junior Secondary Schools
demonstrated against his visit.
The pupils had placards condemning
Kissinger's visit. A huge one on a church
yard wall read 'Dr Kissinger, get out of
Azania (South Africa)-don't bring your
disguised American oppression into
Azania'. Others simply referred to him as
a murderer.
At Sekano-Ntoane High the main school
gate had been locked while the pupils
massed in the school grounds, singing
freedom songs and waving placards.
The police blasted the gate open. Three
vans drove in loaded with heavily armed
policemen. They started shooting at the
pupils, who scattered. There was a great
deal of confusion. Pupils screamed in
pain.
At Jabulani Junior Secondary the bodies
of two pupils in school uniform lay dead
after the police opened fire. A schoolgirl
was shot dead outside Tladi Junior
Secondary.
Altogether at least six students died and a
further 35 were taken to hospital
seriously injured. But the police
succeeded in their main objective. They
removed the placards. General Kriel
explained afterwards that the police had
opened fire 'in self defence'.
They were damaging property with
their stone-throwing and pobce were
forced to open fire to protect themselves
when stones were flung at them', he said
(RDM 18.9.76).
3.30 pm "The world's most important
visitor to South Africa from the world's
most powerful nation' arrived at Waterk-
loof Air Base outside Pretoria. Waiting to
greet him as he stepped off the plane
were Dr Hflgard Muller, Minister of
Foreign Affairs—and General Hendrik van
den Bergh, head of BOSS and the secret
police.
There were several petrol bombings and
firings of buildings in Johannesburg, and
the city was rife with rumours and bomb
hoaxes. Scores of people had to be
evacuated from one major fire in the city
centre. The incidents had been timed to
coincide with the visit.
"The two-day stay-away in Cape Town
cost the city more than three million man
hours. The clothing industry - with a
49,000 labour force and the largest single
employers in the Peninsula — lost two full
days of production. Only 15 per cent of
workers showed up on these days. About
150,000 to 200,000 Cape workers for
feited more than a third of their weekly
pay packets to obey the strike call.'
(Sunday Express [S.A.] 19.9.76)
Minister of Defence Botha, in a major
policy speech to the National Party Cape
Congress the following Monday ap
pealed 'to Whites, Coloureds and Indians
to accept the fact that they needed each
other and (gave) a warning to Coloureds
that their future did not lie in a link up
with Black power' (The Gtizen 21.9.76).
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IN THE TOWNSHIPS
The black workers whose labour has created thewealth of the South ^ca
have been brought to the point where to die at the hands of the not police is hardly
worse than to survive life in the townships.
The demands for basic
luman rights now being voiced by those
vorkers and their children have never
jeen ideologically acceptable to the white
regime, but while South Africa was af
fluent it could buy the time in which to
manoeuvre its apartheid strategies. It
:ould also buy the allies and suppliers to
support its position. But now the South
African boom is over. The economy is
collapsing, and the Whites can no longer
pretend to themselves or anyone else that
black demands can be defused politically
or met economically.
'South Africa is in serious economic
trouble. Continued economic decline will
mean political and military impotence
followed by national collapse.' (Professor
Tusenius at the National Party Con
ference, September 1976)
Recession
South African production has fallen
sharply throughout 1976, after a real
growth rate of only 2.5% in 1975. On an
annual basis 1976 is showing below nil
growth - i.e. a definite contraction. The
Star has predicted that 1977 will be 'the
worst year since 1945' (16.10.76). Invest
ment in the vital metal and engineering
industries has been slashed by a fifth this
year, while car sales are down 38% on
a year ago. As the motor industry slumps
to its lowest level for 20 years. 4,000
workers have already been laid off, most
of the rest are on short time, a price war
rages, and dealers are going out of busi
ness. Inthe building industry - the third
largest employer of African labour after
mines and the domestic sector — contrac
tors are running out of work, skilled wor
kers are changing to other industries, and
12,750 unskilled and semi-skilled Africans
have lost their jobs this year, bringing the
total of those laid-off to 60,000. The
Building Industries Federation expects
120,000 Africans in the industry to be
jobless by the end of 1976. The Feder
ation also expects 20,000 artisans -
Vhites, Coloureds and Asians - to be
iut of work by the end of 1976, double
the current level. (Rand Daily Mail,
16.10.76) Black unemployment is projec
ted to reach 2m (out of a total workforce
of 8m) by 1977.
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Why is the South African economy in
such dire straits? Partly, the crisis is a
result of the world recession pushing
down demand for the raw materials that
form a crucial part of the country's ex
ports. The economy was cushioned from
the full effects of the recession for a
couple of years by a rise in the price of
gold, increased public sector spending,
and the setting up of a television industry.
'In the euphoria of the early 1970s some
$20 billion worth of capital-hungry pro
jects were inaugurated, including uranium
enrichment, the Sasol II coal gasification
development, the Sishen-Saldhana iron
ore project, and the Richards Bay Harbour
project. It was assumed that the gold price
would go on rising and help pay for such
an ambitious infrastructure program.
(BusinessWeek 15.11.76)
But in 1975 the rapid rise in imports
caused a balance of payments crisis
which forced the government to deflate
the economy just as the world recession
was really hitting export earnings. This
balance of payments problem was greatly
aggravated by the fall in the price of gold
from a peak of $200 an ounce at the end
of 1974 to less than #110 per ounce in
August 1976.
In 1975 imports exceeded exports by a
record Rl ,616m. By March 1976 the
figures were heading for a deficit of
R2,230m for the year. In July the govern
ment imposed a 20% deposit on imports
- the cash to be frozen for six months
with no interest - and put up bank rates.
Despite the severity of these measures the
1976 balance of payments deficit will not
be below Rl ,500m.
Arms Spending
Added to the balance of payments crisis
is the very high level of government
spending. In 1975 the government deficit
reached Rl ,353m, up from R816m the
year before. In the first three months of
the 1976-77 financial year the govern
ment overspent by R700m. The main
reason for the increasing deficit is the
ever expanding military budget.
'Increased defence expenditure was almost
entirely responsible for this higher level
of expenditure' admitted the South
African Reserve Bank in its review for
the financial year 1975-76. Again, in its
quarterly review for September 1976 it
pointed out that 'The further increase
in real government consumption spending
was caused mainly by a further substantial
increase in defence spending'. The expan
sion of the military budget shows no sign
of slowing. The original budget figure for
military expenditure for 1976-77 was
Rl ,350m, 17% of the total budget. That
represents an increase in military spending
of 42% on 1975-76, and is three times
the 1973-74 figure. Even so Defence
Minister P.W. Botha has already said that
it will be a substantial underestimate.
In the first financial quarter of 1976-77
government expenditure rose by R264m.
Of this increase, we would attribute at
least R200rp to 'defence', which would
mean a figure of around Rl ,750m a year
on military expenditure - an 80% in
crease on last year.
Blood Money
Faced with growing deficits the South
African government is raising taxes and
slashing subsidies. It has already borrowed
up to the hilt abroad thanks to the
massive state corporation schemes - capi
tal commitments of Rl 1,573m have been
made by public corporations for the next
five years - and has. had to rely heavily
on borrowing from: the banking sector
within South Africa Internal bank lending
to the government has trebled over the last
two years to R3,000m. The two largest
South African banks, Barclays and Stan
dard, are both British controlled. Between
them they are lending the South African
government almost enough money for its
entire defence budget
The white regime used to claim 'Capital
investment in South Africa yields oneof
the highest returns in the world (The
Banker 1973). Those days are over. The
crisis of profitability now besetting the
country is reflected in the economy s
inability to finance new investment from
its own resources. In 1973,74%ofallnew
investment came from internal funds.
By 1974 this had fallen to 47%, and
in 1975 reached a new low of 30%.
R1.44in£l.
9 1.66 in £1.
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Aman with a matric has the pick of jobs.
For example, a top iileman like Mr. Tom
Mboya, who works for Ellerines, earns
a really big money-and because he works
1 on commission as well as pay, the sky is the
, , ,*• limit so far as money is concerned. But of
—I '£ course, the one thins a reallv eood sales-
No business in Soweto - Barclays Bank burned down on the first day of the
uprising.
Foreign investment capital is drying up
too. 'Because of the Angolan war and
the consequent fears among foreign in
vestors abroad for Southern Africa's
political.stability, all long term capital
markets are effectively closed to them.'
(Sunday Times (S.A.) 23.5.76) The pro
portion of long-term loans has fallen
from 45% in March 1975 to 29% a year
later. 'South Africa's foreign debt is
mounting so fast and becoming so short
term that Finance Minister Horwood is
piling up a refinancing and growing in
terest burden over the next few years of
alarming proportions.' (Sunday Times
1.8.76)
In November 1976 Citibank (USA)
arranged a $110m Eurodollar credit. This
falls far short ofthe $300m that Horwood
was after, and has cost the South African
government more. The Financial Mail
is very clear - 'With each political up
heaval raising loans gets more difficult.
The economic implications of the recent
riots are going to depend chiefly on the
reaction of foreign investors. Without
substantial foreign money - at least
Rl ,000m a year - South Africa cannot
finance its traditional current account
deficits nor achieve the economic growth
rates needed to maintain employment'.
The American magazine Business Week
is even more pessimistic. The South
African economy needs a 6.5% real growth
rate to absorb the 25,000 entrants into
the black labour market each year. The
government's economic policies make it
clear that there is no hope of obtaining
such increases in the foreseeable future.
Unfortunately for the South African
government, foreign bankers are so wor
ried by both the nation's economic and
fiscal woes and the prospect of black
unrest, that they are unlikely to loosen
their purse strings lightly.' (15.11.76)
In August 1976 a standby credit of
RlSlm from the IMF was announced.
But this money has strings attached.
The government deficit has to be cut
and private credit squeezed. Import
deposits are also to be removed in Feb
ruary 1977. These measures can only
tighten the net around the government.
Already the two major white union,
confederations are threatening to quit
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hase three of the South African equiva-
mt of the social contract if prices con-
inue to soar while wages are controlled.
lowever it is the Blacks who are bearing
he brunt of the economic crisis. We
lave already detailed the massive black
inemployment, now growing at 20,000
i month, and losing your job, for a South
\frican Black, means more than losing a
veekly wage. Black workers who lose
heir jobs have seven days before they
ire 'endorsed out' of the urban areas.
faiey have their passbooks stamped to
thow they must leave the area and return
\o the 'rural homeland', where unemploy
ment and starvation await them.
hie Unemployment Insurance Fund -
fthe workers' great bulwark against
oblessness' - is meaningless for the vast
tnajority of Blacks. Those who contribute
:arely receive any benefits - at best a
few rands after weeks of waiting. Many
jmployers do not bother to register their
smployees in the scheme. 'Influx control'
- the official term for dispersing unem
ployed Blacks and reducing their numbers
in the industrial areas - has shown 'an
unusual increase' over the past few
months. (Sunday Tribune 22.8.76)
The regime has also been tightening up its
enforcement of the Physical Planning
Act, which allows no more than 2 or
2V4 Blacks to be employed for every
White in white areas. Penalties for em
ployers of illegal Black workers are to
be increased, the workers themselves to
be prosecuted, and 100,000 jobs are
threatened.
The effects of high and increasing levels
of unemployment before the recent
strikes have been to increase the vulnera
bility of militants at work, who have been
heavily victimised over the last two years.
The result has been that strikes by black
workers showed a marked decrease in the
run up to the confrontations which began
in June 1976. According to the Minister
of Labour, 1.3m man-hours were lost
through black strikes in 1973, 653,000
in 1974, and only 86,000 in the nine
fenonths to September 1975. (The Star
R2.ll.75) .
Flanked by rows of typical concrete houses a long column of Soweto
demonstrators is confronted by a police unit.
sSoweto
I 'Row upon row of tiny little eggbox
houses . . . Most of the roads unmade,
street lighting often lacking, electricity
often absent, many miles from the place
of work, inadequate transport and no
security of tenure.' (Bishop of Johan
nesburg June 1976)
Soweto is one of the more monstrous
creations of the apartheid state. One of
the largest towns in Africa, it consists of
87 square kilometres of single storey
concrete and corrugated iron 'housing
units' - 100,000 of them - close-planted
in symmetrical rows with dirt roads in
between. When it rains the streets, without
storm water drainage, become rivers of
mud. The air is often thick with smog.
Most of the houses have no electricity,
and a large proportion have no running
water either. Poverty is the norm, as is
violent crime, hunger and disease.
Soweto is served by only one hospital -
Baragwanath Hospital just outside the
South East reaches of the township
complex. It was built to serve a commu
nity of 600,000. No-one knows for sure
how many Africans live in Soweto, but
most current estimates are around the
1% million maik. 'We are muse than a
hospital says one doctor. We'ie a creche
for abandoned children, a iiome for
cripples, a surgical factory far patching
up wounds of Soweto violence and
overcrowding.' {The Star 29.S.76)
Despite its rambling size Soweto is
chronically overcrowded. Up until the
mid 1950s there were black townships
on three sides of Johannesburg in the
west, the north and the east. In Sophia-
town in the west, Blacks evea had free
hold property rights. However, after the
Nationalist Party took power in 1948,
the policy of keeping all uriban Blacks
in one area, except for an#e Blacks
living in hostels within wMte areas
was begun. Black freehold rights were
I eroded until all Blacks became 'sojour
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Burnt-out bus in Voslosroos township outside Johannesburg. June 1976. An
every day sight in the townships during the unrest.
ners' in the 87% of South Africa official
ly designated white. Their 'citizenship',
as entered in the passbooks, was con
fined to the 'ethnic homelands'. Soweto
did not get its name - an abbreviation
for South Western Townships - until
1963, when it was first applied to the
26 segregated townships under the con
trol of the Johannesburg City Council.
Poverty is a basic fact of existence for
the people of Soweto, as it is for most
Blacks in South Africa. Yet the high
level of inflation which has accompanied
the country's economic decline over the
last two years has hit the Blacks harder
than any other group. In July 1976 The
Star, in cooperation with the South
African Institute for Race Relations and
a group of workers, drew up a monthly
budget outlining the basic essentials for
a black family of two adults, two child
ren and a toddler. It was assumed that
both parents worked, the children went
to school, the toddler was left in a creche
during the day, and the family lived in a
Soweto house without electricity.
The minimal budget arrived at was R145
\ v.
c
per month. It was based on the barest
food needs. Tobacco, liquor, newspapers
and magazines, and personal toiletries
were not included. Even so, R14S is
higher than the average Soweto family
income. Many families have only a single
wage coming in. A man would be lucky
to clear R120 a month, and a woman -
a large proportion of whom are domes
tics - would be unlikely to exceed R70
a month. In addition, many African
families are supporting more than three
children. Many are also supporting other
relatives who need the money to avoid
starvation.
The result is that the average Soweto
family cannot keep up with price increases
on the most basic necessities of life.
Without electricity they have to buy coal,
firewood, eandles and paraffin, all subject
to recent price rises. As well as paying
extra taxes not paid by Whites (poll taxes
and tribal levies), Blacks have to pay for
their children's schooling while white
schooling is. free. In Soweto it costs about
R102 per year to send two children to
school.
Food prices in Soweto are actually higher
than in white areas, due to the govern
ment policy of allowing only small, single
unit businesses to exist there. Most Blacks
try to do their basic food shopping in
their work areas as a result, but diet is
suffering severely as food expenditure is
cut back in order to meet other unavoid
able living costs. Recently the govern
ment has reduced the subsidy on such
staples of African diet as maize and wheat
flour, as well as transport.
April 1976 price increases included 18%
on maize products and cooking oil, 17%
on coffee, 15% on margarine, and 8% on
milk. On 1 September a new round of
increases was announced, to add 17% to
sugar prices, 15% on wheat (following a
massive 50% bread-flour increase the
previous week), and 16% on tea, as well
as large increases in electricity, petrol,
rail freight and cement prices.
While 'the official annual inflation figure,
as applied to a white-expenditure-based
consumer index, is around 13%, the in
flation figure for Blacks, with their nar
row range of high-increase expenditure,
is several times higher. Garment Worker,
a South African union newspaper, has
estimated an inflation level for Blacks of
almost 100% on an annual basis. (16.7.76)
A recent survey by the South African
Medical Institute in the Western Town
ship, Johannesburg, a Coloured area,
found that a third of the children were
suffering from malnutrition - and this in
an area where per capita income is 50%
higher than- in black areas. (The Star
22.7.76)
Nothing left to lose
The Star's 'Housewife of the Year'
competition this year marvelled at a
white family of four living on R500 per
month. Subsequently, doctors recom
mended additions to the family's diet,
as it was deficient. Shortly before, The
Star lad published a Poverty Datum
Level of R129 per month for a black
family of five living in Soweto. Soweto
is not unique. The death rate among
black infants in Cape Town has nearly
doubled in the last year, largely due to
malnutrition. (Cape Herald 10.8.76)
Out of work, poverty stricken, starving
and overcrowded, the inhabitants of
Soweto and other townships across South
Africa have been brought to explosion
point. There is nothing left to lose. In
Soweto they live in misery in a nightmare
town. Violent crime runs unchecked in
the unlit streets and on the cram-packed
trains and buses which ferry a quarter of
a million black workers in and out of
Johannesburg every day.
In 1974 Soweto had the highest murder
45
rate in the world, and the crime level has
risen since then. The crime figures are
inevitably swelled by the high number of
school drop-outs without job prospects.
Yet despite the high drop-out rate
Soweto's schools are so crowded that
the pupil-teacher ratio at some levels is
60 to 1, with teachers forced to do
double daily shifts in order to cover all
pupils.
Schooling in Soweto is not compulsory.
There is an acute shortage of secondary
land high schools. Teaching standards are
minimal, and there is not a single teacher
training school in the townships.
Job opportunities within Soweto are
practically non-existent, as black indust
rialists have been forced by law to move
to the homelands, and traders' operations
are severely limited. Industrial job oppor
tunities around Soweto are rapidly con
tracting, both because of the recession
ay-offs, and also because new investment
is being geared toward capital intensive
rather than labour intensive production.
On 18 August 1976 Metal Box announced
an investment in the Rand area around
Johannesburg, of R1.6m, which will
allow the company to double its South
African output of tin-plate. This new
nvestment will create just three jobs.
Phis example, though extreme, is not
isolated. 'There has undoubtedly been a
shift from labour-intensive to capital-
intensive investment in recent years', said
the executive director of Assocom (the
South African Chambers of Commerce
organisation) in an interview in the
government backed publication To the
Point, October 1976.
Apartheid at Home
Housing provision is another disaster
area in Soweto. Quite apart from the
miserable size, quality and arrangement
of the units, the townships' 100,000
houses are nowhere near sufficient to deal
I with the size and growth of the popu
lation. With an estimated 15,000 families
■to the waiting list, all fulfilling the rigo-
Hus and discriminatory terms of qualifi-
fcation, there is an increase each year of
2,000 married couples in need of accom
modation. Most of these couples despair
of the years-long waiting list and move in
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with relatives. The same applies to widows,
divorcees, deserted wives and unmarried
mothers, none of whom can obtain — or
retain - official registration.
As a result sub-tenancy is widespread,
with as many as 25 people sharing a two-
bedroom unit. The low level ofnew hous
ing provision fails to make any impression
on the problem. BAABs authorities in such
dilapidated areas as Orlando West ex
perience increasing difficulties in raising
loans for house building, because the
government's priority is towards single-
persons' hostels. These prison-like build
ings, each holding 2,500 inmates, are due
to be doubled in number, from 12 to 24.
As if all this were not enough, the govern
ment has even tried to introduce 'ethnic
grouping' into its housing policy, despite
the fact that a large number of the inhabi
tants of Soweto no longer think of them
selves in tribal groupings, and inter-tribal
marriage is common.
Growing Resentment
With crushing social pressures such as
these it is little wonder that divorce and
separation in Soweto are increasingly
common. The women and children are
the most immediate victims, as in such
cases the wife has to move out of the
family house and does not herself qualify
for independent registration.
The authorities have made no real at
tempt to control Soweto's crime. With
55% of the population under the age of
20, and with nothing to do outside of
weekend football matches (there is one
cinema), the streets belong to the gangs
- or did until June 1976. Public tele
phones are few and far between, and
there are only five police stations in the
26 townships. The gangs on public trans
port have added to the frustration with
bus and train facilities which have made
transport one of the focal points of black
fight-back.
Both buses and trains have a very high
accident rate - a combination of over
crowding and poor servicing of machinery,
tracks and roads. Commuting to and from
Johannesburg involves getting up hours
ahead of time in order to negotiate long
queues at ticket offices and bus stops,
and fighting your way onto the bus or
train when it arrives. Station facilities,
public address systems, bridges, stairs
and toilets are all in a terrible, and often
dangerous state of repair.
The only alternatives to this chaos are
to walk - and many people work 20
kilometres from their homes - or to take
expensive taxis. Many workers are forced
to pay up to R30 per month in taxi fares.
Bus fares have been increasing steadily
over the last two years, firstly as a result
of increased fuel costs, and more recently
as a result of cuts in the government
subsidy.
Putco, the largest bus company, reported
riot damage of R279.938 in the year
that ended on 30 June. Numerous and
militant bus boycotts have been organised,
and the police have made every effort to
smash them. They have stopped taxis
being used as alternative transport to
work, ordering everyone out for pass-
checks and driver's for permit checks.
Road blocks are set up and cars with
black occupants double checked, road-
unworthiness being the easiest charge
to make. If firms provide private trans
port for their workers they are charged
prohibitive license fees.
This climate of continuous harassment
and confrontation with the police can
in some measure be seen as a training
ground for events since 16 June. Pass-
infringement arrests were stepped up.
Of the daily prison population of 99,000,
no less than a third are in jail under the
pass laws. One in every four Blacks is
arrested each year for technical infringe
ments of laws that only apply to Blacks.
In Soweto black arrestees lose their
right to house registration.
Soweto demonstrates all the injustices
suffered by black African township dwel
lers, though similar and sometimes worse
conditions exist in all industrial areas
of South Africa. The name Soweto is
synonymous with apartheid, representing
impermanence, oppression and exploit
ation, with no alternative but starvation
in the homelands. It is fitting that the
uprising which could spell the beginning
of the end for the apartheid regime
should have started there.
ARMING APARTHEEQ
•South Africa is a dynamic military society whose educational systeiynust train
people for war. South Africa devotes millions of rands to the development,
manufacture and purchase of armaments. These armaments are^ assaryand
t Ae country is determined to obtain those it needs.'(Defence Minif ptha, 2.10.76) •-
Prime Minister Vorster gets together with Chancellor Schmidt of the FOR
In the past four years, the South African
regime has quadrupled the number of its
armed forces to 201,900. It has also
organised and trained a Home Guard of
75,000 'Commandos', and set up para
military riot squads within the police
force operating from 18 key cities.
The distinction between police and army
is anyway blurred - their equipment and
training are almost identical, and indeed
the South African troops helping the
Smith regime have always been described
as 'police'. The police number 35,000
with a reserve of 17,500. Because of the
rapid expansion of the armed forces ana
the limit to the number of Whites who
could be recruited, the South African
authorities have been reluctantly forced
to draw on the black population.
As well as the 'official' bodies of armed
men, white militias are actively encour
aged, and the black vigilante groups run
by the Urban Bantu Councils in the town
ships - the Makgotlas - have been given
temporary legal status. The Soweto Mak-
gotla was used in the Zulu "backlash1 in
August.
Civilian Whites are very heavily armed,
with almost half the adult white popu
lation owning a gun. About half of the
| guns now coming in are from Russia and
..Czechoslovakia via Hamburg. Others
Dome from Brazil, France, West Germany,
rItaly, Spain and Finland, via England and
Hong Kong. 'The demand for private
firearms has never been bigger in South
Africa than it is today. For weeks on end
there hasn't been a handgun available in
48
any gun shop in Johannesburg.' (RDM
20.10.76) The 'favourites' are shotguns,
preferably automatic, revolvers and auto
matic rifles. "The little weapon is out,
and the large calibre automatic and the
magnum revolver are in.' (Financial Mail
22.10.76)
Both police and army are supplied with
weapons by Armscor (The Armaments
Development and Production Corpor
ation). South Africa is now self sufficient
in many areas of weaponry through
Armscor, and the arms used by the
police are almost all home produced.
As well as rifles, tear gas, ammunition
and so on, Armscor produces AMX tanks,
Panhard armoured cars, Matra-Thompson
Crotale- surface to air missiles, field
guns, bombs, napalm bombs and air to
surface missiles. Its subsidiary Atlas Air
craft provides much of the South African
Air Force's aircraft and parts, usually
operating under licence from foreign
companies.
Gun Running
In 1963, the United Nations passed its
arms embargo, calling on all states 'to
cease forthwith the sale and shipment
of arms, ammunition of all types and
military vehicles to South Africa' and
'equipment and materials for the manu
facture and maintenance of arms and
ammunition in South Africa.' It left
implementation and interpretation to
its member states, and those with sub
stantial trade relations with South Africa
have interpreted it so loosely as to make
a mockery of it.
Any attempts, overwhelmingly supported
by the UN General Assembly, to make
the embargo mandatory have been
blocked by Britain, France and the USA
using their power of veto.
Some governments have openly ignored
the embargo. In particular France, South
Africa's principal source of military sup
plies, has delivered some $160 million
worth of arms between 1969 and 1973.
Over the same period Italy delivered
$20 million and the UK $15m. Both the
US and Israel have made substantial arms
deliveries too.
Like Britain, the US claims to support the
embargo, but in fact supplies South
Africa with a host of militarily useful
equipment, particularly light aircraft.
Similarly the West German government
claims not to have made any arms sales
to the regime, but is involved in the
supply of the Transall aircraft and other
weapons and ammunition.
Besides these open contraventions of
the embargo, many companies have
found other ways of supplying the tools
of repression to this lucrative market.
Licences are granted, manufacturing sub
sidiaries created, technicians seconded
and consultants supplied. We detail some
examples below, but this is only the tip
of the iceberg.
Many other multinationals indirectly
assist Armscor in its efforts to make tbe
p
regime self sufficient in terms of arms.
An armaments industry as sophisticated
as South Africa's depends on a well
ieveloped industrial base. It needs steel
[British Steel), oil (BP, Mobil), chemicals
(ICI, Shea, Hoechst) and many other
materials and know-how. In this sense
any company investing in South Africa
is conMSsuting to its arms capacity.
Foreign; investment in South Africa is
falling, partly because of the political
impact of the uprising, and also because
of the Smith African economic recession.
But it is small an important and continuing
factor in (enabling the regime to maintain
its arms spending, and protect apartheid
and with, it the profitability of foreign
investment.
Arms to the South African government
not only protect big business, they are,
in themsfeves, big business. Western
governments therefore have a dual role in
aiding thsir sale. Every new investment,
every new loan ties the bonds tighter
between Ae South African state and
Western capitals.
Britain and South Africa—
The Arms Trade
The rasst regime has immense powers
supplied 4o it by the imperialist world.
We know of Landrovers which were used
which are British equipment. We know of
police ©spiipment in South Africa which
comes n&ainly from Britain. The most
sophisticated equipment they have comes
from Britain, France and America, and
this sows a lot of bitterness inside the
people with the realisation that their
struggle Is a long one and against very
powerful enemies.' (Mashinini)
Britain is still South Africa's largest
trading partner and investor. Almost a
quarter of South Africa's exports come
to Britain, and 4 per cent of British
exports me destined for South Africa.
Investment in South Africa accounts fo
some 1© per cent of all British oversea
investment - and, more importantly,
forms ho less than half of all foreign
investment in South Africa. Six out of
the top ten, and 28 out of the top 100
South African companies are either
controlled by British companies or art
substantially owned by British interests.
The two largest banks are British regis
tered, md control over half of all South
African 3jank deposits.
Plessey
On August 9 1976, Defence Minister
Botha opened a factory for the manu
facture of integrated circuits. 'Integrated
circuits form part of all sophisticated
weapons using electronic systems. A local
manufacturer of integrated circuits will
be invaluable from the point of view of
defence strategy' he said.
The money for the factory is coming
from the South African Ministry of
Defence and another government body,
the Council for Industrial Research. But
all the technical expertise has been pro
vided by Plessey, the British electronics
firm. The circuits are being made under
licence from Plessey.
No wonder Botha was so pleased. Ever
since the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, when
the Egyptians destroyed large numbers
of Israeli tanks and aircraft, weapons
carrying their own target-finding systems
have been in the forefront of warfare
strategies.
This new factory will for the first time
enable South Africa to produce such
weapons itself. As Botha pointed out,
the South African electronics industry
could not undertake the manufacture
on its own, owing to the technical com
plexity, and the fact that the sole mar
ket was military.
Racal Electronics
'South African forces had learnt through
the years that they could rely on Racal
for equipment and advice when no-
one else could. Racal has come to our
aid with radio sets and we are very
grateful to them on this account. The
company has also rendered invaluable
service to the South African Defence
Force in a consulting capacity.' (Bier-
man, Commandant General, 9.8.73)
Racal Electronics is hardly one of the
best known British companies. Yet it is
one of the most profitable groups, the
leading world supplier of radio manpacks
and tank radios, and has made vast
profits out of arms. Profits have risen
every year for 20 years, reaching £19m
in 1975, and it has a thriving business
in South Africa.
Well over half of Racal's South African
production goes direct to the armed
services. The most important part of its
South African range are the transmitter/
receivers used in monitoring and sur-
eillance, and in military situations.
News from Zimbabwe shows that Racal
equipment was used in the raid on a
Zimbabwean refugee camp in which at
least 800 people were massacred by
Rhodesian troops. The equipment was in
a Ferret armoured car made in South
Africa under British Licence which was
captured by Mozambique forces and
put on display in Maputo.
Marconi
Marconi is building an £8m 'tropospheric
scatter' system, the backbone of a com
puter controlled military communication
network, for the South African Defence
Department.
This strategic equipment was exported
from Britain to the South African Defence
Department for use in Namibia under
loopholes in the regulations. Details of
the deal came to light when Jock Hall, a
Marconi Electronics engineer who had
been working on civilian applications of
the system, felt unable to work on a mili
tary projecr'for South Africa and exposed
the project.
Marconi have never denied that their
equipment would be used in Namibia
and in 1973 had carried out a 'troposcat
ter' survey in Namibia.
A second Marconi contract for data link
equipment to update the South African
Air Defence system was signed last year,
and despite questions in Parliament the
Labour government has not prevented
the export of this military hardware.
ICI
Most of the teargas used against the Blacks
throughout the uprising is manufactured
by African Explosives and Chemical
Industries Ltd., which operates the two
largest commercial explosive factories
in the world. It is 40 per cent owned by
ICI. In return for an annual fee, African
Explosives also runs two munitions
factories for the regime in the Transvaal;
it built a third munitions plant for th'
government in the Cape in 1971.
African Explosives, besides producing
teargas (at its factory in Modderfontein]
makes nerve gas and chemicals usable a
defoliants. In August, 1976 ICI provided
R.40m for African Explosives to invest
in further capital projects.
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The British Connection
These cases illustrate two of the major
ways in which British companies drive a
massive wedge through the UN arms
embargo - through granting licences
and setting up subsidiaries. The govern
ment, whether Tory or Labour, has done
nothing to stop this profitable trade,
indeed the South African subsidiary of
the government owned British Leyland
is busy expanding its production of Land
Rovers as part of a new investment of
R.17m.
Despite pressure Leyland (South Africa)
has consistently refused to recognise
black unions. The Landrovers it produces
go straight to the police and army.
The British Labour government is further
implicated in supporting the apartheid
regime. The Export Credit Guarantee
Department, a government body, advan
ced R40 million in May to South African
Railways, and in October, together with
the British merchant bank Hill Samuel,
announced a further R118 million at
favourable rates of interest. This year a
record number of government subsidised
trade delegations will visit South Africa.
The government's instrument with which
it pays lip service to the UN arms em
bargo is the Export of Goods (Control)
Order 1970. This prohibits the export of
certain arms without a licence. The effect
of this is minimal. Besides the.fact that
the Order does not inhibit delivery or
sub-licencing built on British design, there
are several other factors:
1. South Africa is granted a 'most fa
voured nation* status, which means
there are several categories of goods
that can be sent to South Africa
without a licence, yet would on the
other hand require one for most of
the NATO states.
2. Whilst the order prohibits the sale of
many basic items, like guns and ammu
nition, which South Africa in any case
produces itself, it allows the sale of a
good deal of sophisticated equipment
of military usefulness. For example,
you cannot export parachutes — but
you can send air-borne radar.
3. The 'policing' of the order by customs
is virtually non-existent. It is common
knowledge that Finnish rifles reach
South Africa via England.
4. When the embargo was introduced the
government allowed all existing con
tracts to continue, including the supply
of spares.
There are hundreds of British companies
that contribute to the South African
regime's armed strength; below we list



























































France has been the main supplier of
modern weaponry to South Africa for
over a decade. The French government
has repeatedly stated that they make a
distinction between weapons used for
external defence ana those for internal
suppression. But equipment supplied by
France such as the Frelon helicopters and
the Transall aircraft have been used inter
nally over the last months, as well as in
Namibia and Zimbabwe.
The main strike force of the South
African Air Force is made up of Mirage
fighter bombers and interceptors. A new
batch of 18 Mirages was delivered in 1974.
From 1977 the Mirage F-l will be licence-
produced within South Africa itself,
greatly increasing the air force's strike
capacity.
The four helicopter squadrons are also
entirely French equipped. Puma heli
copters, of joint Franco-British design
have found their way to Pretoria since
1973, and the French-West German
Transall transport plane has also been
delivered. France paid the German com
panies involved in his project DM66m
for the transaction.
Ground-to-air missiles, which are the
foundation of any modern air defence
system, have been provided by France
through an ingenious arrangement; in
1964 construction of the Cactus ground-
to-air missile system was begun in France
according to South African specifications
and with the participation of South
African scientists. About 85% of the cost
was paid by South Africa. The existence
of the programme was only revealed in
1969 when Botha visited France to view
a test launching of the missile. By 1973
three batteries had been deployed on the
Transvaal border, pointing towards
Mozambique.
According to the French producers France
has retained the sales rights for the missile,
so it cannot be re-exported from South
Africa. But Cactus was included in Botha's
1972 list of possible items to be exported
to friendly countries'. The question of
who owns the sales rights will probably
remain unsettled until South Africa
actually delivers a Cactus system to
another country.
France has signed the notorious Koeberg
nuclear power plant construction contract.
Credit Lyonnais led a consortium that
financed no less than R85O million of the
Rl 000 million project. Besides the nuclear
power plant, recent deals include Saf-
maire's purchase of four French built
container ships worth R240 million and
South African Airway's purchase of four
Airbuses worth R70 million, all heavily
financed by French government export
credits. France is now the fifth largest
supplier to South Africa, and French
investment has doubled to around
R800 million since 1970.
Germany (FDR)
Recent weeks have seen a redoubling
of the. South African effort to build up
the West German connection. In October
Connie Mulder, Minister of Information,
was in Germany and in early November
Owen Horwood, Minister of Finance,
Jan Marais, chairman of the Trust Bank
and a number of others were in Dussel-
dorf to preside at investment conferences
and talks.
In recent years West Germany has
rivalled the UK as South Africa's major
supplier and is the fourth largest market
for South African goods. Investment has
been heavy, particularly in chemicals -
Hoechst and BASF - and cars - Volks
wagen and BMW.
Perhaps the most controversial assistance
given to the regime in terms of military
aid is the supply of compressors for the
uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba in
South Africa. This uses the jet nozzle
system — suitable for military production.
The West German government has always
denied that it is giving military aid to the
apartheid regime, but German companies
have helped build the Advocaat surveil
lance system, 137 heavy duty military
trucks were supplied in 1974, Daimler
Benz has sent UNIMOG military vehicles
to the Army, the military Airbus being
built with France is currently being
delivered and four German designed
and engined patrol boats are being built
in Haifa for the South African Navy.
A company in the Thyssen group has
been building tanks for the South African
Army, and the FDR has also supplied a
complete plant for the construction of
armoured vehicles. All these supplies are
subject to government permission under
the External Trade Act.
Israel
In the spring of 1976 Prime Minister
Vorster visited Israel and was escorted by
the Commander of the Israeli navy round
a guided missile patrol boat built in Haifa.
He also inspected the Israeli made Kgir
fighter bomber and there are reports that
j South Africa is interested in a tank de-
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Valindaba nuclear energy headquarter, Components supplied by Germany here couM 1. used to produce nuclear weapons.
signed especially for desert conditions
and in an anti-tank helicopter that Israel
is developing.
Already, South Africa imports heavy
mortars, some types of small arms and
munitions from Israel, as well as electronic
equipment and communications devices.
The Uzi sub-machine gun designed by
Israel is produced, under sub-licence from
Belgium, within South Africa itself.
Nato
For some years now South Africa has
been granted access to the NATO defence
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equipment coding system, with the UK
US, France, Germany and Holland
providing new computerised material
This has been used in the Advocaat
surveillance system based at Silvermine
in Cape Province, with a substation at
Walvis Bay in Namibia. South African
officers have been trained in the Federal
Republic of Germany to operate tftfi
system.
There is considerable support for t&e
South African regime within the upper
echelons of the Western military machm®.
NATO high command has linked itself as
closely as possible with the South African
military, making riot control, anti-guerrilla
warfare, nuclear and missile technology
readily available.
The South African regime has access to
the entire technology of oppression
through support from those in power
within NATO's governments and military-
economic institutions. Only the political
constraints arising from the regimes
brazen apartheid policies prevents that
support exhibiting itself more openly.
Companies and governments throughout
the world are supplying the white South
African regime with the weapons and
the know-how to murder black freedom
fighters within its borders and beyond. I
Malnutrition exposed on a Slater-Walker farm.
• NATIONALIST IMPASSE
Apartheid is the achievement of the Nationalist Government Today, just as the
policy reaches its fruition with the first granting of 'independence* to a Black
Homeland', the Nationalist Party is facing its severest crisis.
Despite its monolithic appearance, the
Nationalist Party is in fact an alliance of
two groups with very different economic
interests, united by a common cultural
heritage. The 'verkramptes' represent
mainly farming interests, and the
'verligtes' represent industrial interests
with links with international capital.
The interests of the verkramptes lie in
keeping black wages as low as possible,
reflected in the fact that black agricul
tural wages are about one fifth of those in
the industrial sector. The verligtes, on the
■other hand, are more aware of the need
to boost productivity and stabilise the
black workforce by raising wages and
granting concessions over job reservation
and trade union rights. They also see the
black worker as a means of limiting the
power of the white trade unions and
reducing overall costs by upgrading
Blacks into Whites' jobs, while continuing
to pay Blacks at their traditional lower
rates.
The conflict of interests between
verkramptes and verligtes is reflected in
the contradictory policies that the
Nationalist Government tries to follow. It
has, for example, publicly committed
itself a number of times to backing
attempts by employers to reclassify jobs
so that they are no longer reserved for
Whites. Yet at the same time it is
currently trying to enforce a law which
makes it an offence for industrialists in
most areas to employ more than 2 or 2.5
Blacks for every White.
Rigid
Already the contradictions in the Nation
alist Party are becoming quite public. The
concessions on the use of Afrikaans in
schools, and the institution of limited-
lease home ownership in black townships
have led the verkramptes to fear 'the
downfall of the volk'. Thirty-six of them,
led by Jaap Marais and Albert Hertzog,
recently demonstrated on Vorster's lawn
d were arrested. They were freed after
'night in jail, and no prosecutions were
rought.
At the same time there have been several
physical attacks directed at the verligtes
rather than the Blacks. The offices of
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M.C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Education,
who imposed the Afrikaans ruling. He
once led a strike in white schools against
the use of English.
Beeld, a leading Nationalist daily, were
attacked, and Rl50,000 of damage
caused by a secret organisation,modelled
on the war-time fascist group 'Ossewa
Brandwag'. In common with other
Nationalist newspapers, Beeld had been
calling for greater concessions to Blacks.
A recent row between verkrampte
Deputy Minister of the Bantu Administra
tion Department, Dr. Treurnicht, and
Afrikaans newspaper editors escalated
and drew in many other Cabinet
members. The Guardian commented,
These fratricidal clashes in the Nation
alist Party occur only at crisis periods in
the party's history. Usually internal
dissent is kept within the family, but this
time there is so much dissatisfaction in
Afrikaner ranks over Mr Vorster's refusal
to liberalise race policies, following black
unrest, that the row has burst out into
the open'(29.11.76).
In short, the problem facing Vorster is
that to go too far in granting concessions
would both fuel Blacks' demands for
political rights, and also cause a rebellion
among the white trade unionists and
employers who depend on apartheid in
jobs for one of the highest standards of
living in the world.
But the crisis in the Nationalist Party is
only a reflection of the bigger crisis facing
the white regime and the apart
heid ideology. Vorster's predecessor,
Verwoerd, summed up the regime's view
of Blacks. 'There is no place for him in
the European community above the level
of certain forms of labour. What is the
use of teaching a Bantu child mathe
matics when it cannot use it in practice?'
Black resistance to the language issue was
dramatically and rapidly escalated into
total opposition to white rule and apart
heid. The slogans and the attempts to
demonstrate in the centre of the white
towns show that black resistance cannot
\e bought off with petty concessions.
Too wide
Vorster knows that the demands already
being raised in the townships will, if met,
spell the death of apartheid. At the
Nationalist Party's Transvaal Congress in
September 1976 he refused a multiracial
convention on the grounds that it was
designed to bring about one man one
vote, and to destroy all the 'beneficial
measures' that separate development had
brought the country.
The gulf between white and black
consciousness is too wide to bridge. We
have had indications from sources close
to the Cillie Commission that their
'findings' will attribute the unrest to
white agitators outside the townships.
Apartheid, and the high white
standard of living that goes with it, can
only be preserved by crushing the Blocks'
militancy. Black demands can only be
achieved by destroying apartheid.
The future of South Africa lies between
the ability of the security forces to
destroy black resistance in the townships
and trade unions, and the ability of that








Thursday 23 September In Johan
nesburg, the students decided to carry
the protest into the white areas. The
police knew of this, and all morning
they stopped cars and searched trains
coming out of Soweto.
Eugene Vilikazi was one of the
thousands of workers travelling into
Johannesburg that morning. He later
made a sworn statement before a
commissioner of oaths.
The train was not running normally.
It kept stopping ... We decided to
hitchhike along the highway to
Mlamlankuzi ... On our way we saw
police in camouflage uniforms coming
towards us. We heard the sound of
bullets coming towards us. I neither saw
nor heard loudspeakers warning us to




"We were caught in the situation. We
could not jnove forwards or backwards.
The students stampeded off the road.
Some women fell. I tried to assist them.
The police stopped coming towards us
in their vehicles, but they still kept
shooting.
'I started running away. The bullets
seemed to be concentrating on me. I then
realised that a student I had met on the
train was running with me. He was just in
front of me. Almost immediately he fell.
I went to him and saw that he had been
shot through the back of the neck.
The police had crossed the highway. I
started running again. I was exhausted.
They shot me in the leg. I fell into a river.
I lay near a big rock. A bullet hit the
rock. They came towards me. I lay quite





Klaar'. (They are finished). They went
away.'
The Net
Vilikazi managed to struggle back onto a
stationary train. But his troubles were not
over. At New Canada station 'police
boarded the train. They were looking for
students. Some were arrested. The adults
sat around me and gave me a newspaper.
I pretended to read the paper and the
police passed me by.'
Despite all these police precautions, some
1500 students managed to slip through
their net and reach the centre of Johan
nesburg. In Jeppe and Hoff streets they
unfurled their banners and chanted
Kruger, release detainees'. Withinminutes
four police vehicles screeched to a halt,
and launched a baton charge.
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The march turned into a running battle
between black demonstrators and police
aided by gangs of white students. Win
dows were smashed and older people who
could not get out of the way in time were
trampled.
In Mzimhlope and Pholomong, unin
hibited by the presence of Whites, the
police used their guns at will. In the
centre of Johannesburg, only batons were
used. Four hundred Blacks were arrested
according to the police - unofficial
sources put the figure much higher. After
they dispersed the crowd the police swept
through the city picking up as many
Blacks between the ages of 14 and 25 as
they could.
At that very moment Mr Heunis was out
lining his view of the problem to the
Nationalist Party Conference in Port
Elizabeth. Unemployment was the culprit,
he argued and went on to say 'there could
not be talk of constitutional or evolu
tionary development in group relations
unless there was economic progress (Star
23.10.76)
That day the police sealed off Alexandra
again, searching cars, arresting people
and refusing entry to journalists. Heavy
gunfire was reported from the township,
both that day and the following two.
School Massacre
One police car drove to Mara Higher
Primary school. The police emerged
with their guns at the ready. Seeing this,
the pupils, who were inside working
quietly, panicked and fled towards the
sports field. The police opened fire.
The school fence was trampled flat by
the frantic school children, and the
police drove straight over the fence in
pursuit. They shot one child on the
other side of the road from the school
by a shop, and when other children tried
to move his body, they opened fire
again wounding many more.
"The police parked their car next to the
stores, got out and looked at the corpse
before buyingsoft drinks.' (RDM 1.10.76)
One policeman, not satisfied with this,
went 'patrolling' on foot. This involved
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shooting several more students with his
rifle, and wounding a 17 year old orphan
standing in his back yard, who was not
even at the school.
An ambulance collected some of the
wounded, but many others refused to go
in it, fearing further police victimisation.
Friday 24 September 'At present
the police have only used a soft hand
in dealing with the rioters' announces
Connie Mulder, Minister of Information.
Late September and early October saw a
comparative lull in the struggle, but in
creased police reprisals and detentions.
Yet another layer of young Blacks iden
tified as leaders of the consciousness
movements were arrested, as well as
black trade unionists and black jour
nalists.
Drinks Ban
Most of the activity of the young Blacks
in the townships was in the campaign
against the 'shebeens' and beer halls.
The beerhalls are owned and run by the
white Bantu Affairs Administration.
They provide a major source of its in
come, and a major drain on black wages.
The shebeens are illegal beerhalls, toler
ated by the police who get substantial
rake-offs from them.
'There are more beer halls than schools
and you find these beer halls are situated
right in the terminals of the buses,
stations and offices where you pay rent.
So when your father comes home from
work, he either goes to the beerhall or
pays rent and when he goes home he is
left with only 5 Rand . . . These beer
halls are what is breaking them down
and lowering the dignity of black
people.' (Barney)
At the end of September a slogan cam
paign began — using both persuasion and
threats. 'Less liquor, more education!*,
'Away with boozers', 'No more liquor
till next year, Please we need sympathy',
were some of the many wall slogans. On
October 11, the liquor ban began. Shebeen
keepers were asked and warned to close
down. In one case a shebeen's entire
stock was emptied into the streets,
while in another students agreed to
postpone the ban for a week.
The approach to the hostel dwellers
was a particular problem. *We were
closing the shebeens on the first day
among the residents, as distinct from
the hostel dwellers. We needed a dif
ferent approach for the hostels', recor
ded one student.
Plot Misfires
The police were once again trying to
stir up trouble with the hostel dwellers.
'There have been rumours of a back
lash although there is no such thing
said a group of Guguletu students.
'"On Tuesday we went to Nyango East
where the hostels are"-. The students
allege that the hostel dwellers were
told by the police to arm themselves
because they were going to be attacked
by the students.
"As we were passing from Guguletu to
Nyanga East we came across a barricade.
The people were armed with kieries and
so forth. There were two camps. Our
force and their force. There was a police
car behind their lines.
"One of our students stepped forward
and brushed his hands to show that he
was unarmed. He wanted one of the
hostel dwellers to come and speak. At
that point a teargas canister was fired at
the student and the police charged us
(Muslim News 22.10.76)
Besides attempting to create another
backlash, an attempt which failed this
time, police were busy attacking the anti-
shebeen squads, i noticed a half lame
boy leaving the NY3 Shopping Centre.
Just then a riot truck arrived. The kids in
front of the shop scattered with a
coloured policeman on their heels. Jm
lame boy was left standing dumbfounded.
"The coloured policeman with the green
jersey over his uniform attacked the
boy. The other riot policemen arrived anfl
attacked the boy as well. He was attackea
as he tried to free himself. When he tnea
to cross the road the police beat him up
with their batons on the body, head ana















Below: A mourner in shot dead at
Mashabane's funeral.
When the watching women protested the
police answered 'Are we supposed to
smell that he is a cripple' and later beat
one of the women up. The crippled boy's
right eye was closed, his right arm swol
len, and he can no longer sleep at night.
Confident
The anti-liquor campaign was over
whelmingly successful. The police failed
to use hostel workers to aggravate tribal
divisions in the townships. It marked a
significant change in the political situ
ation, so that a group of Guguletu stu
dents could say 'We have gained the con
fidence of most of the community.
People have realised what we are trying
to achieve.'
A regular drinker said 'What the kids
are doing is right. They had to force a
ban on shebeens because we lacked the
iwill power to do so.' The significance of
the students' ability to initiate and carry
through such a campaign was not lost.
'Our children have suddenly become poli
ticised', said one Cape Town father.
"They feel the political stand their
parents take is insincere. As parents we
have achieved nothing. We have failed
politically.' (Weekend Argus 16.10.76)
In the Cape, seven out of the eight bottle
stores were burnt down, and the other
closed down. In Soweto prohibition was
total.
The very success of the shebeen actions
contributed to the police decision to
escalate the violence once more - to
57
prove who really controlled the town
ships.
Sunday 17 October Police were
unable to control a furious crowd of
nearly 700 Blacks in Soweto after a mass
funeral for a schoolboy. Sixteen year old
Dumisani Mbatha had been missing from
home since September 16, the day of the
march in central Johannesburg. He had
'become ill' in jail - and died in police
custody. At least seven other people
are known to have died in police hands
- many many more are still missing.
Several thousands attended Mbatha's
funeral. The City Engineer's Department
was stoned, and 27 vehicles burnt,
Saturday 23 October -The police
were taking no chances. As the cortege
at the funeral of Annan Mkhwanazi left
the house, police attacked. They at
tacked the mourners with rifle butts -
and fired indiscriminately on them as
they fled. At least one person died with
a police bullet in his back, ten were
wounded and over 100 arrested. Chasing
mourners, police entered houses and
smashed their contents, making arrests
with maximum violence.
Sunday 24 October The funeral of
Jacob Mashabane, who allegedly hanged
himself whilst in police custody, was
scheduled to take place at mid-afternoon
at Doornkop on the outskirts of Soweto.
Well in advance the police cars had taken
up positions in the cemetery, armed
with shotguns and sub machine guns. As
the crowd of four or five thousand
mourners entered the cemetery, the
police opened fire.
'Scores of screaming people managed
to scurry through the fence and run for
safety in the veld, while others battled
through a swamp just outside the ceme
tery' reported an eye witness. The result
of this unprovoked attack on the grave
side crowd was six deaths, and well over
over SO seriously wounded.
^'General Kriel said that through their
trompt action yesterday, they had been
'able to prevent a recurrence of the
damage caused last Sunday.' (Natal
Mercury 25.10.76)
unrest reported that weekend. They
ranged from Soweto, where police
opened fire at two funerals, to Alexandra
township where buses were stoned, and
to the eastern Transvaal. .
Mass Arrests
In late October and early November the
police stepped up the detentions. The
townships were sealed off and raided by
hundreds of police. They moved from
house to house in an attempt, residents
believe, to crush the Soweto Students
Representative Council.
At Morris Isaacson high school 60 child
ren and 12 teachers were arrested and
taken away in police vans. There were
numerous cases of children being arbit
rarily picked up on the streets. 'One
I father said that as he stood in his garden
I watching his eleven year old daughter
and eight year old niece at the gate, two
policemen in camouflage outfits scooped
them up and took them away in a van.
They were released the next day.' (Sunday
Times 14.11.76)
Major General Kriel, the police officer in
charge of 'riot control' denied that child
ren were picked up without explanation
and said that the arrests must have been
connected with arson.
As a result of the police action hundreds
of children fled from their homes, going
to friends and relatives, moving from
| house to house each day, and being sent
by worried parents to the rural areas.
By the end of the first week in November
Soweto's 250 black schools were virtually
empty. Many students also sought refuge
in neighbouring countries. A Botswana
government spokesman confirmed that
since June more than 500 children had
crossed the border, and over'150 were
known to have fled to Swaziland.
Monday 1 November The Soweto
Student Representative Council called
a five day stay-at-home, but this time it
did not succeed. Both Railways and buses
reported normal services, and although
the atmosphere was tense no incidents
were reported.
This funeral was one of six incidents of The strike, called in sympathy with those
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in detention was ignored by the vast
majority of workers. They agreed with
the students' demands, but in conditions
of starvation wages and chronic unem
ployment, the failure of the black con
sciousness movement to connect with
the black trade unions meant that the
breakdown of this tactic was inevitable.
The fact that the better organised black
workers, in the mines and in Natal,
have not yet responded to the uprisings
in the townships is also indicative of
the gap between the young blacks and
the trade unions.
Monday 8 November Figures com
piled by the South African Institute of
Race Relations show that 1,281 Blacks
have been found guilty at trials arising
out of the uprising. Of these 926 were
under 18 years old. They were found
guilty of public violence, riotous as
sembly, incitement, theft, housebreak-
ing and arson.
Of those under 18,528 were sentenced to
receive between four and eight cuts with
a cane. One hundred and thirty nine
adults were also sentenced to caning.
Typically, an eight year old child was
sentenced to five cuts of the cane for
'attending an illegal gathering'.
At least another 2,915 Blacks are still
awaiting trial. Those detained on 31
October included 25 office bearers of
black consciousness organisations, 42
school children, 61 university students,
16 clergymen, 19 community pro
gramme workers, 21 teachers and lec
turers and 13 juveniles.
The Christian Institute of South Africa,
in its banned publication South Africa
- a 'Police State? claims that well over
2,600 people had been arrested between
16 June and 20 September.
'Swoop upon swoop was made, and
among many others Mr Kenneth Rachidi
was detained. He is the National President
of the Black People's Convention (BPC)
which is seen to be the political umbreM
of the Black Consciousness Movement
with more than 70 affiliated grouping*
ranging from scholar and student organ-
isations to church and cultural move- j
ments. His arrest was followed by those j
of the remaining national leadership oi j
BPC...
Beer hall owner (left) survey's his wrecked premises. The Government owned liquor
business has been driven out of Soweto.
DEATH IN SOUTH AFWCA
Throughout the period covered by this
report there woe official admissions
of 386 killed and 1500 injured as a
result of police action. In nearly every
incident it was quite clear to us that
the official figure was a deliberate
underestimate. In one night in Cape
Town, for instance, doctors and staff
at just two hospitals reported 70
deaths, while the official police figure
for the whole city was nine deaths.
The information used by CIS in the
compilation of this report contains
details of 456 deaths and 2,160 injured
by police action. A Rand Daily Mail
listing of named dead at the end of
December 1976 gave a total of 499.
The true figure will never be known.
Police officials say that the death toll
is a matter of 'national security'. The
fact is that thousands of Blacks are
missing, and many have been given
paupers' burials in unmarked graves.
All our informants are convinced that
well over a thousand have been killed
by the security forces.
There is another side to the official
statistics. Evidence given to the Cillie
Commission by the senior state
pathologist revealed that well over half
of those shot by police around Johan
nesburg had been shot in the back.
The formidable list of organisations
and groupings which have had their leader
ship clapped into prison range from
BPC, the South African Students Organ
isation (SASO), the South African
Students Movement (SASM), the Black
Community Programme (BCM), the
Black Women's Federation, the Soweto
based* Black Parents Association, Black
church organisations, to individual black
students.'
Charges Changed
The Institute points out that many
charges of public violence and arson are
being changed to charges under the
Sabotage Act of 1962, which carries a
minimum sentence of five years. Members
of the Institute have now been detained.
The third and fourth weeks of November
were relatively quiet, though police
searches for pupils continued in the
townships. There were reports that the
police were making checks using school
registers. The exodus of fleeing pupils
continued, and the South African police
blocked the roads on the Swaziland
and Lesotho borders, arresting many
of those attempting to flee the country.
Monday 29 November In the Cape
Town townships of Nyanga and Guguletu
students mounted a new offensive against
shebeens and informers, and also attemp
ted to persuade contract workers living
in hostels to join a strike due to start on
6 December. Fighting broke out between
the contract workers and the students,
giving the police an opportunity to
cordon off the townships and conduct
a house to house search for 'ringleaders'.
Three hundred Africans were arrested.
Weekend December 4/5 The fight
ing between contract workers and demon
strators continued over the weekend.
Two youths were killed and several
houses burned down. Riot squads rushed
in, firing on the crowds. At least five
! Africans were shot dead and 14 wounded.
| Dozens more were arrested.
Tuesday 7 December On this
day official attempts were being made
in Cape Town to end the four month
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school boycott by 30,000 pupils in the
city's three African townships. "The boy
cott resulted in almost total absenteeism
by high school pupils at the end-of-year
examinations, not only in Cape Town but
also in Johannesburg.' (Guardian 9.12.76)
The Director of Bantu education for the
Cape Province was offering a special six
week intensive course, with exams in
February, to enable pupils to catch up.
Young black militants, however, were
saying that there would be no return to
school until the Bantu education system
was abolished.
'The aim of Bantu education has been to
arrest the Westernisation of the Africans,
and withhold from them, particularly in
white areas, positions or opportunities
beyond the level of certain forms of
menial labour.' (ibid)
Struggle Continues
December has seen the continuance of
the government and police tactics against
students, journalists and trade unionists.
Since June at least 30 journalists have
been silenced in South Africa by in
definite detention orders, and the authori
ties are now directing their attention at
editors. The editor of the Daily Dispatch
has been prosecuted, and the editor of
The World interrogated.
'Surprisingly although school children in
Soweto and Cape Town's black locations
have successfully organised several two-
or three-day stay-aways from work, the
country's factories themselves have re
mained quiet. The one or two industrial
disputes were not related to the Soweto
upheavals.
'So it is all the more astonishing — and
ominous — that the Government should
have started to suppress the black labour
movement. In the past few weeks it has
banned 27 trade unionists and members
of the university wages commissions.'
(Financial Times 8.12.76)
Kruger claimed that none of the 27
were banned for their trade union work.
but sceptical observers saw this as an
attempt to mollify the international
trade union movement, in view of the
threat by the International Confeder
ation of Free Trade Unions to organise
a blacklisting of South African transport
and goods in January 1977. Meanwhile
the bannings have hit the Metal and
Allied Workers Union particularly hard,
with its three top officials taken out of
operation. This union has been fighting
for union recognition in Leyland South
Africa, a subsidiary of British Leyland,
for the last three years. 'All its efforts
have met blunt refusal' (Financial Times
8.12.76).
Whereas the silencing of individual trade
unionists and journalists is a relatively
simple matter for the security forces, the
students present a different problem
altogether. They are numerous, fearless,
and their political awareness, mirrored by
their organisational ability and the level
of their demands, grows daily. Although
hundreds have been killed, and thousands
wounded and arrested, their voice has not
been suppressed. The struggle continues.
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gister 1. South Africa: major arms imports, 19S0-7S
e first United Nations resolution calling for an arms embargo





1952-54 50 HS Vampire FB.5
fighter
27 HS Vampire T.SS
trainer
(1955) (5) Auster A.O.P. mono
plane
(1955) 9 HS 104 Devon C Mk 1
light transport
(195S) 2 HS 114 Heron transport
1957 8 HS Avro 696 Shackleton
Mk 3 maritime recce /
bomber
(1959) 1 Vickers Viscount 781
transport
1962 6 BAC Canberra B(I)
Mk 12 bomber
1964 6 Westland Wasp HAS Mk
Mk 1 ASW helicopter
1965 3 BAC Canberra T Mk 4
trainer
1965 16 HS Buccaneer S. Mk 50
strike/bomber
1966 4 Westland Wasp HAS
Mk 1 ASW, helicopter
1969 4 HS 125 "Mercurius"
transport
1971 3 HS 125 "Mercurius"
transport
1973-74 6 Westland Wasp HAS




















service in 1974 as
trainers
Not in service in
1974
Not in service in
1974
Not in service in
1974




All in service 1974






5 lost before 1971 of
10 supplied
3 lost in accident
1970
Replacement for 3
lost: 4 in service in
1974
Order 1971: delivery
of 7th Wasp stopped
by Labour Govern
ment 1974 total of
11 Wasps in service
1974
20 in service in 1974
100 sold to Switzer
land 1960-61
All in service 1974
50 in service 1974
















Seaward defence ship, Displ: 120t: ex-Uk
"Ford**-class: "Nautilus"
Escort minesweeper, Displ: 2 160t: new:
armed with Bofon
AA-guns
Coastal minesweeper "Tom" class












Displ: 2 144t: laun
ched 1960-6 lr re
fitted 1969 and 1971

































































1972: carries 1 c
feslicopter
6 in service in 1974
Arms: Matra R. 530
AAM;all in service
1974
62 in service in 1974
Arms: AS 20/30 ASM;
all in service in 1974
All in service 1974
830m: 1S in service
1974
All in service 1974Dassault Mirage III-B
trainer. 2 seater version
of 111-A pre-series aircraft
Aerospatiale Alouette 62 in service 1974
III helicopter
















62 in service 1974
§27m: all in service
1974
Replacement
All in service 1974
Dassault Mirage FI-A
ground-attack fighter
Matra R. 530 AAM






















first of 1971 licence
prod, agreement for






nents to be built by
Atlas: first Atlas-
produced FT to be
completed in 1977
S4m: to aim Mirage
MI-C
To arm Mirage HIE










financed to 85% by
South Africa
To arm Mirage FI
Ordered early 1974.
South Africa one of
the first customers
To arm Super Frelon
helicopters: ordered
1974
Prior to licence pro
duction














































Displ: 1 200t: u.c.
530.7m: order 1975
Lockheed P-2V Neptune Not in service 1974
maritime recce/bomber
Sikorsky S-51 helicopter Not in service 1974
Mil. version of DC-3:
all in service 1974
Sikonky S-S5 helicopter Not in service 1974
Sikorsky S-55 helicopter Not in service 1974
Assigned to Army
and Citizen Force:
to be replaced by
AM.3Cfrom 1975







Cessna 320 Skynight Not in service 1974
multi-purpose monoplane
12 Cessna 185 Skywagon
multi-purpose mono
plane





to be replaced by
AM.3Cfrom 1975
Mil. version of DC-4:
all in service 1974
USA decided to sell
in 1974. ace. to Rand
Dotty Mail 17 Sep
tember 1974
200 AIM-9 Sidewinder AAM To arm Sabre fight



















9 Piaggio P. 166S
"Albatross" search and
surveillance version of
P. 166 light transport
50 Atlas "Impala I" (M.B.
326K) light-strike
version of M.B. 326
All in service 1974
Unconfirmed








by UK before 1950:
all in service 1974
All in service 1974




parts, rest as partly-
finished components






































Atlas "Kudu" (AL.60C5) Licence production
light-utility transport
Atlas "Bosbpk" (Aeri- Licence production :
being supplied in com
ponent form for
talU AM. 3C) general
purpose monoplane




May order: first pro
duction model flew
in 1974 and was in
spected by a South
African team
Canadair CL-13B Sabre 36 delivered in 1956:
' Mk 6 (USA/Can) fighter- no information on
interceptor deployment in 1974:
unconfirmed report
of replacement by
36 new Mirage Ills
in 1973
Dornier Do 27B general- Not in service 1974
purpose monoplane
















717 Tigercat SAM system
Armoured Vehicle
1974 14




Displ: 1 25Ot: or
dered 1970: known
as Project "Taurus":
to be built in Portu
gal on FRG licence:
missile-equipped:
may have been can
celled after April
1974 change of re
gime in Portugal
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QUESTIONNAIRE: RE-ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS AMD RESOURCES FOR SOUTH AFRICAN REFUGEES
IN TANZANIA AND BOTSWANA
PROPOSED HYPOTHESIS
This questionnaire is to center around the needs of South African refugees in
Tanzania or Botswana. The project is aimed at offering social welfare services
to South African refugees in Tanzania or Botswana because they do not have easy
access in utilizing the services of their various host countries, namely
Tanzania, Botswana and Zambia. The target population is the South African
refugee.
IDENTIFICATION OF CONCEPTS TO BE MEASURED
1. Personal Data: Age, Sex, Marital Status, Children, Income, Environmental
Background.
2. Reasons for migrating.
3. Choice of relocation sites.
4. Reception indices (Government and Community)
'5. Assistance needed.
6. Assistance received.
7. Present state of condition.
8. Program recommendation.
9. What skills did you have upon arrival in host country.
10. How was these skills utilized.
PROCEDURE
1. Oral, i.e., the researcher will conduct oral interviews.




13. If there was an organization that could have utilized your
skills would you have stayed in the host country?
.. ■&? No N> '
b. Yes
c. Other
14, How many countries have you resided in since your departure




ADDRESSING AND ASSESSING SOCIAL AND WELFARE NEEDS
15. What types of shelter were provided for you in the host.country?
a. Rooms '■■:' : - '
b. Houses
c. Hotel accomodations
■16. What type of assistance did you initially seek for when you








18. How did you go about attaining help?
a. Government agencies
b. International agencies
c. Other (Specify) !





20. How were they made available?
a. Direct
b. , Indirect , . , • . ■
c. Other (Specify) ' •-' ' '
i
